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Summary 
!he c h n:-acteristics of African revolution are inves tigated in 
tr is l hes is, which is ma~e up of five parts . The me t nod used is 
cu~p~r1~i ve and descriptive in nature. 
In t he ~irst part problems regarding the definition of 
revoluti , n ~re ex~mined. It is found that revolutions are 
characterised by [a] mass participation and [b] the 
transformation of lhe political and socio-economic orders . Thus , 
five revolutions -- in Algeria , Angola , Mozambique , Guinea-
Bissau and Zimbabwe -- are identified; they are studied here . 
In the second part of the thesis the political and ~oc io-
economic orders prior to the revolutions are studied . It is 
found thal in all the areas little or n o political 
representation of the local population ; repre s sion by the 
rulers ; and poor livi~g conditions existed . 
The manner in which the movements grew is examined in part 
three . Four ele~ents are central· good leadership ; an ideology 
that united the population ; followers from more than one class 
or group; and a good organis a tion. 
Armed conflict between the ru ler and the challenger is examined 
in part f our . Important aspec ~s are the way in which the war was 
waged ; ex t ernal support for both parties ; and the manner in 
which power was transferred to th~ r evolutionary movement . 
In the final part the transformation ~f the political and 
socio-economic orders by the revolutionary movements are 
analysed. 
Opsomml 119 
Die cienskappe van revolusie i n Afrik a i s i n hie r die tes i s , wat 
u;t ~yf de l e besta•n , ondersoek . Die metode wat gebruik is , is 
l:- c31 ... yw~nd en vergelykend van aa r d . 
In Jie eer ste deel ls daar duldelikheld ~e : k ry oor die 
ci ~f~ l ~. £ v a n r evolusie . Daar is bevl nd dat revolusies geken~ ~L,t 
wor r d !.l~ [a) massa-de6lname en [ b) die transfor ma sie van die 
pol i t i~ ~ ~~ s osio-ekonomiese ordes. Daardeur ls vyf revolusies 
-- die i r ~lgPrl e , Angola , Mosamciek , Guinee-Bissau en Zimbabwe 
- - geid enl!i i see r; dit is hlerdie revolusies wat hier ontleed 
word. 
Die twee de dee~ :~n die • esis ls afgestaan aan ' n beskry~i~g 
van die p o li t ieke er. ~oslo-ekonomiese ordes voor die revol~ ~i 
Daar is gevind ~ut l 1l al die gebiede was daar geen of weinig 
polltieke verteenwo~td!~i ng vir die plaaslike bevolklng ; 
verdru kking deur die rege ~rders; en swak lewenstoestande . 
Die wyse waarop die bewegings gegroei het, ls in deel drie 
beskryf. Vier elemente is sentraal : goele leierskap; 'n 
ideologie wat mense saamgeblnd het; volgellnge ult meer as een 
klas of groep ; en ' n goeie organisatoriese struktuur . 
Gewapende konflik tussen die regeerder en die uitdager is in 
deel vier ontleed. Belangrlke aspekte is die wyse waarop c i e 
oorlog gevoer is; buitelandse steun aan die strydende partye; en 
die manier waarop die mag aan die bewegings oorgedra is. 
In die laaste gedeelte is die bewegings se transformasie van 
die politieke en sosio-ekonomiese ordes ondersoek . 
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The aim of this study is to identify the characteristics of 
contemporary revolutions in Africa. This will be done by 
analysing revolutions in various African cocntries, and 
comparing the results of this analysis to ident~fy 
characteristics of revolution. 
It is, therefore, imperative that the approach used i n the 
study allows for the comparison of similar phenomena. The 
first part of the thesis is made up of two chapters. 
In ChapteL One, the history of the concept "revolution" is 
traced, and violent collective acti~n in general is looked at. 
Concepts rela~ed to revolut ~on, for example, civil wars, coups 
d'etats, revolts, a~e analysed, to distinguish them from 
revolutions, with which they ~re often confused, and t o assist 
in the construction of an analytical model of violen~ 
collective action. 
In Chapter Two, a working definition of revolution is 
proposed. Well-known def i nitions of revoluti~n are reviewed t o 
identify pitfalls which should be avoided in the construction 
)fa definition . 
~hese pitfalls include definitions which are too broad in 
scope, and therefore include phenomena which are not 
revolutions. Another pitfall is excessive ideological bias. By 
applying the lessons learnt from the analysis of de:initions 
of revolution, it is possible to construct a working 
definition which will be a precise tool for identifying 
revolutions in this study. 
The definition has two major criteria to disti~guish betwee .. 
revolutions and related concepts: the extent to which society 
is transformed, and the fact that this fundamental 
transformation is the result of the actions of a mass-based 
movement. 
In the final section of Chapter Two, contemporary revolutions 
in Africa will be identified by using the working definition 
and analytical wodel, which was constructed in Chapter One. 
These revolutjons will form the study area in an attempt to 
identify the char~cteristics of revolution. 
The method used i•1 this study is rooted in qualitative 
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instability analysis. It is a study based primarily on 
description1 . The reason why this approach was chosen nbove a 
quantitative approach is primarily because statistics are hard 
to come by during a revolution, or may be biased in favour ~f 
the challenger or incumbent. 
A qualitative approach nllows the student to employ the vas t 
amount of descriptive literature on tlie African revolutions in 
analysing the sharea characteristics of these proces~Ps. 
The approach in this study is thematic . A characteristic of 
contemporary African revolutions is identified and described 
in each or the chapters . Characteristics which form a logical 
unit (although all characteristics are interrelated, some are 
more than others) are grouped together in broader themntic 
streams. 
The reason for the thematic approach is the ineffic~ency and 
sterility of an approach using rigid phases of revulution. r·o 
only does this view rob revolution of one of its central 
characteristics -- the fact that it i3 a complex process, 
filled with interrelated ev~nts -- but it is also conceptually 
weak. 
It is pointed out in this study that, to utilise the phases 
of the French or Russian Revolution in the African context, 
results in a sterile analysis. They are dif~erent types of 
revolution. In somP. revolutions, the capital c·ty fell af Pr 
the old government broke do~n. From there the revolution 
spread to the countryside. In other revolutions, on the other 
hand, the capital fell only after a long struggle in the 
countryside. 
The capital was encircled by revolutionary villages in a 
process which usually took years. The thorough research of 
"western" revolutions, for example, by C1ane Brinton2, 
provides useful insight, but th~ phases identified in these 
works are frequently not appropriate for the study of African 
revolut~ons. 
The phases identified for "eastern" revolutions by writers 
such as McCuen3 leave much to be desirad as well. 
By identifying only organisation, terror, guer1illa warfare 
and conventional war as the stages of revolution, he fails to 
appreciate the wider picture of revolution. In order for a 
revolutionary movement to take root, unfavourable political 
and socio-economic conditions must exist and the regime's 
legitimacy will be low and living conditions poor. A group of 
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revolutionaries will fail if they simply start to organise a 
population which is not discontented -- witness Che Guevara in 
Bolivia4 . 
Furthermore, McCuen's argument that terror precedes guerrilla 
warfares is not borne out by events in African revolutions. 
Finally, a revolution does not end after "conventional war" 
the very important transformation of ~ociety usually starts 
after the fall of the old regime . 
Notwithstanding the thematic approach of this study, 
attention is paid to stages of revolut i on. 
For example, the stages identif i ed by the supporters of the 
tw0-phase approach to revolution (national liberation followed 
by the transformation of society) are included. A primary 
stage often ignored by theorists the structural conditions 
prior to the war of independence is fu~thermore identified. 
The political ai J economic order of the old regimes are 
analysed in Part Two to determine why revolutiona1y activity 
occurs. (It frequently occurred that place names were changed 
at some or stage of the revolutionary process in the African 
countries. Names applicable to a certain phase will be used: 
for example, Lourenco Marques will be used when Portuguese 
rule i3 analysed, and Maputo when the i ndependent Mozambique 
ls discussed. The sa~e holds true for Cabora/Cahora Bassa.) 
The presence of grievances is, however, not enough to ensur~ 
a revolution. The local population should actively challenge 
the rule of ti1e incumbents. In Part Three the mobilisation of 
people arou~d the re~ olutionary ideals is investigated . 
No contemporary revolution can be successful without 
competent leadership. Different aspects of leadership, and 
characteristics of the leaders in particular, are looked at in 
Chapter Five. 
The revolutionary leader~ are the persons who supply the 
ideology of the r~volutionary movements . Ideology plays a 
major role in the mobilisation of followers, because it points 
to a brighter future. It is analysed in Chapter Six. 
A third aspect of mobilisation deals directly ~ith the people 
who are mobilised . Who were the revolutionary followers in 
Af1ica, why did they join the movements, and how much support 
is needed for a movement to be successful? These are some of 
the quest i ons to which answers are sought in Chapter Seven. 
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In Chapter Eight the final aspect of raobilisation in African 
revolutions is analysed. How were the movements organised? For 
Samuel Huntington, there can be no doubt about the importance 
of organisdtion: "Organisation is the road to political 
power .. . In the modernizing world he controls the future who 
organizes it~ politics " 6. IL is shown in Chapter Eight that 
all the African revolutionary h~vements studied here had a 
definite structure, which was the result of the establishment 
of a chain of command. This chain of command provided a 
framework of organisational discipline . 
However, organisation can lead to autocratic tendencies 
within a movement . African revolutions were no exception, and 
it is shown that different wings competed for control of the 
movement , while the leaders usually did not tolerate dissent. 
The nature of the conflict between the revolutionary 
movements and the incumbents, investigated in Chapter Nine, 
can be described as military-political, because it has two 
aims: to take on the government forces in (guerrilla) combat 
and to gain the support of the population and the 
international community. 
The most important aspect in this chapter is the strategy 
followed by the movements: why did they opt for a drawn-out 
guerrilla $truggle, and why did the movements resort to terror 
tac tics against the people whose cause they were fighcing for? 
In Chapter Ten, ti1e ba ttle for international support is 
looked at. To reverse Clausewitz's dictum, thi s diplomatic 
battle between the challenger and incumbent can be seen as an 
alternative war. The support which the movements received 
non military and military, fro~ governments and non-
governmental bodies -- often proved to be crucial in the 
success of the revolutions. 
The final chapter in Pare Four deals with the most dramatic 
aspect of any revolution -- the proces3 by which the old 
rulers are replaced by the revolutionary movement . In Chapter 
Eleven , different aspects of the revolutionary take-over will 
be examined. 
These include the reasons for the success of the 
revolutionary movements, as well dS the manner in which the 
transfer of power from the old regime to the revolutionary 
movement took place . This is very significant , because it 
plays a large role in determining the nature of the regim2 






It is also interesting to note that in some of the movements 
the revolutionary alliance broke up fter the initial goal --
political independence -- had been achieved. 
The final section of this study, Part Five, can be seen as 
the other side of the picture sketched in Part Two (the 
political and socio-economic orders under the old regime). In 
Chapters Twel,~ and Thirteen these orders, as transformed by 
the new rulers are investigated. 
In the Conclusion, the characteristics of the African 
revolutions studied he r e are presented together in order to 
provide an overview. With the characteristics identified, it 
is possible to speculate upon the probable causes of the 
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Chapter One 
Dist_i _n _____ ~ b_etween revolution and r elated conce ts 
1.1. Introduction 
The word revolution is used very loosely -- many people think 
that any uprising against a government is a "revolution". To 
complicate conceptual clarification further, the word is not 
only used in a political sense, but for example in the spheres 
nf the arts, agriculture, and science as well. 
Without a prope= definition of revolution, it would be 
impossible to identify this phenomenon, and the student of 
contemporary Africa would wallow in a morass of fac~s 
regarding political violence and change. 
Before a working definition of revolution (for use in this 
study) is constructed in Chapter Two, uprising~ against 
authority in general ar~ examined in this chapter. Some of the 
characteristics of revolution become apparent from this 
examination. These characteristics form the basis in the 
construction of an analytical model which is used t o 
distinguish African revolutions from other types of violent 
collective action. 
At this stage it will suffice to state that revolution is a 
form of rebellion, which can be defined as "open or determined 
defiance of, or resistance to, authority or controlling 
power"l. Greene2 agrees with this approach, i.e. to view 
rebellion as the genus regarding uprising against authority. 
Types of r~oellion include civil wars, revolts, coups d'etat, 
and revolutionary coups, which can be divided into sub-types3. 
It is important to note that the term rebellion, in al] its 
forms, implies the use of violence by the rebels, or at least 
the threat of violence. 
Although a group of scholars, particularly Harry Eckstein4 , 
a-:ivocates the use of the term "internal war" as the genus for 
upr:-.sings against authority, this study will use the well-
established "rebellion", because the use of "internal war" 
poseD certain conceptual problems: some types of uprising have 
important "external" components -- !:or example, foreign 
support for both challenger and incumbent in a war of 
independence. It also neglects nor violent aspects of 
rebellion, such as the role of ideology, mobilisation, and 
international opinion . 
Rebellion has been part of political life since the earliest 
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times. In the first section of this chapter, the history of 
the ter.n revolution will be traced briefly. Despite centuries 
of thought and research on different types of rebellion, ther~ 
is still no agreement on what exactly the characteristics of a 
revolution are, nor is there a standard definition of the 
phenomenon. Therefore, the second section of this chapter will 
be an attempt to draw lines of distinction between revolutions 
and related concepts such as coups d'etat, revolts, and civil 
wars by means of an analytical model. 
1.2. Short history of the term "revolution" 
The ancient Egyptians showed a lively interest in rebellion in 
approximately 3200 BC, when the northern and southern parts of 
the kingdom were unifiedS. This unification led to a number of 
rebellions, and the then newly-invented art of writing 
chronicled these uprisings, just as video-images would record 
rebellions more th,n five thousand years later. 
In the Classical period, rebellion interested scholars such 
as Aristotle and Plato, when uprisings and changes of 
government were frequent events in the Greek city-states. 
Following a decline in interest in rebellion during the 
Middle Ages, the turbulent Italian states and cities provided 
fertile g~ound for the study of rebellion, such as 
Machiavelli's works on rebellion and political stability6. 
Rebellion, and the study of the phenomenon, was very much in 
evidence during the Reformation, ind culminated in not only 
the fundamental transformation of ~nglish society in the 
seventeenth century, but also in John Locke's rrinciple that 
society has the right to rise against illegitimate rulers 7 . 
The term revolution was first used in astronomy, and gained 
importance through the work of Copernicus (1473-1543) in which 
he used the word to describ~ the regular orbits of heavenly 
bodies. Early philosophers borrowed the term to describe the 
cyclical process -- and ther~fore the return to a preordained 
order -- in human events8. Thus, "[n]othing could be farther 
removed f~om the original meaning of the word 'revolution' 
than the idea of which all revolutionary actors have been 
possessed and obsessed, namely, that they are agents in a 
process which spells the definite end of an old order and 
brings about the birth of a new world"9. 
The term revolution first took on its present poljtical 
meaning during the French Revolution which started in 1789, 
when the idea of a return to a preordained order was changed 
in favour of "the need to embark upon an entirely new 
enterprise 11 l0. This quest for a new enterprise spread through 
Europ~ during t he nineteenth century, as evidenced by the 
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series of rebelli0ns in 1848 which toppled monarchiesll. 
Interest in the study of rebellion, and more specifically 
revolution, was by now deeply embedded in Western political 
thought. This interest was heightened toward the end of the 
nineteenth century when Karl k u LX, in collaboration with 
Friedrich Engels, c~nstrucLed his dialectic materialistic 
world view, which views revol11tion as an essential part of 
history, as mankind struggles fron one @.Conomic epoch to the 
next, culminating in not only a classless and stateless 
society, but a classless and stateless world12_ 
In the twentieth century this doctrine provided the 
inspiration for the Russian and Chinese revolutions, and the 
majority of revolutions in the developing world. These 
revolutions, as well as Hitler's attempt to transform Germany 
(although inspired by a different ideology), led to a wealth 
of information on rebellion and revolution, so much so that 
currently, as Eckstein1 3 states, "one finds not merely 
interest in social force and war, but obsession". 
In order to distinguish between the numerous types of 
rebellion, it is necessary to construct an analytical scheme 
which will aid in the identification of African countries 
which experjenced revolutions. In the following sP.ction, major 
types of rebellion are discussed. From this analysis a graphic 
analytical scheme will be constructed. This discussion and 
analytical scheme will allow for clearer distinction between 
revolution and other types of rebellion. 
1.3. Concepts related to revolution 
1.3.1. Coup d'etat 
The French term coup d'etat literally means a blow of state; 
thus, it implies an unconstitutional seizure, o . attempted 
seizure, of power by individuals within the government 
structurel4 . 
A coup d'etat is characterised by the following: "(a) it is 
the effort by a political coalition illegally to replace the 
existing governmental leaders by violence or the threat of 
violence; (b) the violence employed is usually small; (c) the 
number of people involved is small; (d) the participants 
already possess inst~tutional bases of power within the 
political system11 15. 
Furthermore, the action in a coup is "unexpected, sudden, 
decisive"l6. The relative low death toll in a coup can be 
attributed to this decisive action, coupled with the small 
number of participants. The coup-makers usually attempt to 
. . 
- - · - - - . - -- - - - -
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seize the state's symbols of authority, such as the office of 
the chief exeLutive, and to neutralise the forces opposed to a 
coup
17
. Swiftness of execution is not only important to 
prevent counter-measures by the regime, but also aids the 
leaders of the coup to present the pcl)lic with a fait 
acco~pli18_ ---
The armed forces of a modern nation are superbly suited to 
exec~te a cou~etat. Not only ~re they already part of the 
state structure, but the nature of an army is to plan in 
secret and to execute swiftly, and as Zimmermannl9 points out, 
the armed forces possess the greatest coercive potential in a 
state. If a large segment of the army supports the coup 
(usually carried out by fellow-members of the army), the 
prospects of success are good20_ 
It is important to note that coup-makers are mostly not 
interested in a fundamental transformation of a society -- the 
"stakes of the simple coup are generally power as an end in 
itself
11
21. The new ruling group may introduce changes in 
government, but these are generally not of a sweeping nature. 
In fact, coups are often executed to redress a th1eat, real or 
imagined, to the military as a corporate body, or when the 
armed forcPs are dissatisfied with the policies of the 
government. Examples are the security coup, reform coup, the 
new elite coup and the punitive coup, the typological terms 
employed being indicativ~ of military disaffection with the 
present yo~ernment22 . Huntington23 goes even further and 
states that coups not only serve to redress military 
grievances, but can act as the non-constitutional equivalent 
of electoral change. 
Whichever way coups are viewed, it is important to note that 
the coup-makers do not attempt to fundamentally transform 
society24 . This can be explained by ~he non-ideological 
orientation of the coup-makers, for · t is an ideolog•: which is 
one of the driving forces in mobilisi.i·:J people to alter the 
political, social and economic structu .~s of society25. 
1.3.2. Revolutiona=y coup d'etat 
The revolut~onary coup is identical tc L ~~ coup d'etat in that 
it is carried out by a small number of pe -~le who already hold 
positions in the government structure. They succeed in 
toppling the previous regime swiftly, but h~re the similarity 
between coups and revolutionary coups ends . ',_"· .•o broad, and 
diametrically opposed types of revolutionary ~ up d'etat can 
be identified. 
The first type of revolutionary coup entails more than a mere 




higher26_ It can be seen as "the initiation of revolutionary 
social change"27 . This is particularly the case when the coup-
makers set about constructing new political and economic 
structures, a process which may be characterised by more 
violence than the toppling of a goverrunent28. 
Examples of revolutionary coups are Nasser's take-over in 
1952 in Egypt and the toppling of Selassie in Ethiopia, which 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
Although the leade!:"S of a re·;oJ ·1tionary coup are inspired by 
an ideology, such ideology plays a smaller role in their 
attempt to transform society than it would in a mass-based 
revolutionary movement, which depends to a larger extent on 
mass mobilisation and participation29 . Revolutionary coups are 
not mass based; indeed, they are elite-directed and elite-
executed seizures of power, followed by the fundam~ntal 
changing of society. 
A second type of revolutionary coup is identified by 
Brinton30, who argl.,es that an intensif~cation in the 
revolutionary process is initiated by a "decisive coup d'etat" 
in whic h tne extremists in the revolutionary movement oust the 
moderates. Thus, Brinton argues that different phases in the 
revolutionary proce$S may be ushered in by a revolutionary 
coup 
Both types of revolutionary coup are carried out by a small 
and elitist group. No mass participation of the extent seen in 
revolutions occurs. However, the coup-makers set out to change 
society fundamentally, ;ind often succeed. In this sense the 
revolutionary coup differs profoundly from the coup d'etat. 
1.3.3. Revolt 
Revolt can be defined as an uprising "against established 
authority, [an act] of open defiance and disobedience. But the 
aim of such rebellions was not the challenge of authority or 
the established order of things as such; it was always a 
matter of exchanging the person who happened to be in 
authority"31_ 
It is important to note that these revolts -- which include 
types such as jacguerries, peasant revolts, urban mobs, 
messianism, r9volts, nativistic revolts -- are all mass 
based32. The violence is not, as in the case of coups or 
revolutionary coups, restricted to a small elite. In fact , the 
larger number of participants may result in more bloodshed 
than in a coup and the violence being of a longer duration33, 
A rebel is, like a revolutionary, angered by the way society 
operates, but rather than striving for the abolition of the 
system that angers him, he strikes o~t against per sons whom he 
. ;~' . 





holds responsible for his current position34_ In this sense, 
Wo.lf35 defines modern peasant revolts as "reactions to major 
social dislocations". Johnson36 describes this reactive natu rn 
of revolts as "an act of social surgery· it is incended to cut 
ou~ one or more members who are offending against the joint 
commitments to mairtain a particular social structure" 
The spontaneous eruption of most revolts is added testimony 
to the fact that they are reactions to immediate situations37. 
This lowers the stakes of a revolt and places it diametrically 
opposite revolution, because it. has no doctri~e =or 
fundamentally cha~ ~ing society in a deliberate and planned 
manner. The lower stakes ot a revolt can be ascribed to the 
la~k of ideology. For example, an urban mob, demanding the 
redress of an economic grievance, is "inspired by no specific 
ideology"3S. In a revolution, the members o f the revolutionar_.• 
movement have an ideology, which acts as a guide to the 
creation of a "new world" and is a pol nt force for political 
mobilisation. Although a prolonged revult may develop some 
semblance of ideology, the ideology i.· usually based on 
traditional beliefs and less clear-cut than that of a 
revolutionary movement39. When a revolt topples a regi me, the 
new leaders, although they may be c harismatic, often l ack the 
direction which an ideology provides -- they become hesitant 
and vulnerable to counte~-attack by su~2orters of the previous 
regime 40. 
1.3.4 . War of inde endence 
A war of independence (also known as war of liberation, anti-
colonial war, colonial secession, or secession) is another 
species of the genus rebellion, because it is an uprising 
against established authority. 
Hagopian41 defines secession as "the breaking off of one 
part of the state and he proclamation of its independence". 
Thus, the usual notior. of secession centres around geography; 
for example, a certain region breaking its ties with the 
motherland. In the case of a war of independence, i t is not 
necessarily a part of a state that wishes to pro~laim its 
independence: it may be a geographic entity thousands of 
kilometers Lemoved from the ruling country, or colonial power 
in the ca~e of colonial sece~sion . 
Secession or a war of independence is more likely to occur in 
a country ~hich is characterised by great regional 
heterogeneity, and is especially likely to occur in a region 
or colonial area that is particularly distinctive from the 
rest of the country or colonial power, in terms of its 
economy, religion or culture42. 
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In a war of independence th~ masses play a larger role than in a 
coup d'etat. The word "war" implies that substantial numbers of a 
society are involved in the fighting. Rejai43 states that a war of 
independence involves the "mass violent overthrow of a foreign 
(external) power". 
While a coup d ' etat is a calculated grab for power by an 
exclusive ano elitist group and 3 revolt the spontaneous, mass-
based uprising under charismatic leadership to redress immediate 
q.ievances , a war of indepen ·ence falls somewhere in between. It 
is usually waged as a guerrilla war, which on the one hand 
presupposes an able military and pulitical ~lite within the 
independence movement , and on the other hand relies on the support 
of the masses44. 
The extent to which the political, economic and social ordet of a 
society is altered varies from one war of independence to another. 
The war of liberation can be an early phase Ln a revolution if it 
leads not only to the fall of the old regi~e, but also to the 
fundamental alteration of the the political, economic and social 
order. It is argued in this project that the African revolutions 
studied here shared this tendency. Johnson45 defines a war of 
independence as follows (he refers to this process as a 
militarised mass insurrection): "calculated, mass, revolutionary 
wars on the basis of guerrilla warfare and nationalistic 
ideologies". A war of independence can, in its most developed 
f orm, be "both a war and a revolution unfolding at t he same time" 
i f the movement implements dr~stic reforms prior to the tall of 
the 9overnment46. 
An important element in a war of independence is the degree of 
ext~rnal support which the movement fighting for independence 
obtains47. To a greacer extent than the coup, revolutionary coup, 
and revolt , the war of independence is characterised by the 
involvement of the international community 
1.J . 5 . Civil war 
Civil war can be defined as a "violent conflict between two semi-
autonomous political systems, each with its own regime , and in 
which each side enjoys considerable means of coercion in fairly 
distinct geographical regions . Alsc ... separation or secession is a 
possible uutcorae of civil war 11 48. 
Tilly49 argues that this type of collective violence is primarily 
the result of the attempts of one group to gain resources from the 
other group. These resources can be physical resources such as 
territory , or human resources, such as followers. 
ZimmermannSO indicates that in a civil war the resources 
of both sides have reached parity -- not only the 
• ' I 




~lite, but the masses (human resources) are split in their 
support for the semi-autonomous poljtical systems. A good 
example of this is the situation jn BeiruL, where no clear 
winner has emerged. 
OglesbySl identifies another important feature of a ci~il 
war: both parties are awarded belligerent rights. This feature 
dates back to the American Civil War of 1861: the British 
proclamati0n of neutrality "was the explicit form in which 
belligerent r~cogr:tion was extended"52. Belligerent 
recognition existJ "whenever a foreign Dtate adopts an 
attitude of complete impartiality as between th~ contending 
parties and treats them, so far as tne ~dr is concerned, upon 
a footing of entire equality"SJ . For example, if a coup aborts 
and the situation escalates into a prolonged conflict, 
belligerent recognition will exist if countries declare 
themselves neutral with regard to both the challenger and 
incumbent54. 
1.4. ConstructiL~ an analytical scheme to clistinguiah between 
revolution and ralat&d concepts 
From the analys s f concepts related to revolution above it 
is clear that tw~ elements are central in rebellions: the 
degree to which the political and socio-economic orders are 
trarsformed, and the degree of popular participation. 
For Skocpo155, the above-mentioned transformation boils down 
to the transformation of the state, which she defines as 
"potentially autonomous organisations located at the interface 
of class structures and international situations". 
Thus, one of the yardsticks to distinguish between revolution 
and related concepts (other types of rebelli~n) is the stakes 
of the uprising -- the extent to which a movement aims to 
transform, and actually transforms, the society fundamentally. 
Hagopian56 terms this the "latent aspect" of revolution: 
~what is actually accomplished by the revolution tegardless of 
the wishes and the beliefs of its protagonists". 
The second yardstick is the number of people who participate 
in a revolution. Thus, it i~ important to determine whether 
the uprising is mass-based, or more rarrowly based. 
From an analysis of this aspect othel elements of revolution 
-- such as the importance of organisation and th~ role of 
ideology -- become clear, since they play an important role in 
determining the number of people who participate in a 
revolution. These "manifest aspects" of revolution also nr~d 
to be included in an analytical scheme to distinguish betw~en 




By using these two central aspects, a graphic analytical 
sr.heme can be constructed to indicate whether a process is a 
revoluti~n, or a coup d'etat, revolt, revolutionary coup, war 
of independence, revolutionary war of independence, or civil 
war. The following criteria ai·e central in the scheme: 
(i) the stakes of the uprising, which are reflected by the 
extent of the transformation of society (vertical axis); and 
(ii) the degree to which the popul~cion is mobilised, and 
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It is important to bear in mind that this clas3ifica~ion 
cannot pro~ide an ent i r~ly clear distinction between types of 
rebellion. r.rey area' 1 1 occur when types overlap. The types 
of reb':!llicn identifie n the scheme can be subdivided 
further into, for example, differen~ types of coups d'etat. 
How~ver, for the purpose~ of this study the broad cate3ories 
identified above will, suffice. 
Th\tS, as was argued in section 1. 3., the cuup d'etat is 
characterised by little popular participation as well as 
limited fundamental changes in the political, economic and 
social spheres of society . It is placed in the bottom left 
hand quarter. The revolutionary ~9up d'etat, on the other 
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hand, leads to more fundamental changes in society. In t~is 
sense it shares some characteristics with revolution. However, 
the revolutionary coup is carried ~ut by a small group. It 
differs profoundly ~rom revolution in this "manifest aspect". 
Revolt~ involve a large number of the masses. In this sense 
they show similarities with revolutions. Howeve~, when the 
stakes of the uprising -- as reflected in the fundamental 
transformation of the political, economic and social order 
are examined, it is clear that revolt and revolu~ion are 
opposites. Revolut ion is t~e transformation of society; revolt 
is the uprising again~t members of the ruling group who have 
angered the ruled. In a revolt, no chang~ of society is 
envisaged. It is therefore placed at th~ the bottom right hand 
quarter. 
Like a revolt, a war of independence involves ,\ large number 
of people. In the war of independence, the stakes are higher 
than in a revolt, because the p~rticipants aim at changing the 
political sphere of their society -- they want to rule 
themselves. This means that the war of indepenaence can be 
seen as an early phase of a revolution, from which the 
transformation o~ the socio-economic sphere can follow. For 
these reasons, the war of indep~ndence i:::1 placed i.n the top 
right hand quarter, but below the area allotted to revolution. 
It was argued above that a civil war involves large numbers 
of the populat · on, but the extent to which the belligccent 
p?rties transform society is often limited by the manner in 
which the civil war was conducted and concluded. Civil war is 
best classified as occupying the grey area between revolution, 
war of independence, and revolt. 
1.5. Conclusion 
At the end of this chapter, it has been established to a large 
extent what revolution is not -- coup d'etat, revolutionary 
coup d'etat, revolt, war of i~Jependence, civil war -- and to 
a lesser extent what revolutjon actually is (a process 
characteris~d by mass particLpation and the fundamental 
transformation of society) . 
Concepts related to revolution are characterised by the 
presence of only one of these criteria -- e.g . mass 
participation in revolts and wars of independence, and the 
transformation of societ7 in the revolutionary coup. 
In the following chapter these two central elements in ~he 
~ent~tive definition of revolution will be analysed furtuJc in 
. ' •· . .. . 
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order to construct a working definition of revolution. This 
definition, in conjunction with ~he analytical model discusoed 
above, wjl l then assist in identifying the African countries 
which exper , ~nced ruvo)utions. 
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Toward a definition of revolution 
2 . 1. Introduction 
In the previo·.1s chapter the concept "revoluti,:m" has been 
identified in r~lation to other, related concepts which fall 
under the genus rebellion. From this, the ''outlines" of the 
concept revolution became clear -- ,3 mass-based process which 
changes society fundamentally through violence. In this 
chapter, the concept will be further refined. 
This will be done by examining well-known definitions of 
revolution as proposed jy sc~?lars. Two types of definition 
inclusive and exclusive -- will be examined. This analysis 
will indicate some of the gAnerally accepted characteristics 
of revolution. 
Before a working definition of revolution ia constructed for 
purposes of this study, ic is prudent to examine a general 
pitfall for the student, namely ideological bias found in 
definitions of revolution. This will be done to avoid using a 
working definition that !-1as, implicitly or explicitly, an 
ideological bent. 
Finally, by applying the lessons learned from the analysis of 
definitions of revolution, it is possible to construct a 
working definition which will be a precise tool for 
identifying revoluti~ns in this study. In the final section of 
this chapter, the working definition and analytical model will 
be used to identify contemporary African revolutions. These 
revolutions will form the study area used to identify their 
characteristics. 
2.2. A review of definitions of revolution 
2.2.1. The scope of definitions 
If one scholar of revolution, Barrington Moore, argues that 
only four revolutions ever occurred, whilst another, Pitirim 
Sorokin, claims that there were more than a thousand 
revolutions, it is obvious that the scope of their definitions 
of the concept differs radically1 . 
Basically, two types of definition of revolution exist: tho~e 
with a broad scope (inclusive definitions) and those with a 
narrow scope (exclusive definitions), both of which will be 
examined below. 
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2.2.1.1. Inclusive definitions of re,,olutions 
Definitions of revolution that stres:, political/legal change 
in society as the major characterisc_c of the phenomenon are 
the most common type of broad definit:.ion. 2. 
Revolu ...  ion is, according to Carl Fr1edrich3, "a sudden and 
violent overthrow of an established political order." Tanter 
and Midlarsky4 define revolution in much the same manner: they 
argue that "insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal 
roles within the structure of political au~hority." KamenkaS 
states that "revolution is a sharp, 3udden change in the 
social location of political power." Paul Schrecker6 states 
that because a constitution establis~es the conditions of 
legality, revolution can be defined "as an illegal change in 
the conditions of legality." 
This group of theorists elevates changes in government 
(political change) or in the constitution (legal changes) to 
the criteria used to identify a revolution, "for it is the 
failu . ! of government which is at the core of the political 
revolution" 7 . 
These definitions are inadequate fc,r the purposes of this 
study, because they award the status of "revolution" to any 
event that topples the government violently, or disturbs 
social patterns. Thus, any of the types of rebellion 
identified in the previous chapter will be labelled as 
revolutions by these schools of thought. So that justice be 
d~ne to the comparative nature of this study, a working 
definition of revolution should distinguish revolution clearly 
from related concepts such as cou s d'etat, revolutionary 
coups i'etat , civil wars, and revolts. If this is not the 
case, the object o f a comparative analysis will be defeated, 
because different phenomena will then be compared. 
2 2.1.2 . Exclusive definitions of revolution 
Theorists who use exclusive definitions of revolution ar~ue 
that very few events -- only the so-called Great Revolutions, 
like the French Revolution -- do in fact change society so 
fundamentally as to Le termed a revolution. 
These theorists specify various conditions which a process 
must meet before it can be seen as a revolutions. These 
conditions then form ~he key elements or characteristics of 
revolution. 
Samuel Huntington's definition will be used as a basis for 
this discussion. He views revolution as "rapid, fundamental, 
and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths 
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of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, 
leadership, and government activities and policies"9. When the 
principles of the analytical sct?me used in Chapter One are 
applied to Huntington's definition, the stakes of the uprising 
are reflected in fundamental changes in (a) the dominant 
values and myths of a society, (t) political institutions, (c) 
social structure, (d) leadership, and (e) government 
activities and policies. These changes are all latent aspects 
of revolution, because they refer to changes which are the 
result of revolution. 
Manife~t aspects of revolution -- such as the role of 
leadership, ideology, and organisation -- are only implied in 
Huntington's definition. It is evident {from Chapter One) that 
the fundamental changes ~ssociated with a revolution must be 
carried out bJ a movement with effective leadership and 
organisation, as well as a coherent ideology. However, because 
Huntington does not deal explicitly with these aspects, the 
distinction between, for example, revolution and revolutionary 
coup d'etat (with its lower level of mass participation) 
becomed blurred. To obtain clarity in this regard, it is 
accordingly imperative that manifest aspects of revolution 
should not only be implied, but explicitly stated. 
Huntington identifies a further four key elements of 
revolution in his def'nition. He ~tates that violence is a key 
element in bringing about the fundamental changes set ou~ 
above. This is evident from t~e analytical model used in 
Chapte= One , where it was stated that revolution is a type of 
rebellion, ~hich has the Lwplication of violence. 
~~condlv , t~e use of viole~ce to topple the ~egime and 
transform LhP _,..,,:-iety ml)ans that revolution is a non-legal or 
illegal Frocess, a~ lPast during the period leading to the 
fall of the oJd regime. The~~fore, far-reaching and 
fundarner.t:al c c nstj tutional changes cannot be seen as a 
revolution, ~e~ause s cJety i s then altered fundamentally by 
legally sanctio1ed mea11s. 
Thirdly, Hur,tir>gton states that a revolution invol'- s 
domestic c hange. The process should be carried ouL by the 
citizens of a country, not by an O1Jtside force. F c ex;3.mple , 
the transformation of Eastern Europe afte ,r i~ cannot 
be seen as a revolution, because it was, :Lbout by 
puppet governments under the influence o ie~ Union. 
Finally, Huntington argues that a revolu~ ~ rapid 
process. This key elem~nt presents problems .J~ the student of 
revolution because it is often difficult to determine when a 
revolution has started, or ended. Furthermore, it is unclear 
what time period qualifies as "rapid" . 
Rejai1 0 attempts to accommodate this problem by stating that 
. . ~--~----==~=----- -
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revolut ions are relatively abrupt, ranging from a couple of 
years to two or three decades. Greene11 points out in this 
regaLd that revolution is a process, which by its very natura 
implies a relatively extensive period. It w0uld follow t .,at 
there may be several phases in this extended process. 
Louis Gottschalk12 identifies one manifest aspect of 
revolution -- the participation by a large section of the 
population -- when he defines the phenomenon as "a popular 
mass movement whereby a significant change in the structure of 
a nation or a society is effected.• Andreskil3 also states 
that mass action is one of the key elements of revolution, 
while James Davies1 4 emphasises that the group ~hich topples 
the regime tenas to have a "broader popular basis for 
support." 
Hagopian15, who also defines revolution in exclusive terms, 
adds two manifest elements to the concept when he argues that 
revolution ''involves a purposive, ~lite-directed attempt" to 
reconstruct society. Thus, he hints at the i~portance of an 
ideology in a revolution, for it is an ideology that gives the 
revolutionary movement purpose and allows for the planning cf 
the process of transforma~ion. This plan~ing is usually 
~arried out by the leadership or elite in a revolutionary 
movement, i.e. the "elite-directed attempt" which Hagopian 
incorporate~ in his definition. 
Furthermore, oecause mass action in a revolution is not 
spontaneous, but planned and calculated, the role of 
organisation is stressed by some theorists. Macrides16 argues 
thac a "revolution is an act of organized violence to bring 
about r?dical changes in the economic, social, and political 
relations within a given system." For Ted Gurrl7 internal war 
is characterised by "highly organized politi=al vLolence with 
widespread popular participation designed to overthrow the 
regime or d. ssolve the state and accompanied by extensive 
violence". 
Compared to inclusive definitions of revol ution, exclusive 
definitions are mor~ specific about the prerequisi tes a 
process must meet before it can be termed a revolution, and 
are accocdingly more useful to the student of revolution. 
2.2.2. Ideological b i as 
Every person has a value system which he or she employs to 
analyse events, b they in everyday life or in h~s academic 
discipline. It is not surprising that ideological (or mo~e 
loosely, value system) bias manifests itself in ~efinitions of 
r evolution, and the student of revolution should guard against 
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attentio., will be focused on some of these approaches to 
revolution. 
Tuckerl'l states that Marxism is "inseparable from the idea of 
revolution.~ For Marx, revolution is caused by only 0ne 
factor: the structural arrangement of societyl9. This 
structural arrangement leads to the formation of different 
classes in society -- one class that rules and the other that 
is ruled -- with the exploited class eventually toppling the 
ruling class20_ Thus, the concept of "conflict is explained in 
terms of ,::oncrete .md specific social relationships"21 _ 
For scholars employing this approach, the fundamental issue 
is that material (i.e. economic) factors are the basis of 
man's life, and therefore his society~2 . For Marx, "a social 
revolution is a change in the mode of production with 
consequent change in all subordinate elements of the social 
complex" 2 3 . Revolution is "necessary and unavoidable" a.::1 man 
progresses from one historical epoch to another, with the 
implied changes in mode of production and the establishment of 
a n~w ruling class in the dialectical movement ~o a classless 
societ,24 . 
.J 
For Marx, there can only be a revolution if the old order has 
expanded to its limit -- there can be no socialist revolution 
unless the capitalist mode of production has reached its 
zenith25 _ 
For Marx, then, the central elements of revolution -- indeed, 
of human history -- are economic in nature, the focus being on 
the stratification of society into classes. It is precisely 
for this reason that his conception of revolution can be 
criticised. 
Firstly, "[e]conomic straLi~ication is emphas~zed to the 
point of neglecting or confusi~g the role of other forms of 
stratification"26_ Although Mar~'s ::lass analysis is a useful 
analytical tool, it fails to explain alliances which cut 
across class ties. Lenin and Mao attempted o rectify this 
when they adapted Marx's analysis to include coalitions 
between workers and peas~nts, led by members of the 
intelligentsia27. 
Secondly, Marx's argument that revolution will only occur if 
the productive forces have developed to their capacity is not 
supported in reality, with feudal Russia's movement toward a 
socialist society being the most evident example. Thus, Marx's 
approach to revolution with his emphasis on economic 
determinism, re~ults in all other factors being neglected. 
Several non-Marxist scholars have attempted to overcome this 






However, some of these non-Marxist definitions of revolution 
also suffer from the problem of bias, although on a different 
lev~l. An example is the definition of Hannah Arendt28, who 
states that "violence is no more ad~quate to describe the 
phenomenon of revolution than change; only where chan~e occurs 
in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to 
constitute an altogether different form o f government, to 
bring about the formation of a !,. body politic, where the 
liberation from oppression aims a~ least at the constitution 
of freedom can we speak of revolution." 
The normative aspecc of Arendt's definition becomes apparent 
whEn she states that "the constitution of freedom" is a 
prerequisite Zor the use of the t~rm revolution. In fact, she 
states that "the central idea of revolution ... is the 
foundation of freedom, that is, the foundation of a body 
politic which guarantees the space where freedom can 
appear" 2 9. Revolution is defined in terms of certain moral 
values, because freedom i3 underst0od as political 
participation in the liberal-democratic sense30. 
However, when a rnoveme!lt shifts its aims from "the foundation 
of freedom tc the libaration of man from suffering" Arendt31 
.:.s enmeshed in definitional problems. She argues that no 
revolution has ever succeected in solving the social question 
of freeing man from misery and suffering: in i~s atrempt to do 
so, a reign of terror is unleashed which leadq the revolution 
to its unavoidable doom, because the terror halts pol~tical 
part.icipat.io!132. 
Thus, the French Revolution is not a re•Jolution in Arendt:' s 
views, because it did not lead (initially) to the foundation 
of freedom, but rather t~ a reign of terror. This emphasis on 
moral politics weakens her arguments on revolution. 
Furthermore, moralistic concepts such as freedom are, like 
beauty, in the eye of the beholc~r, and open to a variety of 
interpretations. 
Another view of revolution that is wea.Kened by its iueological 
bias is that of Chalmers Johnson, who constructed the 
functionalist (or systems) approach Lo revolution. 
John~on33 states that "(r]evolutionary change is a speci~l 
kind of social change, one that involves the intrusion of 
violence into civil social relations. And revolution, both as 
a form of behaviour ~nd as a concept, concer· ~them st basic 
level of man's communal existence -- its constitution , in the 
Aristotelian sense of the principles of distributive Justice 
prevailing in a particular society." 
To Johnson and the functionalists, the social system should 
be in equilibrium because society is regulated by a set of 
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shared values34. When the society is thrown out of ~ts balance 
-- primarily because the shared value system can no lon9er 
accou~t for changes in the env~ronment -- a potential 
revolutionary situat:on can be said to exist35. 
If the political elite is ir,transigent and refuses or neglects 
to alter the existing values to be in step with the new 
environment, more ard more force till be needed to secure the 
elite's position, which may lead to a loss of legitimacy, or 
"power defl~tion"36. 
T' ~ functio~alists attach undue importance to the role of the 
elite in a revolution. "[I]f the elite is not intransigent, 
simple change will occur, dysfunction will be relieved, and no 
rev')lution will take place."37. Thus, the elite is viewed as 
having totai control over the c utcome of a revolutio1 1ry 
situation, while, as Smelser38 points out, the options of an 
elite in a revoluti~.1ary situation decreas~ as the revolution 
nears its climaY.. 
This bias in favour cf moral politics -- with its emphasis on 
concepts such as legitimacy and authority -- makes thi~ approach 
less useful. Rev0luLions are highly-charged and passionate 
processed, ar.d the analysis of these processes is more useful if 
it is done with dispassionate analytical tools. In the following 
section one of the main analytical tools of this study -- the 
working definition of revolution that is to be used throughout 
-- will be constructed. 
2 .3. Constructing a working definition of revolution 
A working definition affe1 t s the work of a scholar of revolution 
"from beginning to end"3S The foundation of the working 
definition of revolution to be used in this study was laid in 
Chapter One, w~en an analytical scheme was constructed which 
differentiated between related ccncepts . The criteria used for 
this ::iifferen::iation centre ar .. .n,r ·1 latent (stakes of uprising) 
a11d manifest aspects (mass participation) of revolution, with 
the use of violenc~ being implicL. 
Latent aspects ot revolution· - "what is actually accomplished 
by th~ revolution regardless of the wishes anu the beliefs of 
its protagonists" -- will form the one pill~r of the working 
definition40. As was shown in the analytical scheme, this will 
include the fundamental changing of society -- thus, the 
political and socio-economic orders. It has furthermore 
been pointed cut ~hat this fundamental change ,t 
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society is a process , not a sir•gle dramatic event . If a 
revolution is approached as entailing only fundamental change in 
s0ciety, then any type of peaceful but fundamental change can be 
seen as a " revolution " . 
Skocpol ' s definition of what she calls "ser ial revolutions " 
makes this point clearly: "Social revolutions are rapid, basic 
tra-sformations of a societ1's state and class structures; and 
they are acco,.,panied and in part carried through by class-based 
revolts from below"41_ 
It is also necessary to include manifest aspects of revolution 
-- the action of elites and masses -- in an effective working 
def.inition42. 
In this study, revolution will be defined as: 
the fundamental transformation of the 
political and socio-econo~ic orders of a country 
by an elite-directed, mass-based, and 
ideologically-inspired organisation that employs 
violence during one or all of the phases i n this process. 
This definition will be used to identify where revolutions have 
occurred in contemporary Africa. Furthermore, it provides the 
framework for the comparative analys i s of contemporary African 
revolutions in this study. 
This framework will incc ~porate: (a) the transformation of the 
political order; and the (b) socio-economic order; as well as 
the importance of (c) leadership; (d) a mass movement; (e) 
ideology; ( f) organis~tion; (g) violence; and (h) external 
support. 
2 . . • . Application of t he working defini tion 
2.4 . 1. The identification of African countries which e>:perienced 
revolutions 
Contemporary Africa has been characterised by conf l ict and 
political instability, with numerous coups d ' etat , and some 
revolutionary coups , civil wars , wars of independence, revolts, 
and revolutio:1s. 
The majority of ~cups ct'Etat wers of the first type described 
in ~napte ~ Onr , in which n~mbers oF the military seized power 
but did not transf•)rm society funda'tlentally. There are numerous 
exampl~s of this t1pe ir. Africa , to such an extent that 
Hunti ngton ' s argument that coups take the place of elections 
appears to be validat sd . 
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A number of revolutionary coups d'etat did take place in 
contemporary Africa, and are sometimes mistaken for 
revolutions. 
For example, the fall of Selassie and the transformation of 
Ethiopian society is often referred to as a "revolution". 
However, Selassie was toppled by his own armed forces (an 
elite grouping)43. Accordinq to the analytical scheme, the 
Ethiopian situation lacks one of the major criteria for it to 
qualify as a revolution (mass participation), even though it 
was successful with regard to the second criterium 
(transformation of society). Ethiopia represents a 
revolutionary c~up d'etat, or in the words of Breytenbach44 , 
"a coup that turned into a revolution". 
Another example is the much vaunted revolution in Upper 
Volta, which was renamed Burkina Faso ("Land of the 
incorruptible men") under Thomans Sankara, who seized p 1°r J 
a coup d'etat. The same is true of Egypt. under Nas.3er. hi~. 
coup ended the reign of the monarchy, and transformed society 
fundamentally, but it was a again an elite group which seized 
power, 2nd initiated revolutionary ~hange from above. Benin 
under Kcrekou is another example of a military man snatching 
power in a coup, and then transforming th ~ country and -- as 
Burkina Faso -- changing its name. 
Apart from coups and revolutionary coups, Africa is often the 
scene of other types of rebellion: for example, revolts in 
Chad; a revolt "that developed into a civil war along the 
lines of guerrilla ~arfare" ln Uganda45; civil wars in the 
Sudan, Biafra, Burundi and Zaire (after the Belgium 
decolonisation -- there were strong elements of secession as 
well, most not~bly the attempt to create Katanga); and wacs of 
independence in Cameroon and the Western Sahara. Namibia is a 
good example: of a war of indep~ndence which did not lead to 
the: fu .. Jamental tra:1sformation of society. Swapo ' s long armed 
struggle led to independence for the country -- but the Nujoma 
government ' s pragmatic course has left much of the old socio-
economic order intact. 
lt is often argued that the Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya was a 
revolution. This is, however, incorrect. Breytenbach4 5 points 
out thDt despite the fact that t~e movement had its owr. armed 
wing, the Land and Freedom Army, the Ma~-Mau "was not an 
insurgen~y, only an insurrection". Furthermore, the British 
defe~ted the Mau-Mau -- one of the reasons for this was the 
fact that the rebels did not enjoy much inte.national support . 
Because the British were victorious, they were able to act 
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from a position of strength, and made certain that the process 
of decolonisation in Kenya occurred peacefully and 
evolutionary. 
Thus, despite the fact that Africa is characterised by 
violent collective action, only a few revolutions occurred, if 
the analytical scheme and working definition are employed to 
categorize events. There were revolutions in Algeria, Angola, 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Zimbabwe. Skocpol identified in 
1979 4 7 that revolutions did take place in the first four 
countries. (The revolution in Zimbabwe took place after the 
publication of her work.) In all of these countries, the 
political and socio-econcm~c orders were transformed through 
mass-based parties in processes that involved violence. 
Naturally the degree of transformation varied in each 
instance, but it was fundamental. 
Finally, Namibia, which has seen a war of more than twenty 
years being concluded with independence, cannot be said to 
have experienced a revolution -- yet. The political order 
changed irreversibly when the country became inrtependent, but 
the so . io-economic order did not experience th~ same intensity 
of change. 
2.5. Conclusion 
Definitions of revolution are Otten fraught with problems. 
Inclusive d~finitions appear to be too widely formulated, with 
the result that the studenL of revolutic,1 is still left in the 
dark regarding the characteristics of the phenomenon. From a 
study of exclusive definitions of revolution, however, the 
prerequisites of revolution can be extracted. Coupled with the 
analytical scheme constructed in the previous ch3pter, a 
working definition of revolution was constructed for use in 
this study. 
Thus, the major aim of Part One has been completed; namely, 
to construct a definition of revolution that can be used in 
conjunction with other analytical tools to distinguish between 
revolution and related type3 of rebellion. 
By using these instruments, it is possible to decide exactly 
which processes are contemporary revolutions. These 
revolutions will be analysed and compared in the rem•inder of 
the study in order to arrive at a shared ~et of 
characteristics. The first area of comparison will b~ the 
period prior to the outbreak of armed ccnflict between the 
revolutionary movement and the government, with specific 
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PART TWO : THli! OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION 
Chapter Three 
The political order : the old regime 
3 . 1 . Introduction 
In this chapter the political order prior to the revolution will 
be investigated, in order to identify shared characteristics of 
the ancien rP.gimes that could have been causes of revolution. 
Firstly , the way the old regime introduced its political order 
will be looked at . This process was harsh and repressive, and 
the local population violently resisted the occupiers , thus 
laying the foundation for a tradition of resistance against the 
rulers that was to culminate in a war of independence. 
The resistance of the local population was crushed by the 
superior fire power of the new rulers, who began to shape a new 
political order. This order was European, or at least non-
African , in nature, its basic premise being wh1te superiority. 
The whites formed the elite and controlled political 
institutions, with no intention to allow Muslims or Africans a 
greater role in the administration of the countries. 
The local population protested against this state of affairs in 
a number of ways . The manner of protest will be investigated to 
determine which factors shaped a specific strategy. In the 
Portuguese areas and Rhodesia, protest was muted, while the 
French allowed slightly more criticism of their regime. However, 
in the majority of countries these protests were met with 
indifference or harsh repression. 
J .2. How the political order was establishe d 
3.2.1. Occupation by colonial powers 
All the African countries which expetienced revolutions were 
occupied by a for~ign, colonialist power at some stage prior to 
the revolution. These powers imposed a new political and socio-
economic order en the areas. In fact, the borders of the 
majority of the countries were established by these colonialist 
powers at the Congress of Berlin 1884/1885. However, the first 
contact between these pow_rs and Africa dates back much further 
in history. 
The first Portuguese contact witt1 sub-Saharan Afri ca took 
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place in 1443, when coastal communities near the Guinea coast 
were raided for slavesl. The ?ortuguese presence wa s expanded to 
the Congo and northern Angola in 1482 , and to Mozambique 
following da Gama ' s voyage to India io ~497-14992. Toward the 
end of the sixteenth century Portugal had founded Luanda in 
A~gola and built forts on Mozambique Island and at Sofala3 . 
Portugal obtained, with British help, the "right of occupation" 
of what became present-day Angola and Mozambique at the Berlin 
Conference , but had to acknowledge the British rights in 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia4 . Portugal officially gained 
another African colony , present-day Guinea-Bissau, after an 
agreement with France in 18865. 
These colonies were 23 times the size of Portuga16. By 1970 
they had a population of 13-: · ;,- illion, of which half a million 
were civilian Portuguese or ot. e~ Europeans 7 . 
The Portuguese were also responsi •le for the first European 
contact with present-day Namibia, when in 1485 navigator Diago 
Cao planted a stone cross north of present-day Swakopmund8. 
France had informal contact with the people of Algeria since 
the sixteenth century, but in 1830 French king Charles X decided 
to occupy Algeria to draw attention away from his internal 
problems 9 . As elegant French ladies watched from chartered 
boats, the navy bombarded Algiers, while an expeditionary force 
landed twenty miles f=om Algiers and captured the city on July 
5, 183010. In an age that did not protest against colonialism, 
and placed great importance on bourgeois civilisation , the 
French act was applauded, with Friedrich Engels stating : "(t)he 
conquest of Algeria is an i~portant and fortunate fact for the 
progress of civilisation ... the modern bourgeois , with 
civilisatioP, industry, ordtr, and at least relative 
enlightenment following him, is preferable to the feudal lord or 
the ~arauding robber, with the barbarian state of society to 
whi~h they belong"ll. 
In December 1848 the French Second Republic declared Algeria 
part of France, thus drawing a distinction between Algeria and 
the other spheres of French interest, which remained colonies. 
Algeria ~as now formally a part of Metropolitan France12. 
L'nlike France and Portugal , Zimbabwe ,or Rhodesia, as it was 
kn0wn before black majority rule) was the " last state in history 
built by private enterprise and through the use of a private 
army " 13_ As indicated by t11e name "Rhodesia" , the country was 
founded as a result of the imperial ambitions of Cecil John 
Rhodes, who wished to create a vast British empire in Southern 
Africa. In 1sqo he used the British South Africa Comp3ny and the 
Pioneer Column , d private group of armed men, to secure 
Mashor.aland 1nu lay the foundations of the colonial 
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statel 4 . By 1893 the Ndebele capital was destroyed, and in the 
middle of that decade the British South Africa Company had 
established claims over the area which became known as 
Southern RhodesialS. 
Rhodesia, too, was not a colony in the strict SPnse of the 
word. By 1920 most settlers were unhappy with the rule by 
British Charter of the British South Africa Company. Britai n 
did not want to bear the burden of administering the area, and 
gave the settlers a choice of joining the Union of South 
Africa, or becoming a self-governing colony under nominal 
British contro11°. In 1923, the settl~rs, as well as a small 
nu~~er of Indians and Africans who were allowed to vote, opted 
for the latter. Thirty years later, Southern Rhodesia Joined 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland -_n u federation, and for the 
next ten years this chunk of southern-central Africa was 
control~e~ jointly by whites in Salisbury and the British 
governmentl 7 . When the Federatior. o f Rhode£ ia and Nyasaland 
broke up in 1963 -- with the ind~pendence o f two members, 
present-day Malawi and Zambia -- Southern Rhodesia changed its 
name to Rhodesia and remained a self-governing crlo ny. Fearful 
that the Labour government might alter thi s arra~gement and 
push for black rule, Rhodesian leader Ian Smitn issued his 
Unilateral Declaration o f Independenc e (UDI) on 1~ No~enber 
19651 8. 
3.2.2. Primary resistance 
The colonialisc power~ hd~ t o face various forms of resistance 
from the local population. Thes"? ranged from ba:-tditry ("a form 
of criminali ty very widespread in agrarian class societies111 9) 
to what Terence Ranger terme~ "prim&ry res:stanceq20. This 
type of armed resistance occurred when the lo-::al population 
fought against colonialist expansion and can be seen as a 
fore-runner to the wars of independence . 
In the Portuguese area:3, this primary resiscanc~ ended only 
in the lace nineteenth and early twentieth c enc~ry. For 
example, the Portuguese fought ten "pacification" wars against 
different ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau; the last one --
against the Bijagos -- ended only in 193521. 
In Mozambique a large part of the ninet~~nth century wa~ 
spent in an att~mpt to bring the area under Portugue:se 
control, and the last i~stance of primarv resistance -- the 
• 2? Bar•.1e revolt -- ended in 1917 •. In Angola, where the largest 
concentration ot Portuguese trJops was to be found . t~e 
"Angolan Wars" stnrted in 1575, lasted for nearly one hundred 
years, and cin be compared to the penetration ,,f tne Dutch 
into South Africa23. The final war of pacification in Angola 
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ended in 192424. 
The French, t~o, encountered fierce loca! :r·istance after 
the fall of Algiers. Abd-el-Kader managed tc, ·.mite Algerian 
groups against the French, and waged a protracted guerrilla 
w1r for seventeen years until his surrender in 1~47. He had 
about 15 000 fighters under his command, as opposed to the 90 
000 French troops25 . His revolt was centered in the rural 
areas , because while tl.e urban <::lasses had adapted o French 
rule , "[p]atriotism took refuge in the countryside"26. It is 
interesting to note that unlike Tunisia and Morocco, Algerian 
rural nation~lism preceded the rise of urban nationalism27 . 
The war against Abd-8i-Kader was fought in a brutal manner, 
and was a fore-runner to the merciless killings during the war 
of independence, almost one hundred years later. French 
colonel de Montagnac gave tPe following orcer to his troops in 
1840: "This is how the war must be waged against the Arabs. 
Kill all the men from the age of 15; seize all women and 
children, ship them off to the Maquessa Islands or elsewhere; 
in a word, wipe out all those who will not throw themselves at 
our feet like dogs"28_ 
About twency years after the surrender of Abd-el-Kader, 
another revolt occurred under th~ leadership of Mol: rani in 
1871 in the Kabyle region, which was also put down in a harsh 
manner. About 500 000 hectares of land were confiscated as a 
punitive measuLe and distributed amongst the increasing number 
of Fr.ench colonists29 . 
In present-day Zimbabwe, a war broke out in 1896. Chimurenqa 
("the ·ising") was significant in the sense that .1.t mobilised 
support from both the large ethnic groups (the Ndebele and 
Shon3). Gann & Henriksen30 estimate that about ten percent of 
settlers died in the war . By che end of 1897 black resistance 
was broken, and while social banditry continued for a number 
of years, the settlers were in contro l of the country at t he 
start of the twentieth century31. 
3 . 3 . The pol i t i cal order prior to th~ ravolutijn 
3 . 3 . 1 . The prevalent myth and values 
The prevalent myth and values form the cornerstones of a 
soci~ty , for they have an influence on the shaping of 
virtually every aJpect of that so~iety . This is recognised by 
a number of scholars of revolution , who view the introduccion 
of a new myth and values as a sur~ sign th~t a revolution did 
take place. 
For exampl~. Huntington32 argues that a revolution involves 
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fund3rnental changes in the pre••alent myth and values of society. 
This aspect of Huntington ' s definition shows great sirniJarity to 
that of Neurnan33 . Thomas Kuh.134 sees the prevalent myth as being 
a reflection of the matrix within which behaviour is evaluated. 
If t wo groups differ about thit matrix , of which a constitution 
forms an ingredient , a revolution may o~cur. 
Sorokin35 argues that behaviour ir. any social system is 
ao•erned by " law-norms" which control the natural instincts of 
man , or at least teach man to balance his drives with th~ 
environment. Sorokin believes that a revolution will occur if 
the values (or his " law-norms") are unable to cope with the 
environment . When this happens, man cannot .,alaI,C"' his d.:-ives 
with his environment. This may result in ' 'the growtt, of 
repression of the main instincts of the majority of tt .e society, 
and the impossibility of obtainlng for those stincts ► he 
nec~ssary rnini~um of satisfaction"36. Frustration is a ~t~ult, 
and may eventua l ly l e ad to violent collective action and 
revolution in an at t e mp to alleviate the repression of these 
i nstincts . 
Chalmers Johnson cl a ims that values, or definitiona l symbo ls, 
are of great importance in estaolishing sol idarity in society, 
because they account for the political, eco nomic, and socjal 
environrnent37 . A society is put under pressu=e when external or 
internal pressu~es (such ~s war, famine, 0r a population 
explosion) work in on e1ther the values or the environrnent38 
Thus, when the values can no longer acc~unt tor changes in the 
environment, or, conversely, when changes in the '"dluec do not 
correspono with the existing environrnenc, , country may face a 
revolutionary situatjcn39. 
In such a situation soc i ety is in disequi ibriurn, and what 
Johnson calls multiple dysfunction exists4 J . The social syst~m 
will only return to a state of balance afte1· the environment, 
but more likely the values of society , have been altered --
either through reform or revolution41. 
3 .J .1.1 . European superio=ity 
In the contemporary revolutions t~~ prevalent rnyLh of the old 
order explicitly or iwplicitly declared the supPriority of the 
white mi ,ority group and the right to exploit the econorni~ 
resources of Africa. The values that stern from .:his preval~11t 
myth also reflected a pro-Nhite (settler, bias in the laws of 
theee societies. 
The following statement by Dr Oliveira s~la~ar , Po1 t ugal' 
national-socialist ruler, describes elements of the myth 
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of Portuguese colonialism: "(W]e must revise and pu 1.nto 
execution plans for public works that are indispensable withJ n 
the moderate financial resourc~s available and have a 
guarantee of an effective retur-; and, beforL ev-?ryth1ng, s 
the highest and noblest work of all, we must organise on the 
best possible lir,es measures for safeguaL ing th"' in Prests o f 
those inferior races whose inclusion under the intluenc of 
Christianity is one of the greatest ach.1.eveme~ts o f Poi uguesP 
colonialisation"42. 
This statement by Salazer identifies two of thP hr• 
underlying principles of Portuguese·colonial1sm 
exploitation and the ''c:..vilising mission" with h 
Catholic church43. 
1. 
o n om1.c 
of h 
Article 133 of the Estado :~ovo cons itution d sccib d th.1.s 
myth in even greater detail: "It is of the organic ss nc• o 
the Portuguese Nation to carry out the historic fun_ of 
colonising the land of rhe Discovpries und r is sov r .1. n y, 
and to cornrnunica~e and spread among thA popul t1.o~s x.1.~ in 
there the benefits of its civ1.l.1.sa~Lon"44_ 
Isaacman & Isaacman45 identify thA thir pr.1.nc1 1 s 
belief that the colonies were n AX nt.1.on of Por•u 
tle slogan "One state, onP race, on~ f ion ' 
-- inco:porated .1.n the Port1gues const u~ion o 
S'.IBUr,arised the belief that Portugal c;.nd 1 ol r 1 1.r. 
effect a single state. The Estado Ncvo cons 1 
that all the Portuguese possess1011s form pr 
nation, "'ind the mere suggestion of s c ss:i.on 1 
treasonabl•!" 4 6. 
In fact, the Portuguese believe ht" n 
ccl0nies would rather be Por ugu s th n 
The prevalent myth of the Por ugu 
demo=ratic. Salazar based h.1.s Est 
fascist system, and he made al p 
an interview with Le Figaro in 1958, S 
did not believe in universal suffr g, n 
"dangerous to attribute to 11 h s m p 
It is int9resting to note that Al 
colony ( like neighbouring Morocco 
province of metropolitan France. 
ri w n n') r 
nd Tunis1 ), 
ld 
Second Republic declared Alger.1. n int 
This was to ~ompound the Algeri n probl m tu1 h 
\1ould be impossible to simply gr nt Alg ri 1 
as W<! done in the case of its n ighbours. Thin 
proveu to be "a de ~dly trap from whic h h y ( h• 
find i~ well nigh impossible to esc pe"SO. 
After the humiliating :iefe in h .. ~cond Worl 

















consti~ution that it would "never employ its forces against 
the liberty of any people" -- at the very time when it was 
fighting the Viet-Minh in Indo-ChinaSl. 
The constitution stated that France and the overseas peoples 
formed a union based upon equality -- but this union was 
definitely French in nature, into whi~h Algerians had to be 
assimil~ted52. 
A number of educated Algerians supported assimilation, with 
Ferhat A:.,bas (who was to become a FLN leader, stating in as 
late as 1936: "Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would 
be a nationalist and I wnuld not blush as if I had committed a 
crime ... However, I will not die for the Algerian nation, 
because it does not exist. I have not found it. I have 
examined History, I questioned the living and the dP-ad, I 
vis.:..ted cemeteries; nobocy spoke to me about it. I then turned 
to the Koran and I sought for one solitary verse forbidding a 
Muslim from integrating himself with a non-Muslim nation. I 
did not find that either. One cannot build on the wind"53. 
The Rhodesians never entertained any ideas of assimilating 
even a small number of ~he local population, and their myLh 
was probably the most overtly racist. "I cannot see in my 
lifetime that the Africans will be sufficiently mature and 
reasonable to take over !f we ever have an African majority 
[government] in this country we will have failed in our 
policy, because our policy is one of trying to make a place 
for the white man," said Ian Smith after becoming prime 
minister54 . Even more <plicitly, Smith summed up the attitude 
of his regime in a speech during the 1970 election campaign: 
"Sixty years ago, Africans were uncivilized savages, walking 
around in skins. They have made tremendous progress but they 
have an awful long way to go"SS. 
Thus, the prevalent myth of the ancien regimes centred around 
European superiority -- stated explicitly by the Rhodesians; 
euphemistically by the Portuguese with their "civilising 
mission"; and more subtly by the French, who wanted to 
assimilate Algerians into the French nation. The fact remains, 
however, that the local populations were viewed as being 
backward in their development and civilisation. 
3.3.2. The nature of the political institutions 
The third major element of a political order is found in its 
political institutionc. Moore56 argues that a revolution 
"engages a considerable portion of the population, and results 
in a change in the structure of government". Thus, when the 
structure of a government is altered in a revolution, the most 
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visible change is usually the introduction of new political 
institutions. 
Samuel Huntington57 , who bases his theo~y of revolution 
primarily on the relationship bet\> een modernisation a.1d 
political institutions, differentiates between what he terms 
"modern" and "traditiona!" societies. In tradit~onal societies 
there is limited suppo~t for political institutions and a low 
level of institutionalisation (participation in institutions), 
which results in low legitimacy for the regime58. Modern 
societies with a high level of legitimacy, on the other hand, 
are characterised by a high level of institutionalisation and 
support for government institutions59. 
Huntington argues that economic and social change brought 
about by modernisation creates new groups, with new and 
different demands on the political institutions60. The 
political institutions should, therefore, be altered in the 
direction of those of a "modern" society. If the political 
institutions fail to modernise, or do not modernise fast 
enough, the political community is threatened and 
revoluLionary p,itential heightened61 . This aspect is of prime 
importance for Huntington62, who argues that if the political 
institutions have no capacity to expand and "broaden 
participation within the sys~~m", a revolution will most 
likely occur, particularly if major groups in society are 
mobilised by a common ideology63. 
In a similar fashion, the first cause of revolution which 
Charles Tilley64 identifies is the f a ilure of the government 
to make provision for new groups to join ~h- polity -- usually 
the result of inflexible political inst itut ions. ~ccording to 
Tilley, a revolution is almost certain to occur if groups 
emerge which articulate claims th'l.t the y should govern; if 
these claims are supported by a large se~1t1ent of the 
population; and if the governm&nt either loo~es its ability or 
will to coerce65. 
3.3.2.1. Controlled by the white minorities 
The a • ministration of Algeria (which was treated as a province 
0£ France) wa~ the responsibility of the Minister cf the 
InLerior, ~~a was represented in the country by the governor-
general. The governor-general, who was by tradition never a 
pied noir, was one of ehe most senior officials of the French 
Republic66 . 
Under him fell the prefects of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine 
-- areas which were considered as departments of France and 
thus allowed to send senators and deputies to the National 
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Assembly in Paris. Init ially only the pied noirs voted to 
1ecide who should repres~nt these Alge~~an areas in Faris67. 
However, with the introduction of a second coll~ge (for 
Musli•~j ), both groups could send re~resentatives to Faris 
in 1940 ~ach college could send eight senators and fifteen 
deputi~~ 6a. The implication of this is obvious: th~ voting 
power of o ne million whites equalled that of eight million 
Muslims. 
Furthermore, "laws specifically relating to Algeria were 
adapted or initiated by a 'regi me of decrees' estaLlished in 
1834"69. This me ant that the administration could introduce 
laws without the support of the P.ied no ir o r Muslim 
assemblies. 
The lower l e •·el p o litical institutions evo ked the most 
resentment, l~cause t h~y were tho institution~ the local 
population had to ~e~l wi th in day-to -da1 life. Different 
institutions were used for t he pieds noirs and the Muslims. In 
areas dominated by eieds noir~, the local political 
institution (called the communes de plein exercice) was based 
upon the metropolitan system o f a mayo r and an elected 
municipal council, in which 60 pe-•-~nt o f the seats were 
reserved for colons70. 
In areas dominated by Muslims, the local institutions were 
known as the communes ~· ~t~s, and c ons isted of a whit9 
admi nistrator, governing wi ~h the help of Musl i m local 
officials or caids, who were often very c orrupt71. The reform-
mir.ded governor-generaJ Jacques Soust P.ll o v1.ewed the system of 
l Jcal government and administrat i on as "the heart of t he 
_Joi. i tical problem·• in Algeria 72. 
In t ~·~ p n o ne Africa, the fascist pol ici&s o f Salazar were 
also~, ~lec ted in the political institut ions. The Colonial Act 
of 1930 r c abl ishcd the principles of Portuguese c o lonial rule 
which re.n "J.ine d in forc e, with minor cnanges, until the 
independence of the arE:.'iS 73. Direct, central:i.sed rule was 01!e 
o f the nain pol.tical a ~s of this colonial policy74 . Ind~ed 
it woul d have beef' 1..ontrary to the idea of the unity betwt:"'·· 
metropolis and colo . t ie· s to allow any form of self-government. 
!or Angola, Mozambique. ~nd Guinea-Bissau75. 
There was a minimal flow of ideas between Angola, Mozambique, 
and Guinea-Bissau on the one hand, and Lisbon on the other. 
Instead, it was a one-way communication as Salazar replaced 
the high commissioners with governor-generals "who merely 
administered policies formulated by the Overseas Ministery117 6. 
Within the fascist state, local institutions and even the 
Mozambican Provincial Assembly served only as a rubber stamp 
of these policies77, because the government never "had any 




them any say in affairs"78. 
3.3.2.2. No fundamental reforms 
The old regime generally failed to carry out incremental 
reform to prevent revolutionary energy building up -- and when 
they did announce reforms, these were sel~om fully 
implemented. 
For example, after WWII the French announced reforms which 
would give Eur opeans and Muslims thei~ own parliamentary 
house. s~all as this concession was~- the French would still 
control the coun~ry -- the ad.miuistration decided to turn the 
elections for the Muslim Assembly into 0 a mastE:!rpiece of 
rigging1179. Only "loyal" Muslims were allowed to win seats 
through blatant ~ lection fraud: at Djelfa the government 
candidate received 800 votes, while only 500 voters were 
registered80. The correspondent for Le Monde, usually 
sympathetic to the government, wrote that "the rigging of the 
elections of the Second College has bec ome a byword in 
Algeria. Today, even the most evolue of Algerian nationalists 
wi ll say to you: 'These elections are a farce. If you consider 
us incaE,, ..lble of voting, then why not admit it openly?' 11 8 1 . 
While the pieds.!l_oirs were elated by the fact that the 
reforms were not implemented, more astute observers of the 
Algerian scene were aware of brewing trouble. In 1931, a year 
after France 11ad celebrate:d a hundred years of presence in 
Algeria, gover~or-general Maurice Violette warned 
prophetically: "(B) efore twenty years are u., we will know the 
gravest of difficulties in North Africa• 82 Another Frenchman, 
Jacques Cheva~lier, warned that the pres~nt tactics of rigged 
elections could encourage the Muslims "to attempt to unite 
themselves in a kind of policy o f the worst, and to push them 
into compromising themselves in a desperate gesture"83. A year 
before the outbreak of the Algerian war of independence, 
Professor Charles-Andre Julien stated: "It is by closing the 
normal paths of legality to a mass of eight million people 
that one risks driving it back into the arms of the declared 
adversaries of la presence francaise, who aim to solve the 
Algerian problem by force 11 84. 
The Portuguese, on the other hand, ad.ministered their 
possessions as colonie' until 1951, when they termed them 
"overseas provinces" and moved nominally away from the 
dictatorial powers of the governors of the colonies in an 
attempt to gain ad.mission to the United Nat ions85. 
Still, the local populations found themselves in a situation 
where they ~ere not allowed a say in decisions that affected 
~..J---- ---------- - - ------- - -- -
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their daily lives, their province. or even their country. 
Being a fascist one-party state with laws aimed at limiting 
participation hv the loc~l population, elections in the 
Lusophone colonies "were always a total sham 11 86. Munslow87 
states that by 1961 there were only 29 587 registered voters 
in Mozambique. while t-he population was about 6,7 million. In 
the 1973 election, only two percent of the population cast 
their vote becauqe of the restrictions on voter 
registrat.ioni38. 
While the French gave a limited vote to all the Muslims (and 
then rigged the elections), and the Portuguese placed 
extremely strict educational barriers .1.n the way of the local 
population, the nJ-lodesians re~~ ~ed to their economic power to 
prevent Africans from voting. Under the 1969 constitution, 
Africans obtJined sixteen seats in the Rhodesian parliament, 
and the whites fifty. 
These sixteen African seats would only be increased once the 
black population contributed 24 percent of the national 
revenue through direct income tax89. Smith described the 
constitution as a "world-beater" which "sounded the death 
knell of the notion of majority rule" and "would entrench 
government in the hands of civilised Rl1odesians for all 
time"90. The reason was that in 1969 Africans had only 
contributed 0,5 percent in direct income tax, and at the rate 
at -1hich their tax contributions increased, it would take 980 
years before they would have the same amount of seats as 
1-1hites91. 
The populations of the countries in which revolutions 
occurred found themselves in a situation in which the 
prevalent myth in their country was alien and political 
institutions were virtually closed to them. These institutions 
were administered by, and reflected the interests of, the 
white political elite. 
3.3.3. The political elites 
Several scholars place great importance on the role of the 
political elite in a revolutionary situation. According to 
Chalmers Johnson92, a revolutionary situation will arise if 
the political elite is not responsive to pressures (or 
demands) on the political system. Conversely, "if the elite is 
not intransigent, simple change will occur, dysfunction will 
be relieved, and no revolution will take place93 . 
For Johnson, an elite facing a revolutionary situation has 
two options: it can accommodate the pressures, or it can 
resist them94 . If the political elite chooses the first 
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option, and accommodates the pres~ures successfully (e.g. 
through a reform process), the potential for revolution 
diminishes because the oressures on the society are eased 
through the redressiny of grievances. 
3.3.3 . 1. Mainly whites 
The Portuguese had a precise instrument to determine who were 
members of the political elite (in other words, who had access 
to, or were allowed to serve in, political institutions). The 
Regime do Indigenato was formalised in 1928, and divided 
Africans and mulattos into two groups95. A small number who were 
literate, gainfully employed, and who had rejected tribal 
custom, were classified as assimilados -- they then enjoyed the 
same privileges as Portuguese citizens96. The majority of the 
population, which did not meet these criteria, was classified as 
indigena a~d had to livt outside European areas and fulfill 
labour requirements97. 
In Algeria, a similar system was in operation. I n orde~ to 
become a naturalised French citizen it was necesEa~y for an 
Algerian Muslim to abandon his Koranic status (the legal rights 
which he enjoyed under Islamic law). Only those who were 
prepared to symbolically desert the Islamic community for the 
secular ideology of their conquerors were given the opportunity 
to become citizens in their own land98. 
In 1936 when the Popular Front government came to power in 
Paris, there were only 7 817 natural lsed Arab or Berber 
Algerians who had benefited from the more liberal provisions of 
the law of 1919, passed in Lhe aftermath of Algerian 
parti c ipation in the First World War99. ~he reason for this is 
p ~imarily the very strict criteria laid do~n for assimilation. 
In Rhodesia, the local population had no opportunity of 
becoming a member of the elite, as in the other countries . The 
Africans wielded no real power, and thus 4,5 percent of the 
population (the whites) were able , on 11 Nove,~er 1965 , to 
strike "a blow for the preservation of justice, civilisation and 
Christianity" by declaring Rhodesia independentl00. 
The co-optation of members of the non-elite js often used as an 
anti-revolutionary strategyl0l . However, the ancien regimes 
allowed for no such a safety valve, and the revolutionary 
pressures continued to increase in ~he African countries. 
It was shown above that the white groups , albeit small , h~ld 
political power firmly in their hands. Their myths formed the 
basis of the laws of the colonies, they administered the 
political institutions and controlled access to them -- jn 
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short, the whites were the political elites. The local 
populations, although subdued by the wars of pacification", 
could and would not accept this situation perpetually. 
3.4. Reaction to the political order 
3.4.1. Simmering discontent and nationalism 
Maurice Viollette, former governor-general of Algeria, warned 
the French in 1936 following the rejection of a bill allowing 
for greater integration: 
"When the Muslims p>:otest, you are indignant; when they 
approve, you are suspicious; when they keep quiet you are 
fearful. Messieurs, these men have no political nation. They 
do not even demand their religious nat~on. All they ask is to 
be admitted into yours. If you refuse this, beware lest they 
do not soon create one for themselves 11 102. 
Two strands of Algerian nationalism can be identified between 
the two world wars : the religious movement, tr~ Association 
des Ulema of Sheikh Ben Badis, and the revoJu: 1ary movement 
of Messali Hadj and his followersl0 3. The li ~r~l Ferhat 
Abbas, who favoured assimilation, was lat.er t c c::hange his 
views and support independence. 
After the crushing of Abd-el-Kader's revolt, the Muslim 
reljgious leaders kept alive the nat_onalist ideal in Algeria. 
Ben Badis' movement had a simple, yet revolutionary slogan: 
"Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my 
country10 4 . 
In 1927 Messali Hadj formea the Etoile Nord-Africaine, an 
organisation for Algerian workers in Paris. He argued for a 
type of populist socialism, which included the redistribution 
of land among the Algerian peasants , or fellahs. By 1933 he 
was advocating a struggle ~or independence, universal 
suffrage, "revolution" in Algeria, and the confiscation of 
colon landl0S. Messali was jiiled for several sp~lls, and the 
Etoile Nord-Africaine dissolved, only to emerge under 
different names. 
In Rhodesia no serious resistance to white rule occurred 
after the crushing of the Chimurenga. However, in 1960 four 
persons who were to play a major role in the struggle for 
independence of Zimbabwe formed the National Democratic Party. 
Joshua Nkomo, Ndabanig~ Sithole, Robert Mugabe and Herbert 
Chitepo hoped to pressurise the British into granting 
independence by non-violent actions such as rallies and 
marchesl06. Britain di1 not, and the NOP and its Youth Wing 
were banned, but emerged in 1962 as the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU). A year later, Sithole broke away to 
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form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Sitho le was 
supporc ed by the Shona people, and Nkomo primarily by the 
Ndebele. Fierce fighting between supporters of the movements 
characterised the early existence of these movements. 
The tight control over African protest in the Lusophone areas 
led to more subtle criticism. 
In Angola, for example, Viriato da Cruz founded the magazine 
A Mensagem in 1950 in which the Salazar regime was criticised 
in p o ems and oth6r literary works 1 07 . Da Cruz, an intellectual 
and founder-menhe~ o f the MPLA of which he became the first 
secretary-general (1956-1962 ) w, s dismissed from his job in 
the administration wn-~n A Mensagem was banned after its second 
issue 108. 
-.:n Mozambique , the ,e.,•spaper O African::> was established iri 
1908 for "the de "ense of the native population 11 109_ Its 
!3Uccessor, Q. Bra,jo Afric.1110 (The African Voice) continued in 
thia tradition, 1 ri publi. hed reports highlighting the 
discrimination aga. nst and ~xploitation of Africans. 
3.4.2. Violent reprP.ssion by t ne authorities 
In all the countries, - he old r imes 1." id n o ... hesitate to use 
vio lence in an effort t o root ou•. p rotest. The extent o f the 
violence varied, the mos t b ~ ital .1. rs tances occ urr i ng in 
Algeria. 
On 8 May, 1945 -- VE Day - - the Mu~ lim inhabitants of Setif 
turned d march celebrating peace in Europe into a 
demonstrat i on for independence. The police opened fire on 
some 8 000 nationalist demonstrators, mostly supporters of 
M0 s~ li Hadj. This sparked off brutal attacks on colons. 
Muslims fanned into the countrys i de, claiming that a jihad 
(holy war) had broken out, and killed 103 Europeansll0. 
The European population formed armPd bands, killing 
indiscriminately, while the French A~my bombed forty •il~age~ 
with dive-bombers, and ~ cruiser of the Navy bc:nbarded the 
Kerrata area. The report3 on the number of Muslim deaths 
varied: the official TubP.rt commission placed the loll at 
between 1 020 and 1 300, while academic Robert Ai ~ put the 
figure at 6 000, and Gor~onlll advanced a figure of 80 000. 
Algerian nationalists, and Cairo Radio, claimed tha t 45 000 
people diedl12. 
Even if the most conservative figure is considered, ... ~e 
retaliation still amounted to overkill by a large fac n~ . 
Thus,"[f)or all the gen~ ral ignorance in metropolitan France 
of what happened at s~tif, the i~pact on Algerians was 
incalculable, and ineradicable"ll~. 
- ,.,. 4.. . •· .. . 
- ___ d_ _ ~..L _ u _ 1 - .. 
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In a more or less similar event -- although on a smaller 
scale -- a number of Mozambicans staged a protest at Mueda. On 
16 June 1960 troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing 
between 36114 and 600115. However, like Setif, "[i : f any 
single day marks the end of an old and the beginning of a new 
era in the country's history, it was this"ll6. 
In Guinea-Bissau too, the Portu~ese cracked down on protest. 
On 3 August 1959 the police opened fire on strikir - doc~ 
workecs, killing more than fifty 1.n what became k n as the 
Pidjiguit i Massacre, and on 19 September 1959 the PAIGr opted 
for an arned struggle against the Portuguese1 17 . 
3 . 5. Conclusion: lack of legitimacy 
T'1e central characteristic of all t :1e political or 1ers 
ex~~ined here i~ the fact that the populations did rot 
ackno"•lej,ge the moral right of the ancien regime to r .1le. The 
rulers c.ad r.o legitimacy. 
Apter1 18 defines legitimar,y as being "r~latPrl +-o ace~ -:_-f' 
conceptions held by significant members of the polity about 
the rightness of a oolitlcal pattEc rn, wLich, in turn, provides 
the patterns with a set of properties. Legitimacy is thus a 
behavioural term refe~ring to a set of lin,its on governmental 
action. It is with referenc~ to legitimacy that right conduct 
in office is defined. ·~1en legitimacy is withdrawn, government 
is weakenec."119. 
For Johnsonl20 the 1· ~1.Ls that legitimacy places on 
qovarnment actior i '1atural consequence •>f the fact that 
t!1e members of sec .. • , "authorize the us1:: of force" 'i:.-y a 
r gime. Thus, a }i=- - c~ govern.~1ent. ha$ the right to use 
force th....ough its _ ~• utions. However, \hen the r~gime f_nds 
itself in a poq tion 1.n which more and mor~ force is requir~i 
to contain social problems (or what Johnson terns pressures on 
the social syetern), the legitimacy of the regime will 
declinel2l. This is c 1.early illustrated in the African 
revolutions, where rulers with no moral duthority to use 
force, had to use i: more and ffiore to repress protest. 
Samuel Huntington122 also argues thac political stability is 
determi:ied by legitimacy, or what he calls "political 
corr .. -nu 1ity" -- a general agreement by the population that the 
re· \.n, has a right to function, is functioning properly, and 
sho,, .!. ..! continue to do so in future. 
In the African countries which experienced revolutions, 
this ~,n l itical community" was restricted to the whites. The 
polit1 1• community was based on the belief that the Europeans 
were s~ - rior, white values were reflected in the political 
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institutions, which were d ominated by the Europeans and failed 
to accornrnc date the local populations. In all the territories , 
the administration was clearly non-democratic. As the rulers 
remained intransigent and the local populat i ons grew more 
adamant in their requests for reform, the divide between the 
groups continued to grow. 
************************************~* 
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The socio-economic order: oor livin conditions add t~ 
grievannes 
4.1 . Introduction 
All the counrries which experienced revolutions were not only 
characterised by the concentration of political power in the 
hands of a ffiinority, but by inequality and exploitation in the 
socio-economic order as well. 
Before these aspects d t e examined, the demography of the 
countries will be anal~sed, thus giving some idea of the size of 
the different ethnic groups . This being done, attention will 
then be paid to the control of the means of production. The 
groups which control the economy can dictate the nature of the 
economic order . The ruling elite , which represented the colonial 
power directly or indirectly , controlled the means of production 
in the African countries , and determined the economic order. 
The economies of most of the African countries revolved around 
the exploitation of primary resources. Agriculture in particular 
played a large role. The Europeans , who gained control of large 
areas of fertile land, played the leading role in this sector. 
In the countries which had minerals, these were in the hands of 
the elite as well. 
The fact that the Europeans held the economic power in their 
hands meant that they could to a large extent determine the 
pattern of employment in the countries. Unemployment and 
underemployment were frequent, further lessening the ecvnomic 
power of the local populations, who found themselves drawn into 
a western-type economy. In order to earn a wage, hundreds of 
thousands became migrant workers. 
A final aspect in the examination of che socio-economic order 
is education and health care. Here again, glaring inequaJities 
between the education and health facilities for the local 
populations and the Europeans were evident. 
4 . 2 . Damoqraphy of the countries 
4 . 2.1 . Number of whites 
Im.Migration to the African countries increased after World Wa r 
One , but particularly after World War Two , and this would have 
an effect on the structure of th~ population, as shown below. 
Although they controlled the political and social orders of the 
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Afr~can countries, the whites were numerically weak in 
compar:son to the local populations. 
F~ llc.,wing the defeat of Abd-el-Kader and the integration of 
Algeria into France, immigration to Algeria was encouraged. In 
1841 there were about 37 000 colonists, or pieds noirs , in 
Algeria and about three million Muslimsl. 
Events in Europe provided a steady stream of immigrants --
ref~g~es from the revolution of 1848 as well as the Franco-
Prussi · ~ wcr of 1871. The pied noir population had risen to more 
than 200 ~00 by 18712. Waves of Spanisn, Italian, and M ltese 
immigrants further increased the numbers of the colons, so that 
at the end of World War One only one in five of the pieds noirs 
~as of French or:gin. 
The 2ieds noirs were not a monolithic block. The group 
included peoole of all shades of political opinion, and there 
was a nuge ga~ between the rich land-owners and the poor petits 
bl&ncs. Eighty per cent of pieds noirs were salary earners, and 
on average they earned only about half of what their colleagues 
in metropolitan France were earning3. 
At the start of armed hostilities in 1954 there were one 
million settlers -- the second largest white community (after 
South Africa} on the continent, as opposed to nine million 
Algerians. Algeria presented "the settler problem to end all 
settler problems"4. 
It is interesting to note the increase in numbers of whites in 
Angola. At the uegir,11ing of the twentieth century there were 9 
000 whites in the countryS. By 1940 this figure had risen to 40 
000, and in 1950, after World War Two, it reached 79 0006. In 
the following five years, it increased to 140 0007, and at the 
start of the war of independence in 1961 there were about 200 
000 whites in Angola8. This increased to 290 000 in 1970, and to 
335 000 in 19739. 
In Mozambique, there were about 230 000 Portuguese at the start 
of the war of independence. T~ey lived mainly in the south and 
close to the coastal lowlands; 80 percent of the whites were 
born in Eur~pe, which clearly demonstrates their recent arrival 
in the countrylO. Newittll indicates that there were only 48 200 
whites in Mozambique in 1950, which provides some insight into 
the extent of immigration after World War Two. 
Unlike Mozambique, Angola, and Algeria, a serious effort to 
establish a large white settler community in Guinea-Biss~u was 
never made, partly because the Portuguese did not envisage the 
development of adequate economic opportunities in the disease-
ridden colony12. In 1928 there were 983 whites in the country 
and by 1950 there were only 2263 -- mostly officials and 
traders 13 . 
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In Lusophone Africa, the white settlers and administrators 
were often overtly racist in belief and action; yet Portugal 
liked to claim that it represented non-racialism in Africa --
and pointed to the mestico population as proof of 
intermarriage between black and white1 4 . The reason for this 
was that Portugal, when rebutting criticism on its colonial 
policies, could point to her aim of assimilating and 
civilising the local population. Thus, in her attempt to 
convince the world of the reality of her mission to create a 
multi-racial community, the Portuguese "were prepared to 
totally ignore the prejudices of the local settlers who did 
not have the power or influence to combat them1115. However, 
despite the lack of laws to establish job reservation, or even 
racial separat1on, the whites were the major force in the 
Lusophone s~cieties. 
In 1978, Rhodesia had about 260 000 whites16, who made up 4,5 
percent of the total population17 . Like in the other 
countries, the white group increased dramatically after WWII 
-- from 83 500 in 1946 to 138 000 in 195118. Breytenbach 
points out that they did not move to Rhodesia as a result of 
encouragement by a colonising power, but in spite of it1 9. 
Generally, the whites did not have strong roots in the 
country: at the time of the 1969 census, only 21 percent of 
the people older than 21 years were born in the country20. 
This explains why "every crisis has generated a distinct 
exodus", so that between 1961 and 1964 a total of 55 700 
whites left the country, and one in two of the people who had 
arrived in 1966 had left by March 196921. 
4.2.2. Number of local population 
Algeria had one of the highest birth rates in the world. When 
the French conquered Algeria in 1830, the population was about 
3 million, by 1906 it had risen to 4,5 million, and due to 
modern medicine, which kept down the infant mortality rate, 
the population had shot up to about nine million in 195422. 
During the twenty years prier to the outbreak of the war, the 
urnar. population of Algeria had doubled; it was estimated that 
the Muslim population was growing ten times faster than the 
colon population23. 
The Lusophone colonies were 23 times the size of Portugal24 . 
By 1970 they had a population of 13-14 million, of which half 
a million were civilian Portugue8e or other Europeans25. 
Mozambique had an estimated population of eight million in 
1970, with the population density increasing toward the south 
of the country26. 
In Guinea-Bissau, the total population increased from an 
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estimated 502 457 in 1950 to 521 336 in 1960, and to 777 214 
in 197027 . The majority of these people lived in rural areas; 
Bissau, the capital and largest urban area, had only 17 255 
inhabitants in 195028. 
4.2.2.1. Different ethnic groups 
The oldest inhabitants of Algeria are the Berbers of the Aures 
and Kabylid, who comprised the largest proportion of the 
Muslims at the outbreak of the war in 195429. However, less 
than a third retained their language and culture, and the rest 
were classified as Arabised Berbers. The Kabyles and Arabs had 
had their differences in the past, a factor which the French 
exploited in their administration of Algeri~30. 
The Balantes form the largest ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau 
(in 1950, they numbered 160 000 out of a total population of 
502 457). This anarnist ethnic group lived in the coastal and 
southern areas, and their social system was egalitarian and 
decentralised, with each village under the leadership of a 
council of elders31. 
The Fulas and Manjacas were the second and third largest 
groups, and were Islamic and less egaJitarian. Their society 
was divided into three groups -- chiefs, traders, and 
slaves32. 
Although the different ethnic groups of Guinea-Bissau speak 
different languages, there develoF~d after colonisation a form 
of creole Portuguese which is now ~Jed as the lingua franca in 
the whole of the country33. 
In 1970, the Maka-Lomwe was the largest of the ten ethno-
linguistic groups in Mozambique, with its three million 
members inhabiting the central plateau of the country3 4 . This 
Islam-influenced group was in the past active in the slave 
trade, raiding amongst its northern neighbours, the Makonde 
and Yao (175 000 and 200 000 in 1970)35. 
The second largest group was in the south. The 1,8 million 
strong Thonga group was strongly represented amongst migrant 
workers on the South African mines36. 
4.2.2.2. Persons of mixed race 
In the Portuguese colonies a sizable group of people of mixed 
race developed. Numerically they could not compare to either 
the white or the local populations, but they were to wield 
cremendous influence during the revolutions in Portuguese 
Africa. 
Newitt37 gives the following figures -- based on the census 
of 19~0 -- for mesticos in Portuguese colonies: Angola 29 648; 
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Mozambique 25 149; Guinea-Bissau 4 568 ; and the Cape Verde 
Islands 103 251. With the exception of the Cape Verde Islands, 
the mesti<;_Qs were small groups within the countries. The 
Portuguese claim that intermarriage was common in their 
colonies is contested by Parsons38, who cites the small number 
of intermarriages in civil mar iages during 1954 as proof. Of 
the 158 such marriages, 136 of the males married within their 
race group, while only 18 men married me~ticos, and no 
marriages occurred between Africnns and whites39. 
For Parsons40, sexual liaisons between white men and the 
local population were "occasioned more by the absence of white 
women from the colonial scene than anything else" -- hence the 
term mulheres de necessidade for these encounters. 
However, the mesticos wielded influence far greater than 
their small numbers would indicate. In 1960, about 13 000 of 
the 30 000 mesticos in Angola were concentrated in Luanda, 
where they held jobs in the administration, and "many had a 
level of education vecy much higher than that of the white 
immigrants 1141 . Thirty percent of all Mozambican mesticos lived 
in Lourenco Marques42. 
In this sense, the mesti9~s can be said t o be marginal to the 
populations of Lus ~phone Africa. According to the theory of 
mass society (an attempt by amongst others Hannah Arendt and 
William Kornhauser to explain revolutions) an individual who 
differs markedly from the rest of the population, either 
through education or ethnicity, may experience "social 
atomization and extreme individu~lization114 3. Within such a 
situation revolutionary mobilisation occurs more readily, 
because these atomised persons are anxious to establish new 
groups to belong to44. 
4.2.3. Assimilation 
The Portuguese and French defended their rule in the African 
countries by stressing their policy of assimilaLion, through 
which it was possible for an African to become integrated into 
a European nation45. Only a small portion of the inhabitants 
of Lusophone Africa ever became assimilated, because of the 
stringer.t rules laid down for assimilation. The ind'gena had 
to be ~t l~ast eighteen years old and be able to speak 
Portuguese correctly; had to earn sufficient income to support 
himself and his family; had to produce two testimonies stating 
that he was of good character; had to attain a sufficient 
level of education; had to submit a birth certificate and one 
stating that he was in good health; had to submit a 
declaration of loyalty; and had to have paid the necessary 
taxes and fees 46. These obstacles proved to be nearly 
insurmountabl~ for an indiqena wishing to become an 
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assimilado, and the following figures appeared in the 1950 
census for Lusophone Africa: 
Angola~ 30 089 assimil&dos out of a population of 4 006 598 
(0, 74%) 
Mozambique: 25 149 assimilados out of a population of 5 646 
957 (0, 44%) 
Guinea-Bissau: 1 478 assimilados out of a population of 502 
457 (0,39\)47. 
According to Figueiredo48, less than one percent of Angolans 
had, at the time of the outbreak of the war of independence, 
"qualified for citizenship status in their own country, and 
that as an adminis~rative concession and not as a right". 
In Algeria, , 817 Muslims became French citizens between the 
twc world wars 49. rhe Xuslims ~ad to desert the Islamic 
community for the secular ideology of their conquerors in 
order to become "true Frenchmen"50_ 
Thus, the Portuguese and French, although claiming that the 
local inhabitants had the opportunity to become assimilated 
with the European country, effectively prevented them from 
doing so. 
4 .3. Type of economic control 
Many scholars view alterations in the economic order of a 
society as a characteristic of revolution. For exa~ple, 
Neuman51 considers the alteration of the system of property 
control a vital element in the process of revolution. 
The writer who made the greatest contribution in making the 
economic analysis of revolution (and indeed, of society) a law 
unto itself was Karl Marx. Marx saw a revolution as "a cha,1ge 
in the ~ode of production with the consequent change in all 
subordinate elements of the social complex 11 5 2 . The different 
economic orders, or epochs, in thr ~istory of man can be 
attributed to various types of owne~ qhip, because the owners 
of the mode of production determine Li•e economic structure. 
Marx's view of revolution is uni-ca,~, --tl: the type of 
ownership leads to specific social and !ass relations, and 
the tensions and contradictions ere te•l t-y these will 
eventually lead to revolution53. Som these contradictions 
were visible in Africa as well, and c ... · "' seen as a cause of 
revolution. 
4.3.1. Means of production under control or ~he whites 
In Algeria, the colons soon dominated the agr~:ultural-based 
economy, and most of the fertile land was ownc~ by either the 
French government or by settlers. The pieds noir~ became 
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Firstly, marshal! Pere Bugeaud, who led the French in the 
"pacification" of Abd-el-Kader's revolt, was instrumental in the 
seizure of Arab land by colonists. He advocated the following 
policy: "Wherever there is fresh water and fertile land, there 
one must locate colons, without concerning oneself to whom these 
lands belong"54. At the end of World War One, Muslims owned 
about 66 percent of farmland, which usually consisted of the 
less fertile areasSS. 
The acquisition of land by the French was of such a nature that 
Wheatcroft56 concludes that it overturned "the customary pattern 
of landholding on which the fabric of Islam social and economic 
relationships wer~ based". 
In Rhodesia, "land was the main instrument of social control in 
addition to being the main source of wealth"57. The whites set 
out to entrench thei~ acquisition of land with the Land 
Apporti onment Act of 1931 and the more rigid Land Tenure Act, 
which was passed by the Rhodesian Fron► qovernment in 196958. 
This gave the whites the best farmland at the expense of the 
more numerous rural blacks. 
In Lusophone Africa, the fascist policies of Salazar were 
reflected in the economic o rder as well. Direct centralised 
rule, and a balanced budg were the main political and economic 
aims of this colonial policy59 . 
4.4 . Dominance of primary ••c~or 
4.4.1. Agriculture 
It was noted above that the French acquired a large amount o f 
good farm land. Moreover , their superior and more scientific 
approach to agriculture helped the~ to turn previously infertile 
areas into rich farming areas (cultivated land increased from 2 
000 square miles in 1830 to 27 000 in 1954) and they introduced 
new crops, of which vines became the most important60. 
Agriculture was the mainstay of the Algerian economy, but the 
local population found itself pushed to the less fertile lands 
by the French. By 1930, only an average of seven percent of land 
in fertile areas belonged to Muslims61. 
At the start of the Algerian war of independence, two percent 
of the agricultural population owned more than 25 percent of all 
farming land62. Furthermore, the number of pieds noirs who lived 
on farms declined from 200 000 after World War Two to 93 000 at 
the start of the war of independence (out of a populati n of 
about one million)63. However, they still controlled about seven 
million acres of the most fertile agricultural land in 
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Algeria64 . This resulted in larger colon farms. In the Oran 
district, 750 pieds noirs owned about 55 000 hectares, while 
in Kabylia several Algerians often had joint ownership of a 
solitary fig tree65_ The difference between French and 
Algerian farmers i clearly illustrated when the size of 
farms, as we l l as approximate earnings, are considered. In 
1954, colon farms comprised on average 123,7 hectares; Muslim 
farms only 11,6, while their respective earnings were £2800 
and £100 66 . Andrews67 states that Qied noir farmers owned 95 
percent of all tractors in Algeria, which reveals the 
difference between the two groups regarding the use of modern 
implements. 
The rise of the wine industry in Algeria did little to 
benefit Muslims. The wine industry has~ cyc~ical need for 
labour and did not alleviate the unemployment problem. Wine 
offended the religion of the Muslim and vines were planted on 
land which was previously planted witl1 staples68_ Thi s 
increase in the production of vines furthermore led to the 
decline of ~uslim agricultural potential as more and more 
peasant land was t~rned into French farms. The amount o f 
grazing land declined, as well as yield (coupled with a high 
birth rate), which meant that w~ile each Algerian had 21,5 
bushels of grain per year in 1870, this figure had dropped to 
7,2 by 195069_ 
The Rhodesian Land ApportionmPnt Act and the Land Tenure Act 
gave the whites, of which few were rural, the same amount of 
land as the more numerous rural blacks. Both groups had 70 230 
square miles, which resulted in a populativn density of 46,6 
persons per square mile in the black Tribal Trust lands, and 
3,7 persons per square mile in the white areas70. In 1974, 33 
percent of all employed Africans (345 700 out of 909 000) were 
working in the agricultural sector, where they earned an 
average annual wage of £101, .. •s opposed to t.1e 4 700 (out of 
118 600) whites in tue same sector, who earned on average £2 
257 per year71. 
4.4.2. Minerals 
The mineral wealth of the countries varied, with Guinea-Bissau 
and Mozambique having virtu: lly no known reserves, while 
Ji.ngola and Algeria were known to have huge reserves, some ot· 
\ol'hich were discovered prior or during the war of independence. 
In Angola, the Companhia d ~ Diamantes de Angola (Diamang) was 
formed in 1917 to mine diamonds which werP discovered in the 
Lunda area in 1912. The concession that the company held 
covered large areas of the north-eastern part of the 
cc,unt:ry 72 . In effect, Diamang was the Portuguese arm of t .he De 
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Beers diamond conglomerate, altho ugh 40 percent of shares were 
at first in British or Belgium hands 73. The colonial power 
held 5 percent, which lat3r rose to 11,5 percent74. Between 
1965 and 1970, mineral export doubled and amounted to 170 
million pounds in 197075. 
The extent of the Algerian oil reserves was not yet known at 
the start of the war of independence. However, once it became 
known, it hardened French resolve for Algerie francaise, while 
simultaneously increasing the motivation of the revolutionary 
;novement 7 6 . 
4.5. Labour 
4.5.1. Large-scale unemployment 
Almost eighty percent of the pied noir labour force consisted 
of either salaried employses or merchants, with the remainder 
working in the agricultural sector77 . The gap between the very 
rich and very ~oor was smaller in France than in Algeria with 
its grands colons tycoons; the gap between poor whites (petits 
blancs) and Muslims was often quite slender7 B. The average 
French worker earned less than half of his mainland 
counterpart's salary, but could obtain advantage s, like 
domestic servants, unavailable in France79. 
The situatinn of the average Muslim wcrker was quite 
different. 
DunnBO states that the majority of the population was 
"economically marginal to a degree to which no member of an 
industrial working class in employment could in principle 
become". Furthermore, the traditional suppo~t structures had 
disint egrated as a result of colonisation. Th3 Algerian 
population was p=imarily a "vast lumpenproletariat"Bl. 
In 1955, the Maspetiol Report revealed that about one million 
Algerians were unemployed, with a further two million 
seriously underemployed -- out of a total population of nine 
millionB2. This meant that a farm labourer worked on average 
(if female labour is included) only thirty-five days per year, 
earning only 100 old francs ($0,22) per dayB3. Earnings for 
Muslims were much better in the cities. The national average 
for Muslims was 16 000 old francs per year, still thirty times 
less than the average pied noi~ income. Peasants moved to the 
cities in increasing _nwnbersB4. Algerian peasants furthermore 
suffered crop failures and successive famines. In 1945, Albert 
Camus found such dire poverty in Kabylia that children fought 
"with dogs for the content of a rubbish bin"BS , 
Between 1936 and 1948 the ?Opulation of Algiers increased by 
42 percent, with most of the newcow~rs living in bidonvilles 
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(urban slums)86. The unemployment rate tor Muslims in urban 
areas rose to 25 percent, and this led to great discontent87. 
Unlike the French, the Portuguese tried to extract the maximum 
labour from the inhabitants of the colonies. They did this 
primarily through forced labour. 
Caetano, Salazar's successor, explained Portugal's view on 
African workers in a lecture at the University of Lisbon in 
1954: " ... t~e t~acks of Africa are to be governed and 
organised by Europeans, but are indispensable as the latte='g 
auxiliaries ... The Africans are themselves incapable of 
developing the Lerritories they have lived in for millennia: 
they have made no useful inventions, discovered no profitable 
technology, conquered nothing that counts in the evolution of 
humanity, nothing in the fields of culture and technology can 
be compared with the achievements of turopeans or even of 
Asiatics. The blacks of Africa are thus to be treated as 
productive elPments organised or to be organiseo in an economy 
directed by whites"88. 
With the introduction of the RegulamePto do Trabalho dos 
Indigenas in 1930, all able-bodied men, with the exception of 
assimilados (civilised blacks), were requi~ed to work for six 
months per ytar for a wage under contract with either a 
private employer or the state89. To enforce this law, Africans 
had to carry passbooks which recorded their last date of 
contract work, as well as their payment of taxes90. If the 
local police found an African not payi~g taxes, he was 
punished by having to work for no wage91. Over and above this, 
the Africans were drafted into groups to work on publ ic 
projects92. This labour system, designed to extract the 
maximum amount of labour from the local population, led to 
numerous abuses of~ ~kers and their families93. 
Thus, for all bu- ~ tiny minority of the inhabitants of the 
colonies, life consist~d of harsh Po~tuguese colonial rule. 
One of the most hated practices was the conscription of forced 
labour, ostensibly for public works, but frequently used in 
the prLvate sector as we1194. 
Up to the 1962 colonial reforms, authorities in Guinea-
Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique conscripted forced labour, not 
only for public works, but also tc work on private farms95. In 
the Huila region in Angola, where slavery had existed until 
1875, this forced labour "was virtually a conLinuation of 
slavery"96. 
Despite the fact that it was outlawed in the 1962 Labour 
Code, forced labour remained a fact of life, particular'J in 
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the war zones of MozambiqueS7. 
4.5.3. Migrant l?.bour 
Algerian unemployed not onJy migraced to the cities, but also 
across the Mediterranean to France, where they found 
employment and higher wages98. 
The majority of these migrant workers came from Kabylia, a 
densely populated but very poor area to the south-east of 
Al~iers. In the twelve years between 1912 and 1924, the number 
of migrant workers who left for France increased from 5 000 to 
100 000; this figuro increased after WWII, and at the outbreak 
of the war of inderendenc~ there were 500 000 Algerian migrant 
workers in France99. The wages they sent home were equal to a 
third of all agricultural wages and provided an essential 
income to 1, 5 mi 1.ll.on dependantslOO. When this flow of wages 
was cut off, as in WWII, the impact was shatteringlOl. 
Migrant lab..-: ur was important in the Lusophone colonies as 
well. In Mozambique particularly, did the Portuguese exploit 
this phenomenc: .. Antonio Enes, who laid down the early 
colonial policy in Mozambique, said: "If we do not learn 
how ... to make t~e Ne~-~ w~rk and cannot take advantage of his 
work, within a sho1 _ while we will be obliged to abandon 
hfrica to someone le5s sentimental and more 
utilitarian .•. 0 102. 
Mozambique supplied migrant labo•Jrers to neighbouring South 
Africa's gold mines. At the start of the twentieth century, 75 
perr.ent of the 54 000 Africans working on South African gold 
mines were from outside the country103. Mozambique provided 
t..he largest proportion of its labour for migrant work on the 
mines, experting annu z,lly between 25 and 33 percent of its 
wor,cforce to neighbou·:ing countries104 . From early this 
century until 1975, between 80 000 and 115 000 Mozambican 
migrants worked every year on South Afric~n mine5105. 
Migrant labour was ben~ficial for both the South African 
mining companies and the Portuguese. The mines did not need to 
pay a mi9rant worker a wage large enough to acquire 
accommodation, food, and education for his family; instead, 
the women remaining in the rural a.reas provided these 
necessities1 06. 
Portugal ttnefitted from the system of migrant workere in 
Af~ica, not only because payments were made in gold, but the 
workers had to pay taxes upon their return107. As a further 
advantage, Portugal was assured that 50 peLcent of Transvaal 
trade would pass through the port of Louren~o Marques108. 
Thus, for Munslowl09 "Po rtugal became little more than a 
rentier state riring out , labour force of its African 
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colony " . 
4 . 6 . Education and health care 
4.6.1. Education 
The chapter so far has been a catalogue of social inequalit,, 
and education and health care were no exception. In the 
Lusophone colonies , there was little schooling or health care, 
while in Algeria and Rhooesia the wnites received more funds 
than the Muslims or Africans for education and health care. 
The French gave preference to the schooling of pied noir 
~hildren. Thus, 2,5 million old francs were set aside for the 
schooling of white children in 1892; for the same year , 450 000 
old francs were allocated to the education of the more numerous 
Muslim childrenll0. At the end of World War Two, there were 200 
000 white school children and 1400 white primary schools , as 
opposed to 1 250 000 Muslim children who had to be accommodated 
in 699 primary schoolslll. 
The Portuguese did not establish state schools on a large 
scale. In 1940 Salazar reached an agreement with the Vatican 
which placert the Catholic church in charge of tr.e education of 
the indigenas in Guinea-Biss au, while only assim~lados were 
allo~ed to attend state schools112. The leve l of ~ducation in 
Guinea-Bi ssau i n particul ar was poor, and can t o a certai n 
extent explain t he small number of assimilados. Only four per 
c~nt of Guinea-Bissau ' s revenues went to education: in 1951-'52 
there we1e eleven state primary schools, with 27 teachers and 
735 pupils, and only one state secondary school, in Bissau, with 
78 pupils113. A furLher 1979 pupils received primary education 
in 55 missionary schools, and more than 5000 pupils attended 
Koranic schools114. It is not surprising that 99 , 7 percent of 
the mainland population of Guin~~-Bissau was illiterate115 . 
In the other Portuguese colonies , the situation was not much 
better. At the sta1~ of the 1960's, 8 percent of black children 
in Angola attended primary si:~,vols and 24 percent in 
Mozambique116. In Angola, 4 f19 834 people (or 96,97 percent of 
the total population) were illiterate, as were 5 615 053 
Mozambicans ( 97 , 84 percent o.« the population) 117. 
4.6.2. Health care 
The lack of education W3S reflected in the poor health carP. In 
1960 Guinea-Bissau had four ho 0 p Ltals , six health centres {n 




nurses and 73 auxilia1iesll8. 
The healLh s~rvic~ ~n the Lusophone areas was so poorly 
financed th~t ~ngola had -- at the outbreak of the war -- one 
hospital bed pe= 2250 Af , icans , but three priests for every 
medical doctorll 9 
The bad social condi• · o ... ' -: c.l to a migration of ~etwe••n five 
and ten percent of the population (250 OuO t o 400 000) to Congo, 
Northern Rhodesia, and South West Africa, i:-, search of !'ligher 
wdges and better living conditions120. 
4.7. Conclusion 
It is apparent from this analysis that the socio-economic order 
of the countries was characterised by inequality and 
exploitation, althcugh the PortuguG~e leader Salazar did not 
think so: "We believe that there are dP~adent or -- if you 
prefer -- backward racr 3 whom \o1e fee 1 w~ have a duty to lead to 
civilisation: a task of educating human beings that must be 
tackled in a humane way. That ~e do feel and act lik~ this is 
shown by the fact that there is no netwo rk ot hatred and 
subversive organisations (ln our terri~ories) whose aim is to 
reject and displace the sovereignty of Portugal"12l _ 
However, Lloyd Garrisonl22 of the New Yo r k Times wrote in 196J 
that "after interviewing scores of Africans in PortuguPse-held 
Angola as well as in the rebel north," he had a "sir1gl~ 
overwhelming impression that black and white in Angola ere 
separated by a gulf so d-ep and wide that it may never be 
bridged". 
For Dunn123, the economic order established by the French in 
Algeria was provocative, and led to resentment amongst Muslims 
of all classes. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis in Algeria not only increased 
the potential for spontaneous action by the suffering masses 
(such as the Setif uprising), but raised their political 
consciousness while further lowering the legitimacy of the 
regime. The so=io-economic problems should have alerted the ~ 
French authorities to the possibility of a revolution -- after 
all, c~E of the accelerators of the French Revolution was t~e 
poor harvest of 1788 . 
The combination of a repressive political order and an 
exploitative socio-economic order characterised the period prior 
to the revolutions in the African countries studied here. It is 
shown in the following chapter that these revol~tions were 
furthermore characterised by leaders of revolutionary movements 
whose aim was the transformation of the old order. 
, . -
~- ~ ------- ---~ ~ ~--- -
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Leadership in African revolutions 
5.1 . Introduction 
It is a characteristic of all wajor revolutions that they were 
initiated and directed by competent leaders -- for example 
Lenin and Trotsky in the Russian Revolution of 19171 . Rejai & 
Phillips2 argue that the structural conditions of a country 
will determine the mental set and range of skills of 
revolutionary leaders, because within the political and socio-
economic orders the potential rtvolutionary leader acquires 
his motivati~n and skills. 
It is , h owever, not within the scope of this pr.eject to 
ident'fy reasons why specific leaders emerged in the 
revolutions studied here. What is important here is the fact 
that the leader~ shared a number of characteristics . As is 
~ ~hewn below, they were highly educ3ted, and refused to be co-
opted by the ancien regime. 
In order to arrive at the shared characttcistics of 
revolutionary leadership, the ~spect is o/<amined on a number 
of levels. At the outset, obj~ttive crit,ria such as age , 
education , social class, and ~thnicity ~111 be considered. 
This will give a clear indication of the type of persons 
involved. Attention will hen turn to the subjective and more 
hazy area of personality . Finally, because of the range of 
factors determining a leadership personality, personality 
clashes and power struggles characterised some movements. 
5.2. Age profile of leadership 
The political leaders in a stable society tend to be the older 
members of society , primarily because political leadership is 
often equated with age and status3. 
However, research by a number of scholars indicates t hat this 
is not the ~ase in revolutionary leadership . 
Brinton4, SchuellerS, Leiden & Schmitt6 , as well as North & 
Pool 7 found in their studies of the English, French , American, 
Russian and Chinese revolutions that the average age of the 
revolutionary leaders varied between 27 years (China) and 41.8 
years (France). Thomas Greene8 furthermore notes that the 
• . . ---~ 
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revolutionaries, being compaiatively young, "are not 
constrained in their revolutionary activity by family 
responsibilities". 
5.2.1. Thirtysomething 
In the African revolutions, the leaders were of much the same 
average age as the leaders of revolutions elsewhere. (For ease 
of comparison, the age of the revolutionary leaders at the 
outbreak of armed conflict in the respective countries will be 
considered.) 
Dr. Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA, was born on 17 
September 1922, making him 39 years and nine months old at the 
outbreak of the Luanda uprising in 1961. Other important 
figures in the MPLA at that time were slightly younger: Mario 
de Andrade was 32 and Viriato da Cruz 33 years of age9. 
In another Lusophone country, Amilcar Cabral, the 
revo~utionary leader from Guinea-Bissau, was born in 1924 and 
aged 38 when armed hostilities broke ou~1 0. Dr. Eduardo 
Mondlane, Frelimo's first leader, was slightly older at the 
start of the movement's military campaign. He was born in 1920 
in Gaza province, which made hi~ 45 years of agel1 . One of his 
deputies and l?ter his successor, Samora Machel, was born on 
September 29, 1933; the Mozambican armed struggle began in 
1964 -- four day~ prior to Machel's 31st birthday12. 
The origi~el leaders ot the FLN i~ Algeria consisted on the 
whole of younger pers ons . the average age of the nine founder 
members or the FLN was 32 yearslJ. The oldest member of the 
group was MC"l'"'"'m~d Khider (45), and the youngest Mourad 
Di douche ,27)14, with FLN leader Ben Bella, aged 3615. 
In Zimbabwe, Rob~r~ Mugab~, leader of Zanu, was born in 1924, 
making him '12 years c.ld at the start of the insurgency in 
April 1966, u'"lile Josu ·1a Nkor:to , leader of Zapu, was somewhat 
older at 481~. Hc~e ✓er , the leaders of Zanu's military forces, 
Josiah Tongog,ra a~d his second-in-command and later 
successor, Rex Nhongo, were aged only 26 a ·.1d ~l respectively 
at the outbreak of armed hostiliti~s17. 
5.2.2. Effect of l ength of revolutionaL 
profile 
den leadership 
The wars of irdependence (as phases of revv J~ion) in Africa 
extended over a long period, with Breytenbach18 indicating an 
average of eighteen years. With the exception of Algeria 
(eight years), all the guerrilla wars lasted more than ten 
years, the longest being that of Swapo (23 years) 19. 
The length of the wars of independence was to have a marked 
. ~-- ----------------------- ~-- - ----
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effect on the leadership age profiles of the r~volutionary 
movements, because a leader who was in his thirties at the 
start of the guerrilla war, would have been in his forties, or 
e,•en early fifties, at the end of the war -- when the 
movements began to transform society. 
Thus, MPLA leader Neto was 53 wh _n Angola gained it-s 
independence from Portuga120, while Machel was 42 years of age 
when Mozambique became independent21 . In Zimbabwe, Robert 
Mugabe was at 56 the oldest of the African revolutionary 
leaders to take control of a new governrnent22. Ben Bella was 
44 when Algeria became an independent country23. 
An interesting aspect , which will be explored further in the 
cection dealing with leadership struggles, is the fact that 
the long revolutionary processes experienced in Africa often 
led to strife in the leadership . This time factor exposed 
various tensions in the movements, which led to the murders of 
Cabral and Mondlane by the authorities, who were aided by 
members of the revolutionary movements. 
5.3. Education and class origin of leaders 
Studies of major revolutions show that the social background 
and education of thr leaders usually differ markedly from that 
of their followers, and that in this regard a close 
resemblance exists to the elite which the revolutionary 
movement attempts to dispose24. 
Brinton25 found that 66 percent of the French revolutiona~y 
leadership was middle class, and that the leadership in the 
English, American and Russian revolutions was similarly 
dominated by the middle classes. In a study of "revolutionary 
elites in modernizing societies", Kautsky2 6 found that 93 
percent of the leaders occupied middle or upper-middle class 
positions in their societies. 
The fact that these revolutionary leaders came from the 
middle or upper-middle classes meant that they often had 
access to educat_;_onal institutions that were out of reach fo'r 
the lower classes. 
This is borne out by research by Brinton27, who found that 
the leadership of the English, French, American and Russian 
revolutions ~0ssessed excellent educational qualifications. 
Similarly, Kautsky28 found in his study of 32 revolutionary 
leaders in the developing world that 88 percent had received 
"an education appropriate to an industrialised country". 
The education of revolutionary leaders is significant for a 
number of reasons. For Eric Hoffer29, all revolutionary 
movements are "conceived not by men of action but by 
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faultfinding intellectuals " . Greene30 defines intellectuals as 
those "who are predisposed . .. to manipulate the symbolic rath~r 
than the material env~ronment". This is echoed by North & 
Poo131 when they state that the leaders in the early stages of 
a revolution are manipulators of symbols. 
Brinton32 places great emphasis on the fact that the early 
phases of a revolution are characterised by the "desertion of 
intellectuals" , who lower the l~gitimacy of the regime when 
they withdraw their support for its policies. 
It will be shown in the following section that the 
revolutionary movements studied here shared as a 
characteristic the fact there were large numbers cf 
intellect~als in their leadership. 
5 . 3 . 1. Intellectualc dS revolutionary leaders 
Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA, was the second child o F a 
Methodist pastor33. He was a "very serious minded" child, who 
obtai ned good marks at school and became one of the few black 
st~dents a ~ the Portuguese liceu (high school) in Luanda34. In 
1947, he recei ved a Methodist scoJarship, and went to Portugal 
to study mzdicine35. Having spent eleven years in Europe, Neto 
and his Portuguese wife , Lucillia, r t 11rned to Angola , where 
he was one of only 203 medical doctors36. 
Another senior MPLA leader, Mario de Andrade, studied 
Fhilosophy at the University of Lisbon , the Sorbonne and the 
Ecole Practigue dt:?s Hautes Etudes37 . De Andrade, who 
contributed much to the intellectual image of the MPLA, was 
instrumental i n the organisation of a 1957 conference of 
nationalist groups from the Portuguese African c~lonies, at 
which an umbrella organisation, the Movimento Anti-
Colonialista , was formed. Deolinda ~P Almeida , a cousin of 
Neto , studied at the Luanda liceu , the Unive~sity of Sao Paulo 
in Brazil , and the Drew University in the Unitea States on 
Methodist scholarships before returning to Angola to organise 
the MPLA's women ' s section39 . 
Amilcar Cabral was the mestico son of a Cape Verdean teacher 
and a shop owner40 . Following the separation of his parents, 
he lived a poverty-stricken youth on the Cape Verde Islands, 
and left at age 21 for Portugal to study agronomy after being 
a warded a scholarship4 1 . Cabral completed the five year course 
at the Institute superior de agromia in 1951 , where he was not 
only a brilliant student (even tutoring the Rector's 
' ) . ~~------ -
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children), but "the extent to which he was assimilated into 
Portuguese life and culture impressed both his colleagu~s and 
professors" 42 . Like Neto, he married a Portuguese woman and 
fellow-student, Maria HeJena Rodrigues 43. In 1952, after an 
absence of seven years, Cabral returned to Guinea-Bissau to 
work as an agronomist for the colonial administration44. 
Eduardo Mondlane's father died before Mondlane was two years 
old. He lived the very ordin~-v life of a herdboy until his 
eleventh t-irthday, when his fo .... 1al education began45. 
Mondlane studied in Louren9O Marques and at the University of 
the Witwatersrand (until his expulsion by South Africa). He 
then founded the National Union of Mozambican Students 
(UNEMO), was arrested and subsequently sent to study in 
Portugal to lessen his influence;~ Mozambique46. He left the 
University of Lisbon to study in Lhe United States on a 
scholarship4 7 Mondlane obtained a BA degree from 0berlin 
College, and a MA and PhD degree at Northwestern University, 
working under the anthropologist Mellville J. Herskovits 48. He 
became Mvzambique's first PhD, and started working at the 
United Nations in New York~9, before lecturing at Syracuse 
University in New York50. Mondlane married a white American 
woman, Janet Rae Robinson, in 1956, and had spent seventeen 
years in urban settings befor•? returning to Mozambique in 
196151. 
It was during their studies at overseas universities that the 
majority of the leaders of revolutionary moveme:1ts in 
Lusophone Africa were politicised and developed a political 
philosophy52 . Mondlane stud~e~ the works of major 
sociologists, and "began the search for a synergy that would 
unite Marx and Jefferson"53. Neto served as a member of the 
central committee of an anti-Salazar youth group, the 
Movimento de Unidade Democratica-Juvenil (MUD-Juvenil)54 , 
which was founded by, amongst others, Mario Soares55. Neto was 
arrested and jailed in 1952, and rusticated from February 1955 
~o June 1957 for his political protests and anti-Portuguese 
poetry56 . 
Robert Mugabe, too, shous similarities to the three 
revolutionary leaders in Portuguese Africa. In 1960, at the 
age of 32, Mugabe gave up a teaching job in Ghana and, 
accompanied by his Ghanian wife, Sally, re~•·rned to Southern 
Rhodesia to join the National Democratic E c•. rty (the forerunner 
of Zapu) as its publicity secretary57. Today Mugabe holds six 
degrees, of which he obtained three during his eJeven years in 
prison and detention58. 
Houari Boumedienne, one of the leaders of the FLN in the 
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Algerian war of independence and successor of Ben Bella, wati 
one ot the few FLN leaders who can be described as an 
intellectual in a m0•ement not known for its intellec~ualism . 
Boumedienne studied at the Wo:!ll known Islamic university , El 
A2.nar, jn Cair0, and was noted for his "coldly searching 
intellect 1159 . 
This non-Western education put him apart from the other 
leaders, as well as from Ferhat Abbas, another FLN leader who 
attended Algiers University and also marritd a French woman60. 
5.3.2. Why intellectuals and members of the middle-class 
be,..?me leaders 
As was argued earlier, a large percentage of people is moved 
l:o revoluti0nary action uecause of certain grievances with the 
existing dispensation. The leadership of contempor.ary African 
revolutions was no exception, and several types of grievances 
can be Ldentifiea . 
Firstly, the mirldle classes and educated groups might find 
themselves in a position in which their upward mobility is 
hampered by the ruling elitc6l. Horne62 notes that a number or 
leading figures in the FLN, particularly Ferhat Abbas and Ben 
Khedda, were pharmacists because it was an occupation i~ which 
Muslims encountered few obstacles to advancement. 
Th~ frustration due t.o the obstruction of economic mobility 
was further strengthened by the fact that under the ancien 
regi~e the local popu~ation was treated as a second class 
citizenry. Ben Bella deRcribed how discrimination affected him, 
as follows: "At Tlemcen, the gulf between the French world and 
the Algeria~ world was obvious. Discrimination hit you in the 
face, even at rchool. At Tlemcen I felt, for the first time, 
Lhat I belonged t.o a community •-.t,: -:.h was considered inferior 
Ly th~ Europeans. For the firs _ t rne I realised that I was a 
f~reigner in my own country 11 63. 
Secoudly, the highly educated yL r-ul• in African countries is 
"moved by a sense of responsiti~ity as an educated elite in' 
backward societies, ~otivated by nationalism in economically 
dependent countries 11 64 . The ~ntellectuals and educated group, 
particularly in developing countries, are also more likely to 
comP. into contact with "t.he progressive norms of mo,:-e moder~ 
80cieties", ffidking these groups "more acutely aware of the 
appar ~nt backwarr' i1P.ss of their own government" f;S. 
Thus, Lhe sLJdents from LusophoJe areas who stud~Ld in 
Portugal during the 195O's -- Mondlane, Neto, Cabral, Mario de 
A.,drade, and Marcelino dos Santos -- realised that the 
situation in thej r countries was i·he resul+- ,: Portuguese 
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rule, and discussed the pro~pects ~fa brighter futu r e in an 
African Studies society66. 
Thirdly, the lower classes and less ectucated groups o ften 
lack specific skills, such as the ability to constLuct an 
ideology and to organi=e a ~ ovemenc, which are vital for 
revolutionary success67 . D~ring the early stages of a 
revolution, the "men of words" who dorr.inate the leadership are 
usually intellectuals -- teachers, lawyers, journalists --
with above average education68_ The peasants and unskilled 
workers of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, and 
Zimb~bwe are accordingly much indebted to the communication 
skills and academic standing of leaders suet 3S Mondlane, 
Cabral, Neto, Ben Bella and Mugabe for the attainment of 
political independence of their cou1,tries. 
It is obvious, then, that intellecLuals are of great 
importance in th~ shaping of a revolution. For Eric Hoffer69, 
ttc.y are indispe:isa.ble: "Whenever we find a dispensat i on 
enduring beyond its span of competence, there is either an 
entire absence o f an educated class or an intimate alliance 
between those in pc,wer and the men of words" The ancier. 
regime, realising t hat i n tellectuals are capable of creating a 
revolutionary ide0logy and leading the movement, may often try 
to co-opt thi s g r o up as a n anti-re volutionary strategy70. 
Howe ver, the intellectuals' actions may be resented by 
el mcnts within a revolutionary move ment, or by oppos ition 
groups. Fvr example, rival Angolan nationalist leader Ho lden 
Roberto (of the UPA and its succes sor, the FNLA) desc ribed the 
leaders of the MPLA as "self-styled intellectuals"71 . 
5.1. The relationship between ethnic group and leadership 
Ethnicity played an important role in several major 
revolutions, with sone ethnic groups producing more 
revolutionary le3ders and follc~ers than others . In Afr ica, 
some ethnic groups were better represented than others in the 
leadership of revolutionary movements. 
In the Angolan revolution, the support of the major ethnic 
groups varied curing the anti-colonial war: a~ well as in the 
en~uing ci•~l wa~, and the leadership structure closely 
reflected this suppoct. 
The majority of the MPLA leadership, and to a smaller extent, 
of ilP f o llowers, w~re either membeLs of the Mbundu Lribr or 
mestico~. Neto himself was born in Bengo (Catete) villag~, a 
membe1:: of the Mt.undu tribe, ~,i1ich was ccncentrated in and 
~round Luanda 72 , whilP. de Ar,drar.l~ anc! d3 Cruz were mesticos 73 . 
' . 
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At the First National conference of the MPLA in December 1962 
-~~ore than half of Lhe Steering Committee (executive committee) 
were rneti9os74 . The fact that some MPLA supporters were whites 
led to the decision by the 1968 party congress that whites 
born or resident in Angola could become members of the MPLA --
this inc)uded Neto's Portuguese wife75. 
Marcurn7 6 dPscribes the MPLA leadership as being 
characterised by: "a prepondo::;rance of Mbundu and mulatto .. . , 
most of which had li" ed for some time i. . or about Luanda, and 
an intellectual orientation that stressed the importance of 
party docLrine (non-racis~) " . 
~he leaders of Frelimo and PAIGC were also from groups which 
traditionally lived close to the colonial capital. 
Furthermore, Neto, Mondlane, Machel, and Cabral moved o urban 
areas in their teens ~o become members of the educated elites 
of their respective countries. 
Mondlane was born in the Gaza province of Mozambique : r ,, 
moved to Lourenyo Marques to complete his Parly years ot 
study??. A large number of senior Frelimo leaders came from 
the southern part of Mozambique, where the ethnic groups had 
the longest exposure to the excesses of Portuguese rule7 8. 
Cabral w~nt to the Cape Verde Islands when he was ten, and 
finished hie secondary schooling in the urban environment of 
Praia, the capital of the islands7 9. The leadership of the 
PAIGC was dominated by Cape Verdean mesticos80. This led to 
resP-ntment in tb.e large mainland Balante group, and cau be 
seen as one of the reasons for the murder of Cabral by BalanLe 
members of the PAIGC, as well as the 1980 coup in Guinea-
Bissau, which Loppled Cabral's brother, Luiz, and resulted in 
a government dominated by Balantes. 
In Algeria, the leaders of the FLN were drawn Lrom the two 
major ethnic groups, the Arab and the Kabyles, which would be 
the source of numerous and often bloody clashes within the 
orgarisa .. on. 
For example, at a meeting of the nine founder members of the 
FLN in Ap.cil 1954 to plan the start of the armeci struggle, 
Belkacem Krim, a Kabyle, refused to take orders from Arab 
leaders of the revolutionary movement81, To paper over the 
disagreements between the leaders of the different et~~ic 
groups, it was dP,cided that Kabylia should be an autonomou~ 
zone in the war of independence82. This simmering animosity 
between the Arabs dnd Kabyles, and the pr~spe' of a sectarian 
split , was "the E'LN's single greatest enemy"83 . 
S . S . The revolutionary perso nality 
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Si&,ey Hook84 differentiates betwee n what he calls the 
even~ful man and the event-making man in history. While the 
eventful man is primarily a medium for sucial forces, the 
evenl-makjng man is distinguished by his extraordinary 
character tr~its which he uses to overcome all opposition and 
introduce fundamental changes85. The leaders of African 
revolutions were, in varying degrees, event-making men, who 
overcame powerful colonial powers or white minority regimes 
and changed the face of the continent dramatically. 
In an interesting work on mass movements, Eric Hoffer argues 
that each phase of a revolution requires leadership skills of 
a different kind86. "A movement is pioneered by men of words, 
materialized by fanatics and consolidated by men of action••8 7 . 
This does not, however, m0 an that a single revolutionary 
leader cannot guide the movement throughout the revolutionary 
process, as was the case in for example, Angola, Zimbabwe, and 
to a lesser extent in Algeria. Like Mao Zedong, these African 
revolutionary all-rounders were skiJled men of words, 
s~ccessful applicators of violence, and men of action who 
consolidated the revolution. Hagopian88 refers to such all-
round leaders as "protean" revolutionaries. 
5.5.1. Qifferent phase s of revolution ~ires ecial 
character traits 
Some scholars argue that often personal factors rather than 
economic or political factors influence a per~on in his 
decision to become a revolut:~nary -- which can result in a 
decision which goes against economic and political forces89. 
According to these scholar~, an individual does not become a 
revolutionary by chance. As a result of his mental make-ur, 
which may be strongly influenced by childhood experiences, the 
individual who becomes a revolutionary can be said to have a 
"revolutionary psychology»90. This ~evolutionary psychology 
has several characteriscics, a number of which are evident in 
the personalitits of the revolutionary leaders studied here. 
Apart from the "men of words" -- intellectual leaders of 
revolutionary movements discussed above -- Hoffer identifies 
the other personality types as the ''fanatics" and "men of 
action". 
All revolutionary leaders, but particularly the fanatics, 
hold convictions with an exceptional intensity and 
inflexibility. "Whatever their convictions, they held them 
with a pathological intensity ... Sane men do not carve women up 
with their swords or empty their revolvers into bodies already 
dead1191 . 
FLN leader Ramdane Abane -- the brain behind the terror 
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just as France had conquered Algeria through violence, nothing 
but violen~e would shake loose he~ grip. The sinister dictum, 
'one corpse in a j3cket is always worth more than twenty in 
uniforn,' was a favourite of Aba:1,:;; · s, and representative of 
his basic thinking"92. 
The fanatic revels in the chaotic atmcsph ~d during the 
toppling of the old regime and is rf'lent l 1rsuing his 
goals -- the total destruction of thE ~reb For the 
fanatic, "all that already exis·:~ h1 ?Ubbish , and 1,as to be 
destroyed before there can be :1_· , t'rder94 . Furthermore, the 
fanatic knows how to use this ch-.,' · ) mobilise vast numbers 
for his movement. "He alone knows tt craving of the masses in 
r.1.ction: the c.t.aving for communion"95. 
Other writers acknowledge the existenr.e of this type of 
leader, although they use different labels: "radical"96; 
"organizational skill groups and masters of violence"9 1; and 
"managers of violence"98. 
However, this type of revolutionary leader, whose prime aim 
.. ~ to destroy the present, is not the most suitable 
personality to consolidate the situation at the end of the war 
of independence. For t~e fanatic, there is always another 
order that must be overthrown, or, like Trotsky, a world to be 
won over to the cause of the revolutionary movement. The 
revolutionary leader in the last stages of a revolution is 
usually more of an organiser, who strives to institutionalise 
the revolution. 
Hoffer99 calls his third type of revolutionarx leader the 
"man of action": a leader who establishes a new order and 
saves "the movement from the suicidal dissensions and the 
recklessness of the fanatics". HopperlOO argues that these 
leaders -- he calls them statesmen -- formulate a policy that 
embodies the ideas ~nd ideals of the revolutionary 
prophets101 . 
Stability is of prime importance f~r the revolutionary leader 
in th~ final stages of revolution. "The genuine man of action 
is not a man of faith but a man of law"l02. Although the men 
of action may extol the virtues of the prophet's ideals and 
implemen~ some of them, they aLe primarily interested in 
securing the compliance of the pooulation -- established by 
force, if necessary, with the result that a dictatorsh~p is 
often characteristic of the final stages of a revolution103. 
For H~ffer10 4 this shoulJ come as no surprise, because the 
revolutionary leader in the final stag.~ of rPvolution is not 
too finicky about the methods employed ~o instituLio~a1 ise the 
revolution , :ind way even use technique& and meth("',d~ associated 
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with the old order. 
Houari Boumedienne is a rare example of a "man of action" in 
African revolutions. He brought stability -- and direction --
to Algeria with his military-like plans for the trans~ormation 
of the country . As w .11 be shown in Part Five, this 
transformation was carried out in a pragmatic fashion, which 
explains to some extent the success of the revolution led by 
this deadly serious and "utterly unromantic revolutionary"lOS. 
5.6. Leadership struggles 
All the African revolutionary movements experienced power 
struggl~s prior to political ~ndependence . In some countries, 
ther;e struggle~ were the forerunners of even larger struggle~ 
between different gi:oups after independence. In other 
countries the power struggles led to the untimely death of the 
most at.le revolutionary leaders, who could have had a great 
impact 01, the transformation of their societies. 
The Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutions suffered the least 
from leadership struggles, a probable reason for this being 
the fact that there was more than one movement fighting the 
war of independence. Different groups and classes supported 
specj : nationalist movements, which minimised ethnic and 
class differences within the movements. 
H---we·rer, the leadership of MPLA president Neto was challenged 
at least two times before Angola became independent. In July 
1963 senior MPLA member Viriato de Cruz tri~d to take control 
of the movement, and ten years later there was an alleged 
attempt by Daniel Chipenda, a member of the executive 
committee, to assassinate Neto106. 
Although these struggles can to a certain extent be 
attributed to personal ambition, they also reflected ethnic 
discord between the mulattos and Mbundu leaders, on the one 
hand, and Bunda, Luchazi and Chokwe and some Ovimbundu 
followers -- the guerrillas in Eastern Angola -- on the other 
handl07. 
The Algerian Revolution was characterised by leadership 
struggles within the FLN. Ramdane Abane, the leading figure 
behind Lhe decision to establish the principle of the primacy 
of the political leaders over the mjlitary leaders, criticised 
the ambitions of the military, whic h, he alleged, wanted b"> 
take control of the FLN108. When the military leaders obtained 
the majority on the nine man revolutionary council, Abane was 
furious. He told the colonels : "You are creating a power based 
on the army. The maquis (guerrilla fighting) is one thing, 
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politics is another, and it is not conducted either by 
illiterates or iqnoramuses! 11 109, The military leaders decided 
to kill Abane. He was lured to Morocco, djstrustfully ("I 
sense there ' s a dirty trick ahead" ), and strangled with a cord 
on December 26 , 1958110. 
The five military leaders, true to the FLN' s rule of 
collective leadership , accepted joint responsibility for 
Abane ' s death, although his death was against the wishes of 
Belkacem Krim, who was to die in a similar manner after 
independencelll. 
Cabral and Mondlane were also the victims of power struggles 
within their movements. Mondlane was killed by a parcel-bomb 
in Dar-es-Salaam in 1969, and Cab1al was assassinated by 
members of his organisation in Conakry in 1973. The Portuguese 
secret police carried out the operation with the aid of 
dissident Frelimo members, including the party secretary for 
Cabo Delgado, Lazaro Nkavandame, and Silverio Nungu, another 
senior member112 . Mondlane, aware of the tensions in his 
movement and the tactics of the Portuguese, told Shore113 a 
week before his death: 
"They are determined to kill me . . . I guess sooner or 
later they will. But I am not worried anymore. We really do 
have a collective leadership, a good leadership. Frelimo --
the Movement -- is greater than any one man. They don't 
understand that ... That Samora (Machel), the; don't know him. 
That man is brilliant. He understands. (Joachim) Chissano and 
Marcelino [dos Santos], poet that he is, young Jorge Rebelo 
and the others." 
5.7 . Conclusion 
William Kornhauserll4 argues tha t the first members to join a 
mass movement -- and, by implication, its founders -- will be 
"marginal " members of society. A marginal man can be defined 
as a "man who deviates from a substantial number cf vari8ty of 
predominant attributes in his society 11 115. Marginal persons 
would for example b~ literate people in an illiterate society 
and people with exposure to the outside world in a backward 
and isolated society. 
This is clearly illustrated in an examination of the profiles 
of leaders in Afri can revolu~ions. Distinguishing features 
were (a) their relative youth; {b) high level of education: 
and (c) a middle class background . Ethnicity and personality 
played a role in all the phases of African revolutions, ~nd it 
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sometime3 defined lines of conflict in the po~'er struggles 
which characterised some of the revolutions studied here. 
Fir.ally, it is important to note that the efforts of the 
ancien regimes to silence the revolutionary leaders often 
s~rved to ~eighten their status as pr.ophets of the coming 
transformation of societyl16_ The campaign for MPLA leader 
Agostinho Neto's release (he was held in Portugal after the 
1961 uprising) can be equalled to a similar campaign following 
the arrest of Algerian leader Ben Bella117_ Neto's stature as 
revolutionary leader was further enhanced when the MPLA named 
him "honorary president" while he was still in prison, thus 
transforming Neto's "life into a political legend well before 
he had the opportunity to ext r ·i ~e public political 
leadership"118_ The same is trL • for particularly Ben Bella 
and Mugabe, while the murdered Mon, lane and Cabral became 
symbols of African revolutionaries. 
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The role of ideolo in mobilising support 
6.1. Introduction 
Both leaders and students of revolutions acknowledge the 
importance of ideology. "There can be no revolutionary action 
without a revolutionar~ theory," wrote Leninl . This is echoed 
by Greene2 , who sta~es that without a strong ideology there 
can be no political mobilisation, and therefore no successful 
revolution. 
For political philosopher Hannah Arendt3 "only the two-edged 
c-ompulsion of ideology and terror, one compelling men from 
within anc the other compelling them from without, can fully 
explain the m~~kness with which revolutionists in all 
countries ... have gone to their doom". 
Ideology can be defined as "a set of closely related beliefs, 
or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or even 
of a community 114 • A political ideology, therefore, will b~ 
this" 'set of ideas and beliefs' that people hold about their 
political regime and its institutions and about their ow~ 
position and role in it"S. In this senee, the prevalent 
political ideology in a society has much in common, or can 
indeed appear to be synonymous with, the society's political 
culture or political tradition6. 
A political ideology indicates the societal values and 
incites people to become political actors in order to 
transform or protect the present order. This makes an ideology 
a powerful weapon -- even in the hands of a minority --
because people are only mobilised once they get the idea that 
organised action can transform society7 . 
Before the characteristics of revolutionary ideologies in 
Africa are analysed, it may be fruitful to look at the 
characteristics of any major political ideology. 
MacrideslO lists four: coherence, pervasiveness, 
extensiveness, and intensiveness. 
A coherent ideology should be complete, spelling out a set of 
goals as well as the manner in which to bring about these 
goals . The propositions . about political, social and economic 
life should be logical and structured. There should preferably 
be only o ne (immediate) goal, with an orgar.isation to bring 
this aboutll. 
An ideology is pervasive if it has been in existence for a 
long time; and extensive if a large number of people share the 
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same idaology. The more people that share the ideology, the 
stronger the ideology is likely to be. Intensiven~ss denotes 
the appeal the ideology has: whether the believers are willing 
to risk life and limb in their struggle for the new wor.ld 
propagated by their ideologyl2. 
In summar·,, it can be said that a revolutionary ideology not 
only dictates what the world should look like, but also 
encourages people to strive energetically for the creation of 
a new world. To be at its most effective, an ideology should 
be logically structured and be ~ell known and shared by a 
large number of mobilised people who are intensely committed 
to these shared beliefs. 
6.2. Emphasis on nationa1ism 
Greenel3 states that an ideology based on nationalism is the 
most powerful means of mobilising revolutionary support, 
because nationalism has the greatest potential for cutting 
across the cl~avages that exist in society. A revolutionary 
movement that preaches nationalism as well as major economic 
and social reform may be virtually invincible. Hoffer14 echoes 
this statement; for him nationalism is the "most copious and 
durable source of mass enthusi~sm". Huntington also stresses 
the importance of political mobilisation o t various groups and 
classes against an alien elite and he sees nationalism as the 
most powerful mobilising agentlS . 
Of all the African revolutionary ~deo: ~gies, it is the FLN's 
in Algeri a which relied most on na tional i s m. Nationalistic 
(or, a t least, anti-French) feelings r a n strong ever since the 
occupation of 1830, and it waJ logical t ha~ ~he FLN ~hould 
capitalise on this, as illustrated by the message on Radio 
Cairo after the start of the armed struggl e: "To the Algerian 
people ... After decades or struggle, the National Movement 
reached its final phase of fu . filment"l6. The message went on 
to state that the goal of the FLN was national independence 
and the restoration of the Algerian state by every meansl 7 . 
Du1,nl8 poin~s out that although the ideological affiliar.ions 
of the FLN leader.s were not known, the one thing that was 
clear wa~ thei= determination to fight the French colonial 
regime. 
The FLN, which was to experience great problems with intra-
party tensions, found that "[o)nly the dynamic provided by 
anti-colonialism papered over the conflicts and lent the 
movement whatever cohesion it enjoyed"l9. 
The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) indicated that its 
most important revolution~rv goal was the transformation of 
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the political order by ending white rule. "The mdin political 
objectives of our revolution are to create a free, democratic, 
indep~nclent . . . Zimbawe and remove the political domination of 
the foreign settler element"2O. Every other goal should be 
subjected to th~se objectives, said Zanu's leader, Robert 
Mugabe21. (During the later stages of a revolution, the 
transformation of the socio-economic order increases in 
importance. Characteristics of this aspect -- such as whether 
the transformation should be fundamental and in the manner 
envisaged by the movement, or if it need only be fundarr.ental 
-- ar~ examined in Part Four.) 
In Guinea-B~ssa11 , the PAIGC under Amilcar Cabral similarly 
strived to be a pragmatic nationalistic group with a la~k of 
dogmatlsm or ideological rigidity. Thus, Cabra122 stated that 
"[t]o speak of the struggle against imperialism does not work 
here. Instead, we used a simple language ... " which meant a 
better life for the largely rur~l community in an indepen~ent 
Guinea-Bissau. 
The MPLA's minimum plan23 streesed (a) "The urgently needed 
creation of an Angolan liberation ccalition ... (b) the 
s t ruggle, by all avail able means, for the li4ui dation of the 
Portuguese colonial domination in Angola". 
Likewise, Frelimo's constitution24 indicated that the 
movement 's first aim was to end Portuguese colonialism. 
Natlunalism is , however, not the onl1 aspect of an ideolo9·, . 
1~ f~:t , it may be useful to achieve national liberation, b~l 
Js ... € ined insufficient to inspire the transformation of 
soci i •v. Frcntz Fanon, the great political theorist of the 
Algeric r. },•=volution, described it as follows: "Nationalism, 
that magr~'icent son~ that made the people rise against their 
opprcss~Ls, , 0ps shc1ts, falters and dies away on the day 
tha~ independe~cc is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a 
political doctri~~ , nor a program. If you really wish your 
country to avoic regression , or at best halts and 
uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national 
consciousness to political and social consciousness"25. 
Social criticism and the aspiration to create a new world to 
take the place of the morally corrupt present, form another 
important element of an ideology. The revolutionary movements 
in Angola and Mozambique are particularly noted for this 
aspect of their ideologies. As will be pointed out in Part 
Five, this aspect of their ideologies featured more 
prominently after the war of independence -- when the foc us 
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the socio-economic order. 
6.3. Social criticism 
As Fanon eloquently argued above, the ideology of a 
revolutionary movement should encompass more than nationalism. 
The ideology should stress the introduction of new, radical 
values2 6. Rejai27 states that a revolutionary ideology attacks 
the present regime on moral grounds, 3nd articulates what the 
believers of the ideology believe to be a superior social 
order. To be most effective in mobilising the masses, this 
superior order should best be summari sed in one slogan -- for 
example, the "Liberty, equality, fraternity" of the French 
Revolution28. 
If an ideology is too utopian, it may lay the basis for its 
own defeat by promising that which it cannot deliver29. 
However, "continued lip service to the origi nal ideals of the 
revolution can inspire commitment and sacrifice, even under 
the same circumstances that earlier inspired revolutionary 
a-::t.ivity"30. Hoffer31 uses the term "religioficcition" to 
indicate the process through which practical aims become holy 
c auses. These holy causes, which include the transformation of 
the po litical order during the early phases of the revolution, 
are later centred around the transformation of the qocio-
•°1Conomj c order. 
6.3.1. Emphasis on transformation of socio-economic order 
A number of the revolutionary movement3 have what is termed a 
minimum and a maximum program. The minimum program aims to 
unite as many groups and classes ag~inst the ancien reqime. It 
deals only with the replacement of the current political 
system with a new order, and is nationalistic in nature. 
The maximum program, on the other hand, refers to the phase 
of the revolution after the fall of the old regime. The major 
objective of the revolutionary movement is now the 
transformation of the economic and social orders of society. 
In Mozambique, Frelimo formulated several aspects of its 
maximum program during the armed struggle. In 1966 the Central 
Committee decided that racism, tribalism, and regionalism were 
"enemiefJ to be fougt ; in the same way as colonialism" 32 . 
Frelimo's attempt to create a morally superior social order is 
further reflected in the identification of "the enemy ... as 
'(w]hoever at a certain moment practices the exploitation of 
man by man, whatever the methods and forms that exploitation 
takes'"33. Thus, Frelimo articulated i ts social criticism of 
the exploitative colonial system, and simultaneously declared 
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its intent to create a new and morally just social order. 
Machel said: "Our war is a war of national liberation against 
Portuguese c~1nnialism, against imperialism and against the 
exploitation of man by man"34. 
The revolu~ionary ideologies are heavily indebted to Marxism 
for their fo~nulation of social criticism and directives for a 
new or~er, but the leaders are careful not to appear as 
communi.sr puppets. Mache135 denies that Marxism was 
transplanted to Mozambique. "Marxism-Leninism did not appear 
in our country as an imported product. Mark this well, we want 
to combat this idea. Is it a policy foreign to our country? Is 
it an imported product or merely the result of reading the 
classics? No. Our country is ~ta study group of scientists 
specialising in the reading and interpretation of Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin. 
Our struggle, the class struggle of our working people, their 
experiences of suffering enabled them to assume and 
internalise the fundamentals of scientific socialism ... In the 
process of the struggle we synthesized our experiences and 
heightened our theoretical knowledge ... We thinl that, in the 
final analysis, this has been the experience of every 
socialist revolution." Although Machel attempted to play down 
Frelimo's ideological indebtedness to Marxism, his argument 
that Frelimo's ideology was a home-grown ideology is doubtful. 
111 a country with a 96 percent rural population and a small 
and underdeveloped working class, scientific socialism could 
hardly have been internalised by the local population. At the 
very best the peasants rallied around the revolutionary 
movement because it claimed to providP. them with a better way 
of life. 
According to Henriksen36, Frelimo mobilised the population 
around issues such as exploitative labour methods, low prices 
for agricultural produce, and lack of health and education 
facilities. 
In Algeria, Frantz Fanon argued that the deracines, the urban 
and more particularly the rural lumpen-proletariat, would be 
transformed by the supposedly creative and therapeutic 
activity of violent destruction37. 
Furthermore, Fanon argued that the armed struggle would lead 
to profound economic and social changes in the country, such 
as the abolition of numerous traditional values and 
institutions and the ~stablishment of a new role for women and 
c hildren38. 
In contrast to Algeria, where nationalism was the touchstone 
of the revolutionary movement, Arnilcar Cabral's PAIGC 
concentrated more on ~ocio-economic conditions to mobilise 
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support, as shown in the following chapter39_ 
In its maximuv programme -- formulated during the Angolan war 
of independence -- the MPLA indicates that it favoured the 
"[c]reation and progressive development of state commercial 
and industrial enterprises 114 0, as well as the nationalisation 
ar.d "distribution of land to landless peasants 1141. 
6. 4 . Powerful instrument for the mobilisation 
6.4.1. Lending legitimacv to che movement 
A political ideology can play an important role in lending 
legitimacy to the revolutionary movement, and, inversely, 
weakening that of the government. 
Gaetano Mosca42 argues that a regime claims legitimacy in 
terms of what he calls the political formula of the ruling 
class. This formula justifies the existence of a regime in 
terms of basic values, for example, a Divine Right or natural 
law. Thus, a revolutionary ideology attacks these basic 
values, decreasing the legitimacy of the regime, while 
enhancing the political formula of the revoh1tionary movement. 
This is particularly important if the movement has to use 
sustained violence in the process of revolution43. 
A final aspect regarding legitimacy which was of extreme 
importance in the African revolutions was the mannPr in which 
a movement's legitimacy was enhanced when it claimed 
continuity with traditional goals and values o f society44 . 
Examples of this were the fact that the revolutionaries in 
Rhodesia chose a name for their c ountry which referred to an 
old African kingdom. The FLN in Algeria used the same flag 
which Abd-el-Kader used more than a cent v earlier during his 
rebellion against the French. 
6.4.2. Cutting across class and ethnic cleavages 
Samuel Huntington45 states that two of the three f actors that 
will determine whether a country experiences a revolution are 
associated with ideological mobilisation across cleavages. 
Firstly, key groups, like the urban middle-class and the 
peasants, should both be socially mobilisect46 . Secondly, these 
groups should act in concert, primarily through a common 
ideology that cuts across class differences and mobilises them 
against an alien or colonial elite. If these factors are 
present in a society, the chances of a revolutlon increase 
dramatically. For this reason, Greene47 states that the 
building of cross-cutting alliances is the most important 
function of an ideology. 
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To appeal to as many potential followers a~ possible, the 
ideology should be ambiguous, flexible and vague. "Ideological 
purism may prove fatal .. 4a. The more di,.•erse (ethnically and 
otherwise) a society js, the greater the danger of ideological. 
purism, and the greater the challenge to create an ideology 
that has broad appea1.49. 
Mao stressed the i mportance of communication between the 
leaders and followers of a revolutionary movement, which 
included the shaping of a revol.ut onary ideol.ogy50. Mao 
introduced the concept of the "mass line" to explain his idea. 
The mass line consists of four progressive stages: perception, 
summarisation, authorisation and implementation51. The ideas 
of the masses are crucial. in the mass line: in the first stage 
they are perceived, in the second the leadership summarizes 
the ideas, in the third the leaders give authorization to go 
ahead with the ideas, and in the last stage these ideas arF 
implemented. Thus, there is a constant interplay between the 
masses and the leaders with regard to revol.u~ionary ideas52. 
In Algeria, only an ideology that relied hE, l.y on 
nationalism succeeded in uniting Arab ard 1 -1~ y ~, peasant and 
proletariat53. 
6.4.3. Encourages political action 
Rcjai54 states that a revolutionary ideology "embodies a 
statement of plans and programs intended to realize the 
alternative order" . Thus, the ideology encourages political 
action on the part of the followers. 
"Above al l , ideo logy moves people into concerted action. 
Sometimes it moves a whole nation; sometimes it is a group, a 
cl.ass or a political. party that unite behind certain 
principles to express their interests, demands, and 
bel.iefs"55. 
Hoffer5~ states that: "The men who rush into undertakings of 
vast change usually feel they are in possession of some 
irresistible power ... Lenin and the Bolsheviks who plunged 
recklessly into the chaos of the creation of a new world had 
bl.ind faith in the omnipotence of Marxist doctrine." 
Furthermore, those who feel. themselves in possession of this 
power, should also have "extravagant hope, (because) even when 
not backed by actual. power, is likely to generate a most 
reckless daring ... No faith is potent unless it is also faith 
in the future; unless.it has a millennial component"57 . 
In this sense, the ideologies of the revolutionary movements 
were successful, and t his can be seen as one of the major 
reasons for the fact that people opted for the hardships of 
guerrilla warfare. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
The ;deologies in contemporary revolutions shared a nurnbe= of 
characte =istics -- all of which have some bearing on the 
mobili~ation of followers. 
During the earlier phases of the revolution, and particularly 
du~ing the v ar of independence , this ideology was heavily 
tinged with natlonalism. The expulsion of the rulers, and the 
creation of a new, nationalist regime was the highest 
priority. This e~phasis on nationalism aided the revolutionary 
movements in moLl ... ising large numbers of followers, and 
inciting tnem to ·e~olutionary action. The unifying goal of 
attacking the old .=eg1.me made it possible for the 
revolutionary ~ovemPnL to attrack followers from all walks of 
life, young ar • .::. old, ar.d diffe:i::ent ethnic groups. 
In this sense th9 ideol ')gy lays the groundwork for different 
phases within a L~volutio~. 0ne such phase is the war oi 
independence mentioned abo -~ . After the fall of the old 
regime, the r~volutior.ary movement attempts to transform 
society fundamentally. 
This later phase in the proce~~ of revolution is ai3O mapped 
out by the revolutionary 1deol -:iy y, which embodies di r ectives 
on how the "new society" s ~ ,uld function. 
These directives often ci ; !:f•?rs sha ,;:-ply from the ·noveme nt' s 
"minimu. program", which \ W .. a r af oeal for political 
independence and free elect.:. ons. 'i'!i.e "major program", .! S the 
ideological directives for the transformation of society were 
known, was usually based on Marxism-Leninism. The ideolog} ucw 
st 2 ~ed that there should be only one political party, which 
should be a vanguard party, to aid the masses in the 
transformation to soci~lism. Property should be nation~lised 
and/or brought under state control. 
Thus, the political ideology of the revolutionary m1vement 
often echoes the so-called two phases of revolution: ~he 
attack on the ancien regime, and directives to transform 
society fundamentally. 
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The followers of the revolutionary movements 
7.1. Introduction 
If the advocates of revolution fail to mobilis e a significant 
section of the population around their ideals for a new world, 
they are likely to remain armchair revolutionaries. Henriksenl 
identifies t.1e mobilisation of the population as the "science 
of rural revolutions". 
In this chapter, three broad aspects regarding the followers 
of a revolutionary movement are analysed. (It is important to 
keep in mind that the term "follcwers" generally refers to 
people involved with a broad idea-based movement , while 
" supporters" refer to people who belony L 0 a political party.) 
Firstly, the characteristics of the followers. How o ld are 
they ; what are their social and educational backgr~ ods; ~nd 
from which ethnic groups do they come? When these findings are 
compared to the characteristics of the revolutionary leaders, 
some of the similarities and differences between leaders and 
followers in the revolutionary moveme nts studied here become 
3pparent. 
Secondly, answers to questions regarding the motivat on of 
followers -- why did they chrow their weight behind the 
movemenc? -- will be sought. Aspects such as the level of 
frustration with the old regime, the disintegration of 
establish~d groups, and economic incentives will, amongsL 
others, be looked at. 
The final section of this chapter is devoted to a discussion 
of the fact that the revolutionary movements studied here 
succeeded in varying degrees to mobilise people from different 
classes and groups , and that these followers were ii tensely 
committed to their cause. 
7.2. Characteristics of followers 
7.2.1. Age 
The majority of the followers of revolutionary movements tends 
to consist of young, single males2 . The followers of African 
revolutions were no exception. 
In Rhodesia, the guerrillas were known by the Shona word 
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vokuman~ ("the boys"), and more often tha n not the fighters 
were only teen-aged3. David Caute's acc ount4 of a meeting with 
Zipra guerrillas (from Zapu's military wing) stresse d the 
youth of the fighters. "A moment later two young men walked 
through the door carrying AK47 rifles ... this young guerrilla 
had been forced to leave school afte~ Grade 7 [the last year 
of primary education], found no work, and soon cro s s ed wit~ 
two companions into Bor.swana [and] having declared their 
support for Nkomo, they were airlifted to Zambia, whe~e they 
received their first military instruction". 
Apart from the revolutionary fighters who actually fought i n 
the guerrilla war, the revolutionary movements in Zimbabwe had 
a well-developed support system amongst th~ youth. These 
youths, known as mujibas, acted as scouts or messengers, and 
had a highly developed organisation that mirrored that of the 
revolutionary group, particularly that of Zanu. In 1979, Zane 
claimed to have 50 000 mujibas; according to Moorcraft & 
McLaughlin5 , not an "unrealistic figure". 
In Mozambique Freli mo tried to mobilise the youth in 
particular. "With 58 percent of the country's population be . ow 
the age of twent y in 1970, it could not have been otherwise"6. 
Teenagers and men in their e arly twenties constituted the 
group which responded most enthusiastically to the 
revolutionary call and became the backbone of Frelimo's 
guerrilla army?. 
In another Portuguese colony, Amiilcar Cabral started the 
PAIGC's guerrilla war for the independence of Guiuea-Bissau 
with "a few dozen young recruits" who had fled the country8. 
The members of this group, which was to produc e leaders such 
as Francisco Mendes and Joao Bernardo Vieira, were in their 
teens or early twenties9. 
In Algeria, the situation was much the same. Ali la Pointe, 
oerhaps the best-known {urban) gu 0 rrilla during the war of 
independence, was 26 years of age at the time ~,f his death1 0: 
La Pointe' s nephew, "Petit Omar", was only twe1're years old, 
but acted as a courier and died with La Pointe when the French 
blew up a partition in the house where they were hiding11. 
Pretty young Muslim girls, who could pass as French in order 
to avoid detection, were used to place bombs: in February 1957 
ten people died and 45 were injured as a result of explosives 
placed by two girls, aged sixteen and seventeen12 . 
Why did the call to revolucion strike such a responsive chord 
amongst the youth? 
Henriksen13 cites the following reasons: the youths were not 
breadwinners with families to feed; they found the excitement 
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of guerrilla life enticing; they were mostly semi-sci1.ooled and 
not trained for professions; they saw a rapid social mobility 
for themselves once independence was attained; and the 
revolutionary movement offered egaJitarianism within a society 
characterised by class, age and ~thnic stratification. 
The same would appear to apply tot.a large number of young 
people that joined Cabral's movement. Many had recently 
migrated to th~ urban areas to search in vain for jobs, and 
with no family commitments and prospects of a bleak life, they 
found it easy to leave Guinea-Bissau and join Cabral's 
movement14 . 
Caute'slS interview with a young Zimbabwean guerrilla 
illustrates the attitude of these youths. "But didn't it worry 
him, for the future of Zimbabwe, that so many children were 
now out of school," Caute asked (the guerrillas closed down 
schools). "This provoked his first display of real anger, a 
sudden coiling of his body. 'Did I ever get a school? Why 
should they sit in school whiLe we are fighting, you tell 
n,e?'"16. 
7.2.2. glass and education 
Greene17 states that the bulk of followers of revolutionai 
movements are from the lower social classes of society, and 
have less education or social standing than their leaders. The 
majority of the followers will bo "drawn from the more 
activist ana oolitical conscious sectors" of society18. Who 
formed these groups in African revolutions? 
Some scholars argue that most revolutionary followers are not 
from th~ very poor groups. Hoff~r sketches the attitude of 
these groups: "Those that are awed by their surroundings do 
not think of change, no matter how miserable their condition. 
When our mode of life is so precarious as to make it patent 
that we cannot control the circu~stances of our existence, we 
tend to stick to the proven and the familiar ... The abjectly 
poor ... stand in awe of tliod world arourid them and are not 
hospitable to change 11 19. 
Whilst the leadership of revolutionary movemPnts in Africa 
was drawn from the middle and upper-middle classes, followers 
of revolutionary movement~ were characteristically from lower 
social classes than the leaders, and were usually workers or 
peasants20. 
In Algeria, the followers were predominantly peasants, and in 
particular the middle level of peasants who owned a small area 
of land21 Chaliand22 mentions the "very humble origins" of 








fighting in the war of independence was done by rural 
peasants. 
Franz Fanon, the FLN ideologue, was doubtful about the role 
of the working class in an African revolution. For him, the 
working classes are the "most favoured section of the 
population, and represent the nost comfortably off fraction of 
tl~ people"23. Rather, the peasantry will be the major force 
i., revolutions, because they are "a coherent people who go 
living, as it were, statically, but who keep their mnra l 
values and their devotion to the nation intact .. a people that 
is generous, ready to sacrifice themselves completely, an 
impatient people with a stony pride"24. 
The fi~st members of the population who left Guinea-Bissau 
to join Cabral in Conakry were young people who had recently 
moved to the cities, where they were eithe r unemployed or 
involved in petty trade25. However, the PAIGC found its 
greatest sapport in the south-eastern area of the country, 
which was inhabited by the Balante ethnic group26. 
Particularly the peasants and plantation workers provided the 
bulk of PAIGC followers. 
In Mozambique, with 96 percent of the population living in 
rural areas, most followers were subsistence farmers, while 
civil servants and members of the petit bourgeoisie remained 
loyal to Portuga127. 
Josiah Tongogara, military leader of Zanu, was very clear 
about the nature of the Zanu follower in Zimbabwe: "[O]ur 
people are traditional farmers, but they ha,•e no land. So you 
find most of them come up [joined] because they have no land 
or because they are deprived of education"28. Ranger29 found 
that "most elements [of the population] ... were moving into 
radical opposition to t ,ie government over the question of land 
-- the embittered peasants." 
In Angola, the UPA, fore-runner of the FNLA, was ·' largely a 
peasant party and its strength is confined to the northern 
area of Angola, its ties with the people 01 these areas being 
tribal cather than political"30. 
Another interesting characteristic is the fact that most of 
the revolutionary movements made use of females, despite the 
fact that revolutionary foll0wers tended Lo be young males. 
This was to provide the movements with a large support base 
amongst the population. 
In Mozambique, Frelimo made special efforts to mobilise 
females for the revolution. At its First Congrese, the 
movement stressed the "social and cultural development of the 
Mozarabican women"31 . The League of Mozambican Women (Lifemo) 
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was established to mobilise women, provide food and clothes to 
the guerrillas, and to serve ger~rally in a back-up role32. 
Barbara Cornwa1133 who spent SLJe time with guerrilla forces, 
estimated that in 1969 there were two hundred women Frelimo 
guerrillas. Females also proved to be good at mobilising the 
population, with Josina Machel, wife of Samora Machel, 
stating: "[I]t has been proved that we women can perform this 
task of mobilisation and education better than men"34. 
Students played a ~mall and ambivalent role as revolutionary 
followers, primari l y because of their small numbers. In 
Mozambique, some became top leaders, but others deserted the 
revolution to attain personal goals. For example, a Frelimo 
defector, Alves Muganga, indicated that only 2 out of J54 
students studying with scholarships in the West retarned for 
service in Frelimo35. Baron36 found that 85 percent (51 out of 
60) of Mozambican students rE:m;iined :i.n the Uni';:ed States after 
completion of studies. 
However, not all members of the population joined the 
revolutionary movements. Some ethnic groups were r.,ore 
enthusiastic in joining, while others actively assisted and 
supported the ancien reg~.me. In the following section this 
phenomenon will be investigated. 
7.2.3. Ethnic group 
Henriksen37 warns that the student of revolution should not 
view the support of an ethnic group for a revolutionary 
movement or regime as monolithic, because inevitably some will 
join the opposite camp. However, broad patterns of ethnic 
support can be identified in nearly all the African 
revolutions. 
In Mozambique, the Portuguese claimed that they faced an 
uprising by three ethnic groups: the Makonde, Nya~ja, and 
Chewa38, The Portuguese argued that only ethnic groups which 
straddle borders (and would thus be prone to foreign 
influences, such as the groups mentioned above) would provide 
followers for revolutionary movements39. It can also be argued 
that the authorities had less control over groups living in 
remote border areas, as was the case with the three Mozambican 
groups mentioned. Frelimo had followers from other ethnic 
groups, although these three groups made up a large percentage 
of the movement's followers. 
The Frelimo guerrilla groups in the northern area, 
particularly Cabo Delgado, were largely made up of Makondes, 
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whosP. heartland was in that province4 0. The Makonde was known 
- Jr ni~ opposition to the Portuguese administration, 
particularly after the introduction of large scale relocation 
programs41. 
A fair number of followers came from the Nyr1ja group in the 
Nyasa district, as well as from the Yao, the latter being 
split between favouring the incumbents and the 
revo:· ► i.onaries 1 2. Frelimo also had many followers amongst the 
smaller igoni and Nyasa groups, and the Chewa in the border 
area betwe\· - Malawi and Zambia43. South of the Zambezi, 
Frelimo resorted to terror tactics to boost mobilisation, but 
Samora Machel c vntended that despite this, Frelimo obtained 
its s~aunchest followers from the region's Shona-related 
groups44. 
Because mosi: of the leaders camH from the south and the 
majority of Fr elimo guerrillas from the northern provinces, an 
element of factional tension existed within the movement45. 
Furthermore, rrelimo was largely unsuccessful in mobilising 
the Makua ethnic group, whose heartland was inLffiediately south 
of that of the Makonde46. Although a s.nall number of Makua 
from the cities of Nampula and Poito Amelia (Pemba) joined 
Frelimo, political mobilisation did not make much headway, 
particularly because the variety of M~kua dialects made it 
difficult for cadres to reach the rural and illiterate 
population effectively47. Joachim Chissano, current leader of 
Mozambique, said in a wartime interview in Tanzania that the 
movement had overcome animosity betw~er Makonde and Makua in 
its own ranks, and that the same woula occur in an independent 
Mozambique48, 
In Guinea-Bissau, the Balante ethnic group in the south-east 
was over-represented amongst the followers of the PAIGC --
even Cabral was taken aback49, Several interesting reasons are 
advanced for this support. 
The heartland of the Balantes was closest to the border with 
Guinea, frc,.n where most cadres infiltrated50. Thus, the 
argument goes, the Balante was more frequently exposed to the' 
political message of the PAIGC. It is also argued that the 
PAIGC was very effective in itq political mobilisation of this 
particular ethnic group51. This is without doubt the case, but 
it cannot be the sole reason for the successful mobilisation, 
because prior to 1963 (when the loyal~y of the Balante was 
more or less assured) the PAIGC's political campaign was 
"extremely limited"52. 
In his research on this phenomenon, Cunningham5 3 focnd that 
up to 50 percent of the members of the relevant age groups had 
joined the guerrillas. He advances two explanations for this. 
Firstly, the Balantes, who grew rice, had to deal with 
. ' 
• --,;,& , ' 
....._ : .. l"' • . . . .. 
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exploitative Portuguese middle men. This economic restriction 
partly explains the Balante support for the PAIGc54. Secondly, 
the traditional socio-political system of the Balante aided 
the PAIGC in mobilising a large number of men. Political 
control was in the hands of the elders, and once this age 
group was wen over to the nationalist cause, the mobilisation 
of members of younger age-groups was easierSS. This age-group 
structure was so strong that military chains of command were 
initially modelled on it56. Finally, competition between 
members of the same age group served as an incentive for yoJng 
males to show their worth in (guerrilla) combat57. 
Angola provides another example of mobilising along ethnic 
lines, with the MPLA drawing followers from the Mbunct~ and 
meticos, the FNLA from the Bakongo, and Onita from the 
Ovimbundu ethnic group of central Angola. 
In Zimbabwe, too, the two major revolutionary movem~~ts where 
split along ethnic lines, with Zanu's follow~rs made up of 
Shonas, and Zapu having a Ndebele power base. 
7.3. jfuy did people become followers of the revolutionary 
moveme'Rt~? 
It was shown above that the followers of revolutiona~y 
movements were from a specific age group, with more or less 
the same social background and educaLion, and from specific 
ethnic groups. This leads to the questions: why did they 
decide to join the revolutionary movement? What motivated 
them? 
Hannah "\.rendt58 talks about the "two-edged compulsion of 
ideology and ter ror, one compelling men from within and the 
other compelling them from without'· which mobilises people 
into revolutionary action. Aspects of this "inner compulsion" 
will now be 3nalysed. (The role of terror in the mobilisation 
of followers -- for example, abduction, press-ganging etc. --
will be examined in Part Four.) 
it is important to keep in mind that very little quantitative 
research has been done on motivations of followers in African 
revolutions. There is, however, a fair amount of descriptive 
and qualitative work, which can be used with some success to 
identify important factors whic' ~ompelled people to join the 
revolutionary movement. 
7.3.1. Frustration-a ression 
For Eric Hoffer59 the main characteristic of a revolutionary 
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follower is frustration. "To the frustrated a mass movement 
offers substitutes either for the whole self or for the 
elements which make life bearable and which they cannot evoke 
out of their individual resour<.:es 11 60. 
"For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of va~t 
change, t~ey must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, 
and they must have the feeling that by the possession of some 
potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they 
have access to a source of irresistible power. They must also 
have an extravagant conception of the prospects and 
potentialities of the future. Finally, thPy must be wholly 
ignorant of the difficulties involved in their vast 
undertaking 11 6l. 
The frustrated are indeed more susceptible to mobilis~tion as 
followers to bring about a new world, because "to the 
frustrated the present is irremediably spoiled ... No real 
con~ent or co~fort can ever arise in their minds but from 
hope" (for a neµ world)62. 
Dunn63 claims that the frustrations of the colonial system 
induced the population to join the revolutionary movements 
out of "a largely reflex character". A good example of this is 
provided by the Algerian poet Kateb Yacine, when he describes 
his feelings after the repression at S6tif: "(M)y sense of 
humanity was affronted for the fi1 ~t time by the most 
atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I 
felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of 
thousands of Musl ims, I have never forgotten. From that moment 
my nationalism took definite form 11 64. · 
7.3.2. Economic incentives 
Followers will be "less likely than their leaders to think in 
terms of sweeping principles related to morality, the social 
order, and political organization 11 6S. Gurr66 argues that the 
follower will most likely view the revolutionary situation 
from the angle of how it will affect his material position. 
Realising this, Arnilcar Cabra167 told mobilising cadres 
with.in the PAIGC: "Always remember that the people are not 
fighting for ideas, nor for what is in men's minds. The people 
fight and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle in 
order to gain material advantages, to live better and in 
peace, to benefit from progress, and for the better future of 
their children. National liberation, the struggle against 
colonialism, the construction of peace, progress and 
independence are hollow words devoid of any significance 
unles~ they can be translated into a real improvement of 
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In order - O mobilise followers, Frelimo's message was aimed 
at the rural population, wh~ h comprised 96 percent of the 
total population. Thus, economic issues such as ~xploitative 
labour methods, low prices for agricult.ural produc e, as well 
as lack of health and education opportunities were raised 
against the backdrop of previc,us resistance to colonial 
injustices68. 
Algeria experienced extreme poverty prior to the start of the 
war of independence. Apart from the general shortages that 
were the result of the war, Algeria suffered crop failures in 
two consecutive years. On the other hand, the Swiss-owned 
Compagnie Genovoise -- which held 15 000 hectares of prime 
farmland -- was reaping good harvests69. 
Waring7v, a supporter of Portuguese rule in Africa, stressed 
the economic ~~ctor as a reason f or the March 1961 uprising in 
northern Angola. He claims that the rebels were "paid, and 
apparently quite well. Cheque s made out from Leopoldville 
b wnks have been taken from prisone rs-o f-war and dead bodies". 
A rebel told Waring71 why he j oined the uprising: "First we 
must kill all the white men or drive them into the sea, then 
we take over their housea, thei : plantations, their wome n, 
their cars and their banks. After that we will never need to 
work dgain and everybody will have all they could want". 
Young people often joined Frelimo because their situation 
improved les~r rapidly than they expected, argues Henriksen72. 
The youths dLd not only feel anger about economic and social 
injustices , but also felt that their upward mobility was not 
as fast as it should have been73. 
7 .3.3. Breakdown of traditional ties 
Hoffer74 argues that the rise and spread of mass movements can 
be counteracted if "any arrangement which ... discourages 
atomistic individualiam" is made. Hoffer refers to a social 
condition known as "mass society". Arendt75 defines this 
phenomenon as the "social atomization and extreme 
individualization" of the individual", which is experienced 
when group, class, ethnic and other allegiances have broken 
down, and society is in a flux. Another scholar of mass 
society, William Kornhauser7 6 sta~es that in such a situation 
elites and non-elites are more accessible to influence from 
one another. People are, therefore, more easily mobilised 
around new ideologies or groups. 
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The revolulionary leader realises what the society in flux 
needs: "He alone knows the craving of the masses in action: 
the craving for cornrnunion" 77 . The revolutionary movement 
supplies this communion because, as Rejai78 puts it in a 
similar religious metaphor, an ideology "gives the 
revolutionaries a sense of unity, solidarity, and cohesion; it 
instills revolutionary zeal, commitment, devotion, and 
sacrif:ce". Less stridently, Macrides 7 9 argues that within the 
revolutionary movement the revolutionary follower usually 
finds everything that life outside the movement cannot offer: 
a feeling of equality, personal relationships, responsibility, 
as well as status mobility by means of promotion80. 
In the Algerian war of independence, the French resettled 
almost half of the Algerian rural population as a counter-
insurgency tactic, thereby completing the disruption of 
Algerian rural society81. According to Chaliand8?, Algerian 
society was broken down to an exent virtually unparalleled by 
other colonial areas, and this proved to be important in the 
conception and growth of the FLN. In the disrupted Algerian 
society, the struggle against the French provided this sense 
of unity. A sense of national identity developed rapidly prior 
to the start of the war of independence , particularly after 
the repression at Setif, in which thousands of Muslims were 
killed. 
Further~vre, Messali's Etoille was formed by migrant 
labourers in Paris, where the Algerians most probably suffered 
from the "extreme individualisation" that Arendt mentions 
above. 
7.4. "Critical mass" 
The revolutionary movements studied ► ~re succeeded in varying 
degrees to draw support from differenL classes and groups. 
This characteristic of the sPlected Afi can revolutions is 
described below. A further characterist.~ of the selected 
revolutions is the fact that the mov~ment c did not necessarily 
enjoy the support of the majority of , ''f' ,"'eople, but of a 
smaller group which supported its caus, r~ntically . 
7.4.1. Cross-cutting alliances 
Greene83 states that revolutionary movements «succeed only 
where a critical mass of most or al] of the ma ?r classes in 
society is mobilized in the revolutionary proce~s. The ~ustbin 
o{ history is filled with revolutionary leaders who thought 
only in terms of the parochial interests of their - lienteles". 
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Two of the three preconditions for revolution that Huntington 
identifies centre around the nature of the revolutionary 
followers. 
Firstly, key groups, like the urban middle-class and the 
peasants, should both be mobilised84 . Secondly, th~se groups 
should act in concert ,. primarily through a common ideology 
that cuts across class differences and mobilises them against 
an alien or colonial elite85. 
It is, however, not necessary that all the classes of a 
society support the revolutionists: the support of a class may 
often be tacit, "or the revolution may succeed simply by 
neutralizing the large majority of the society's non-
revolutionary classes 11 86. Jacques Soustelle, French governor-
general in Algeria, realieed that the FLN had largely achieved 
this aim, mainly through terror, by 1955: "The population as a 
whole, without throwing in its lot with the rebels ... remained 
frightened dnd non-committal"87. 
7.4.2. Followers as a of the o ulation 
The success or failure of a revolutionary movement is to a 
large extent determined by its ability to effect cross-cutting 
alliances between different classes and groups88. 
However, this alliance hetween like-minded persons of 
different classes will always involve a small percentage of 
the population. "A revolution involves minorities fighting 
minorities"89. If thP. revolutionaries do not enjoy a numerical 
superiority, they at least have the advantage of intense 
commitment to their cause90. This is particularly the case in 
African revolutions, where the anti-colonial feelings of the 
population were intense. This "intense commitment to 
revolution is their most valuable resource"91 . 
Finally, the number of followers needed to achieve critical 
mass in a revolutionary movement will depend amongst others on 
the strength of the regime, the power of the ideology, the · 
organisation of the movement, and the techniques employed92. 
It is also interesting to note that the ancien regime managed 
to mobilise a large number of followers. Dunn93 states that 
"(t)here were during the Algerian war of national 
liberation ... at least as many of the indigenous population 
fighting with the French colours on a voluntary basis, as 
there were fighting against the French". 
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7 . 5. Conclusion 
In the African revolutions the followers were particularly 
young. 
The youth , with little education and few prospects of a good 
life, joined movemer.ts which they thought would create a more 
equal and prosperous society. The fact that the movements d ·ew 
more followers from some ethnic groups than others makes a 
simple class-analysis of African revolutions dangerous . It is, 
therefore, important to look at factors such as the disruption 
of traditional society together with economic questions when 
investigating the motivation of revolutionary followers . 
The revolutionary movement which draws support from the 
youth , and offers members from differen~ ethnic groups the 
prospect of a better life, seems to have a good prospect of 
successfully transforming society. In Angola, the Mbundu-based 
MPLA did not have followers from othnr major ethnic groups, 
which did not only led to a war of independence being fought 
by three squabling groups, but to a civil war after 
independence. Only a small number of MPLA followers during the 
war of independence became supporters of the vanguard party 
whi ch was for~ed after independence. (The transformation of 
followers of revolutionary movements into members and 
supporters of political parties is examined in Part Five.) 
Finally, revolutions are the result of the actions of 
minorities . The sile,t majority, frightened and divided, is 
seldom a factor in the process of revolution. Once a 
revolut jonary movement is supported by a fairly l~rge 
percentage (but not necessarily the majority) of the 
population, and once it represents various classes and groups, 
it can be proposed that the chances of success for the 
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The organisation of the_ revol~tiona~ movements 
8.1. Introduction 
It was argued in Part One that the organisation of a movement 
formq part of the criteria to distinguish between different 
types of collective action. For example, revolts were said to 
be spontaneous uprisings, characterised by a lack of 
organisationl. 
A revolution, on the other hand, is a process in which a 
movement, through an effort of will, and organisation, 
transforms society2. Samuel Huntington3 states the importance 
of organi=~tion to a revolutionary movement very explicitly: 
"Organisation is ti1e road to political power ... In the 
modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its 
politics". Dunn4 supports thi~ arg•..unent wl;en he states that a 
war of independence (as a phase in a revolution) requires less 
politica ~ :ippeal than it does effecti-.·0 organisc1tion. 
It has already been noted in Chapter Five that the 
leaderships of the FLN, MPLA, PAIGC, Frelimo, Zanu-PF were 
very small and elitist. However, in order to gain political 
power, the revolutionary idea cannot remain the sole property 
of this elitist group. It has to reach the masses, who have to 
be mobilised for politJcal action -- and this is one of the 
major reasons why a revolutionary movement must be efficiently 
organised5. 
In this chapter the organisation of the revolutionary 
movements will ue analysed along the following lines. Firstly, 
it will be shown that all the African revolutionary movements 
hac a definitP. ~tructure, which was the result of the 
establislul'\ent o: a chain of command. This chain of command 
provided a fcamfwork of organisational discipline. 
However, organLsation leads to autocr~tic tendencies within a 
movement. This aspect of African revolutionary movements will 
be examined, and tne relationship between the nature of their 
pre-independence organisation and the current political order 
will be investigated. 
Furthermore, thera were different groups -- for example, the 
military and the politicians -- within the movement's chain of 
command. In all the African revolutions one finds that tension 




clashes. In this :hapter this pheno~enon will b~ examined, and 
probable explanations for its existence in African 
revL1utionary movements forwarded 
r.inally, ~lJ revolutionary movements tried to challenge the 
gov~r,~11 ~ ;>y r:>stablishinq organisation3.l ;;Jtructures which 
oppostd th·Qe v f the government by levying taxe~. dispensing 
justic~, and aveP marrying c~uples. The ~uccess of these 
alternative structures will be examined a s well. 
As will be shown below, good organisation in, revolutionary 
movemen t is of particular importanc~ when the p esent regime 
is very effective in its repression, and th~ revvlutionary 
process is drawn out6. Under these circumstancee -- which 
characterised the African revolutions -- the organisation of 
the movement has to remain strong i f it wants to Keep on 
fighting the govarnment. 
8.2 . Providgs structure to the movement 
Lenin7 is verr outspoken about the importJnce of organis~tion: 
"The proletariat can become and inevitabl; will become a 
dominant force only because its intellectual unity created by 
the principles of Marxism is fortified by the material unity 
of organisation which welds milli~ns of toilers into an ~rmy 
of the working class". This welding of followers into a 
powerful movement cannot take place unl~ss the movew~ut has a 
clear-cut structure through which the id€ology can be 
converted ::..1to i!Olitical actions. 
8.2.1. Creates a chain of command 
An effective revolutionary organisation has a well established 
and clearly ~efined chain of command running from the leader 
to the peasant in a remote village9. Such a chain of c ommand 
serves a number of functions. Firstly , it is the most jirect 
manifestation of t h e structure of the revolutionary movement. 
Followers and leaders alike Y..now their position in the 
movement. 
The chain of command of a movement should preierably follow 
closely the traditional organisation cf society, such as Mao's 
and Ho Chi Minh's organisational systemslO . 
Frel" mo laid down its chain of command at its First Congress 
in Septemoer 1962. It was to be organised on the following 
levels : nation, province, district, area (locality), and 
c 111 . Each area, district, and province was to have an 
assembly, which elected an executive committee, while a 
. .,,.. . . 
~-=--= - -=~-----=--=- - -----~-- ~-= 
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congress was the supreme national organ, from which the 
Central Committee was electedl2. The MPLA was organised along 
more or less the same lines: nation, zone, district, and 
localityl3. 
In the Frelimo hierarchy, every level was held responsible by 
the higher level for the implementation of policy. The 
int=oduction of this hierarchy sometimes took a number of 
years: in eastern Nyasa this organisational structure only 
commenced operating in 1968, although the guer_illa war had 
started in 196414. 
This initial structure of Frelimo was based on that of the 
nationalist movements in the British colonies (even the word 
"chairman" was usedl5). Many traditional chiefs were 
incorporated in the structure, particularly in the early part 
of the armed struggle, which helped to integrate the 
revolutionary movement with the (traditional) society. In 
Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC also relied heavily on the homen 
grand~ (chiefs) in mobilising followers ~nd taking up 
positions in the hierarchy of the movementl6. 
In the Zimbabwean revolution, Zanu divided the country into 
provinces, which were sub-divided into sectors17 . The sectors 
were sub-divided in districts, branches, and villages. The 
committee at each level of the organisation was responsible to 
the next leve1l8. 
The FLN too borrowed heavily from others ln the establishment 
of a revolutionary structure. From Messali's MTLD it borrowed 
the five provinces, or wilaya~, into which the country was 
dividedl9. The wilayas were dividgd further into zones, 
regions, sectors, douars, and fractions20. The structures of 
douars (made up of two or three Arab villages with inhabitants 
from the same tribe) nnd fractions were taken over from the 
French colonial administration21. Unlike the movements in 
particularly Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique . which stressed the 
importance of peoples' committees and elections, a colonel waa 
the supreme authority within a wilaya, with no differentiation 
between military and pclitical authority22. The FLN borrowed 
its military organisation from the French as well, which is 
not surprising, as a number of its leaders served in the 
French army23. It is also interesting to note that the 
organisation of the FLN was influenced by the cell system used 
by the French Resistance of WWII24. 
Most of the revolutionary movemf ::sin Africa did incorporate 
a feedback system in the chain ot command, so that it was 
possible for the rank-and-file to make suggestions to, and 





• ~ - ✓ 
. . 
. . . . . 
Frelimo's structure allowed room for self-criticism within a 
collective spirit from its inception2 S. However, at the Second 
Congress, held in 1968 in the "liberated" Nyasa province, it 
emerged that communication between leaders and followers, let 
alone self-criticism, left much to be desired in a movement 
which described itself as "popular112 6. The PAIGC members had 
wide-ranging discussions27, ~ut aftey the Cassaca Congress --
where Cabral cracked down on the military wing -- the feedback 
system was watered down as authority became centralised28. 
The scope for self-criticism within the MPLA was apparent at 
its conference in December 1962, where not only the 
leadership, ideology, and structure came under scrutiny, but 
the lack of a forum for self-criticism was lamented by 
delegates29. 
In the FLN, however, there was little room for this type of 
criticism. In fact, the colonels -- as leaders of the 
different wilayas -- "tended to act as provincial warlords 1•30. 
In a revolutiondry movement, where power often came from the 
barrel of a gun, it was inevitable that members of the 
military would view themselves as the strongest section of the 
movement. Nearly all the movements had to contend at one stage 
or another with different groups that attempted to take 
control of the movements. 
8.3. Different power groups within the organisation 
8.3.1. The militar__y versus r.he politicians 
Within the chain of command of a revolutionary movemPnt, there 
are some leaders and f u llowers who represent the military 
wing, while others represent the political wing of the 
movement. This is representative of the manner in which Mao 
organised the Chinese Communist Party31. Although Mao argued 
for the superiority of the political leader~ over the military 
leaders, it was not always the case in African revolutions. 
Tn Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Zimb~bwe the political group 
kept the control of the revolution?ry movement, while in 
Mozambique and Algeria the milit-:.ry ., e3t! '"'? ".llanaged to oust 
the politi ans. As will be illus, r~~~d b~lol , conflict 
between the sections occ:·Jrred in 11e- : ly '!very revolution and 
cnn be seen as a characteristic ot the revolutionary process. 
In Guinea-Bissau, the Cassaca Congress, which also took place 
in a "liberated area" in 1964, was a turning point for the 
PAIGC's organisation and policies32. An armed struggle was 
launched a year earlier, and militaristic tendencies had made 
the movement "already sick", according to C.1bra133. 
The military commanders killed local chiefs -- whom Cabral 
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thought were important for mobilising the rural population --
and abused the local population, thus alienating the very 
people that Cabral wished to mobilise for his movement34. The 
situation was so ~erious that, according to Cabral's brother, 
Luiz, "the whole struggle was in jeopardy because of t~ese 
combatants' military power ... people began to flee from the 
liberated areas 11 15. 
Amilcar Cabral acted firmly. He called t ~ Cassaca Congress, 
reaffirmed his control, and had the ~ebel military leaders 
executed at the congre~s in order to retain the primacy of the 
political leaders in the PAIGc36. 
In a document written after the congress, Cabral noted that 
the militaristic attitudes had appeared because of a lack of 
political work in the military wing. Consequently, he set out 
to reconstruct the movement to prevent another surge in 
militarism. He brought the military and management of the 
liberated areas under more direct and central control under 
his brother, Luiz Cabral, and Aristides Pereira37 . The 
structure of the organisation was expanded to allow for more 
political committees t middle level, which controlled the 
military at that level. These committees aided Cabrdl to 
establish control by the politic ians. The most direct 
manifestation of thi s is the f o rmnti~n of the conselho de 
guerre (council o f war) to control the armed struggle, with 
Cabral as its chairman38. 
Zanu's military wing, the Zimb ~bwP Ar-r i c an National 
LJberation Army (Zanla), remained 11nde,:- the control of the 
political leaders, bec ause it was the "Party which commanded 
the gun"39. This is not to say that the military leaders did 
not wield considerable power. For example, at the Lancaster 
House negotiations the power of Joshia Tongo3ara, leader of 
th~ Zanla High Command and member of the revolutionary council 
of Zanu, was acknowledged by Lord Carrington, and even 
Mugabe40. 
At its December 1962 congress, the MPLA reiterated the 
import~nce of the separation of the political and military 
wings, with the primac\ of the former over the laLter. 
Political power le"/ ".1- , , ~ ten-member Steering Committee, 
nominated by the Na t i nr ~. I olitical Counci141. The military 
wing was controllec. l>\ 10 Politico-Military Committee, which 
consisted of six membPf q from the Steering Committee42 . 
Because this committee was dominated by the political leaders, 
they dominated the leadership of the military wing as well. 
However, the MPLA was not without tensions between the 
military and political groups. Agostinho Neto acknowledged 
these tensions when he said in Dar-es-Salaam, shortly before 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
---- -----------~ 
the 1974 coup: "the worst thing the Portuguese did to us was 
to oblige us to wage a liberation struggle from abroad"43. 
In Algeria and Mozambique, the political l ·~aders did not 
retain control over the revolutionary movements, and the 
military wing increased its power. In Mozambis-ue the military 
faction became ascendant, ironically, by winninJ a political 
battle after Mondlane'J death, bu~ in Algeria th~ struggle was 
characterised by violence and death. 
The French had erected an electric barrier along the border 
with Tunisia44 . This led to a rift between the political 
leadership of the FLN in Tunis and Cairo, and the harried 
guerrillas in the wilayas, because the guerrillas felt that 
they had to bear the brunt of the fighting. To co~plicate 
matters further, an Army of the Frontiers was organised under 
Boumedienne in Tunisia, who could not relieve the internal 
guerrillas, but became extremely powerful within the 
revolutionary movement. Although the FLN decided at the 
Soummam Conference (held in 1956 in Algeria) to establish the 
principle of the primacy of the political leaders over the 
military leaders, the latter became more powerfu145. They 
murdered Ramdane Abane, one of the political leaders, and from 
then the primacy of the military in Algerian politics was 
assured. This supremacy manifested itself in Boumedienne's 
role as king maker in the case of Ben Bella (when the army 
intervened on his side), and Boumedienne's coup. Dunn 4 6 
suggests that the rising of the military was inevitable, given 
the situation the FLN faced: a colonial power that was 
unpopular and a population that could be mobilised. What was 
of utmost importance in the second phase of the Algerian 
revolution was "organizational effectiveness from a purely 
military point of view 11 47. 
Frelimo's structure was initially divided into the Department 
of Interior Organisation (DOI), which united the political 
structures, and the Department of Defence, which organised the 
guerrillas48. The military wing was the junior partner, and no 
political role was ascribed to the guerrillas49. 
After the ascendancy of Machel in the leadership struggle of 
May 1972, there occurred a merging of the two groups with the 
creation of a Political Military Co-ordinating Committee, 
which consisted of the president (Machel), vice-president, 
political commissar, chiefs of security, defeuce, and 
organisation, as well as the secretaries of the provinces50 . 
MunslowSl states that under this system, all cadres had to 
participate in the armed struggle, "as this was the only way 
to end colonial rule", but these guerrillas now had the 
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additional task of politically mobilising the populacioL. All 
cadres of Frelimo received political-military training at the 
Nachingwea camp in Tanzania to prepare them for their d ual 
role52. 
8. 4 . The i ron l aw o f o ligarc h y 
Rejai53 argues that the revolutionary party is usually 
centralised and closely controlled -- it tends to be 
authoritarian, with little tolerance of dissenting views 
even if it preaches the opposite. Michels5 4 states that there 
is an " iron law of oligarchy'' in every political organisation. 
Leiden & SchrnittSS point out that most revolutionary leacers 
are JO convinced of the rightness of their struggle that they 
"asuume dictatorial control when their revolutions or coups 
are successful no matter what their previous political 
philosophy may have been". 
It often h~ppens, as was the case in Angola and Mozambique, 
that the revolutionary movement -- which was a broad front 
during th~ war of independence -- becomes an elitist "vanguard 
party". 
In Mozarnbi•;iue, this change was effected shortly after 
independence. Samora Machel said in his Independence Day 
address: "In establishing our development strategy, we must 
attach special value to what is our chief strength, che 
mobilisation and organisation of the people"56_ 
The movement implemented this strategy by establishing grupos 
dinamizadores (dynamising groups, also known as g . d.s.) as a 
transitional measure to mobilise and organise the Mozambican 
population as a whole57. A typical g.d. would consist of a 
secretary, assistant secr~tary, and a respcnsavel (literally 
translated, a responsible, but here it refers to a leader who 
serves the people) with assistants for mobilisation and 
organisation; information and propaganda ; education and 
culture (which started a literacy campaign); women ; social 
affairs; production; and commerce and finance58. The g. d. s . , 
which were publicly elected59, served as admin istrative 
structures after independence, and can be descr ibec as t h e 
"earliest structural forms of poder popular, people ' s power, 
stretching throughout the nation••60 . They also served as a 
transition to the formation of a vanguard party, because ir. 
them were combined el~ments of popular democracy and a 
vanguard party61. 
However, the most important chdnge in the organ isation of 
Frelimo came at the Third Congress that was held in 1977 , 
during which the movement took on a Marxist-Len i n ist character 
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and decided to proceed to the Popular Democratic (socialist; 
phase of the Mozambican Revolution62_ Here the front for 
nat;onal liberation was changed into a vanguard party, because 
it was deemed that a party which represented the working 
classes was required to lead the transition to socialism63_ 
This vanguard party was characterised by democratic 
centralism, although Machel stressed the importance of the 
democratic aspect of thiq concept64 . After it became a 
vanguard party, Frelimo changed its criteria for membership: 
no longer being a mass-based movement, only selected 
individuals who passed stringent requirements were now allowed 
into the party65. 
8 .5. Makes "dual government" possible 
When the revolutionary process is extended through time, it is 
important that the revolutionary movement should transform 
itself into an organisation that equals the administration of 
the government -- counter-government, or "riual power", as 
Trotsky referred to the soviets established by the Bolshevists 
to oppose the tsar's governrnent66. This is particularly 
important in the areas which the revolutionary movement has 
"liberated" -- usually areas in which it is active and 
rec e i ves the support of the population. 
At tne start of its armed s t ruggle in Mozambique, Frelimo 
a_aowed t he Pc-rtugu~se politic al and administrative structures 
t o ba re~ l a c ed oy the traditional structures, simply because 
the chiefs ~ere best equipped f ~r these tasks67 . 
:t c-uu:!.ri levy taxes, provide services, ''and the likelihood of 
succ~ss itcreases as the movement is able to develop 
institu tions that actually function as agencies of 
c,, overnmenc '' 68. 
8.6 . Cor.cludion 
"If the success of the nation?l 1 'bi 
explained in as few words as 
that Frelimo knew how to mob 
population"6 9 . 
tio. struggle had to be 
, chese would have to be 
• OJ ganise the 
This is not only true of Frel~ all t~e revolutionary 
movements were, as Huntington points out, able to determine 
what the future of their countries would look like because 
they consisted of t~e most able organisers of the population. 
Neto said, in a speech on 20 March 1975 in Benguela, that 
political organisation would sustain the Angolan revolution. 
"It is by popular organisation that we are going to defend our 
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movement. We who have defended our organisation since its 
foundation in 1956, we have some experience, and it is not by 
arms that political struggle is won. What we need to know is 
how to satisfy the dearest wishes of the people, and organise 
so that the people w~!l defend their own interests"70. 
It is true that good organisation is to the advantage of a 
revolutionary movement. However, it can lead to the 
concentration of power in the hands of a few and may result in 
clashes between different groups within the movements. African 
revolutions were no exception. The military wing often tried 
-- and in the case of Algeria and Mozambique succeeded in 
gaining control over the revolutionary movements. 
In the African revolution&, the "iron law of oligarchy" 
manifested itself further after political independence, when 
the former revolutionary movements in Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea-Bissau and Algeria became in varving degrees elitist 
vanguard parties. The revolutionary movements which fought for 
freedom often became examples of the worst kind of 
concentration of power -- a small ruling group in a single-
party state. 
This study of the characteristics of African revolutions has 
thus far concentrated on the structural causes of revolution, 
as well as the manner in which the population was mobilised 
around the ideals to transform the old regime fundamentally. 
In Part Four the attention will turn to the most dramatic and 
highly publicised phase of these revolutions: armed conrlict 
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PART FOUR: THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE 
Cnapter Nine 
Armed conflict betwYen the revolutiona 
ancien regime 
9 . 1. I~troduction 
movement and the 
All the selected African revolutionary movements -- f~ced with 
structural causes of revolution and oossessing the ability to 
mobilise a large following -- resor _~d to violence against the 
c:rncien regime. Revolution-'lry violence can be ter1:1ed a 
military-political conflict , because the violence has two 
aims: to take on the government forces in (guerrilla) combat 
and to gain the support of the population and the 
international community. 
A large group o f scholars cf revolution views the use of 
violence as an integral part of revolution. Greenel defines 
violrnce as "those ac tions by individuals or groups that 
endanger the physical security 0 f people o r property". He 
identifies the threat or use of VlOlence, and its 
just.fication by an ideology, as O1 ,e of the clearest 
indicators of a movement's revolutionary intent2. 
Du1n3 states that "revolutions are a form of massive, violent 
and rapid social change". Violence is a central element in 
Samuel Huntington's4 definition as well. Calvert5 uses it when 
he definLs revolution very broadly as "a form of governmental 
change through violence". 
Mao Zedong6 maintained that violence gives revolution its 
specific characteristics: "A revolution is an insurrection , an 
act of violencL by which one class overthrows another". 
Finally , it has to be kept in mind that if a revolution is 
d~fined only in terms of violence , th~ process of revolution 
is limited to the period in which a sociPty experiences 
political v io.1.ence , thus ignoring the subsequent 
transformati0n of society 7. Although the use of violence plays 
a centr~l role i n the fall of the a~cien regime during the 
1·evolutir-n~ry process , the revoluti.on does not end there , but 
co~ : inues with the transformation of society8. 
9 . 2. Deci sion to abandon non -violent atrateqiaa 
The armed struggles in all the African revolutions were 
preceded by de cc:1, tes of non-violent protest to effect gradual 
ch,3nge in the p .. ~. itica: ,lnd socio- econo ,ic orders. As wa s 
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shown jn Part Twc, this approach was ineffective against 
intransigent ancien regimes and led to no fundamental changes. 
This frustration is eJoquently stated by Ferhat Abb~s, the 
former Algerian liberal leade,:- who became FLN president: "The 
methods that I have upheld for the last fifteen years -- co-
operation, discussion, persuasion -- have shown themselves to 
be ineffective; this I recognise .,9 
In a similar ~ein, F~ench expert Germainne Tillion believes 
that if meani~gful political reform and free elections in 
Algeria had taken place by November 1954, "they probably would 
have spared us a long and cruel war 11 lO. 
Shortly after the Setif massacre, a number of frustrated 
Algerian ex-soldiers formed a splinter group, the Organisation 
Speciale (OS), within Messali's partyll. They decided t 0 fight 
the French "by all means", thus becoming the first ~1gerian 
uationalist mo•rement "dedicated to preparing fer . ·med 
confrontation with France -- now considered int·: ~b ~ -- and 
thereby it became the immediate f,C1:decessor of the =·LN' 12. 
After the French cracked down on the OS, former l~ading 
figures met in Paris in March 1954 and decided to create a 
"third force", which would have as its objective an armed 
,.1surrectionl3. Nine leaders, including Ben Bella, were 
appointed under the system of collective leadership14 . 
On 10 October 1954 the new revolutionary movement named 
itseJf the Front de Liberatign Nationale (FLN). A date was set 
for the outbreak of the insurrection in Algeria: 00:01 hours 
on l November 1954 -- All Saints' Day. 
The Algerian events were closely mirrored by tho~e in the 
other countries. For example, Eduardo Mordlanel5 described 
Frelimo's decision to abandon non-violence as follows: "Two 
conclusi?ns were obvious. First, Portugal would not admit the 
principie of self-determination and independence, or allow for 
any extension of democracy under her own rule ... Secondly, 
Joderate political action such as strikes, demonstrations and 
petitions, would result only in the destruction of those who 
took part in them. We were therefore left with thcsa 
alternatives: to continue indefinitely living under a 
repressive imperial rule, or to find a means of using force 
against Portugal which would be effective enough to hurt 
Portugal without resulting in our own ruin". 
At its First CongreJs, held in September 1962, the newly-
formed Frelimo had not yet decided whether to opt for ar1 . .:d 
conflict a ~ainst the Portuguesel 0 . This was partly because of 
different views in the leadership: some members thought that 
international pressure alone would be sufficient to end 
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colonialism, while others emphasised Portuguese intransigence, 
which led to tr.e Mueda massacre in which hundreds of civilians 
died17. Furthermore, between 1961-1962, military forces in 
Mozambique were increased f~om 3 000 to 12 000, which Frelimo 
saw as further proof of Portugal's willingness to stamp out 
protest18 . 
Portugal's ~ejection of talks on the future of Mozambique 
tipped the scales in favour of armed conflict, and although 
the training began shortly after the First Congress, fighting 
broke out only in September 196419. 
The example of revolutionary movements taking up weapons 
against the rulers often spurred other movements on to abandon 
non-violence. 
In February 1961, violence broYe out in Luanda, followed by a 
massive insurrection in northern Angola20. This was followed 
at the end of 1Q62 by the start of armed resistance in Guinea-
Bissau, when Portuguese ~atrols were ambushed2 1 . With these 
movements, Frelimo formed the third member of the Conferencia 
das OrganJzacoos Nacionalistas das Colo.das Portuquesas 
(CONC~, an alliance of liberation movements in Portuguese 
colonies). Frelimo actually came into being when CONCP urged 
two Mozambican movements +-o "come together"22. The fact that 
the MPLA and PAIGC were already engaqed in fighting against 
the Portuguese must have served as a "demonstration effect" 
for Frelimo, compounding the effects of pressure from Algerian 
instructors and co~~etition from a rival movement Ahich had 
begun armed actions23. 
At Zanu's Inaugural Congress in August 1963, the Rev. 
Nda~aningi Sithole, the movement's first leader, noted the 
almost natural progression from non-violent to violent 
po·icies. "As a rule, human beings everywhere first try the 
method of non-violence, but if circumstances are such that 
non-viJlence cannot work, the same human beings have not 
hesitated to use violence to achieve certain practical ends 
which would be denied to them if they persued only the path of 
non-violence 11 24. The banning of Zanu and the People's 
Caretaker Council (Zapu) on 26 August ~964 proved to be 
decisive, and on 28 April 1966 Zanu fighters engaged the 
Rhodesian security forces at Sinoia25. 
9.3. Rural guerrilla warfare 
In the African revolutions the anc:iPn regimes were not easily 
toppled, as was the case in what H•.mtington terms "Western" 
revolutions, such as the French Revolution26_ T~e wars of 
independence in African revolutions show a close resemblance 
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to what Huntington describes as "Eastern" revolutions (like 
the Chinese Revolution), when the regime is toppled at the end 
of a long struggle27 . African revolutions aJso tend to follow 
the "Easr..ern" pattern in regard to the status of the capital: 
in a "Western" revolution ~he fall of the capital marks the 
beginnin~ of tne revoluti·H . while in the "Eastern" revolution 
it is t~e final objective o ' a dtrategy of consolidating the 
urban base and encircling t.he major pr' centers28. This 
encircling is don~ througP guerriJ re . 
Guerrilla warfare has ~ee ~ irac tist ~ince the earliest 
times. Greene29, cites r i~ a~ t i ons of the Hebrews and Gauls 
against the Roman rul~rs t.:. •~ ;• arnples of resi:::::ance against a 
regime which is militaril f s·~;:>erior to the guerrillas. The 
word "guerrilla" dates back to the Spanish resistance against 
the invading ar.nies of Napoleon in 1808 -- the term is derived 
from the Spanish word for war, guerra30. 
Although the basic premise of guerrilla warfare -- do not 
confront the enemy in a pitched battle when your forces are 
weak -- has remained unchanged since the resistance against 
the Romans, the strategy has been refined over the centuries 
by a number of guerrilla strategists, the most noticeable 
being Mao Zedong31 . His writings were s o in:luential that they 
made a "rural-based revolution a supreme law unto itself11 32 , 
and his teachings affected the conflict in African revolutions 
profoundly. 
For Mao, the central element of guerrilla warfare is the fact 
that it is a protracted struggle in which the enemy is not 
defeated in a few military confrontations, but through 
attrition: to wear down the enemy, the guerrillas should 
attack only when they are in a good tactical position, 3nd 
above all, they should remain mobile and avoid positional 
warfare. 
At L~e start of a guerrilla struggle , the revolutionary 
movement will be on the defensive. It should only go on the 
offensive lf the population supports the guerrillas, the 
terrain is favourable to the guerrillas, and the government 
forces -- their weak spots now visible -- have been 
demoralised and are making mistakes33_ 
9.3.1. An inconspicious start 
In ~n analysis of guerri: la warfare in the African 
revolutions, it iR of interest to noce that only a small 
number of combat «"'nts started wars that W"ere to last y..::ars, 
take hundredn of thousands or liva~, disrupt lhe :iv~s of 
millions, and humiliate the ancj.en reoimes. 
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The French Minister of the Interior (and, therefore, 
responsible for Algeria) was Fran9ois Mit terrand, and in June 
1954 he felt armec conflict brewing: "I sense something ... the 
situation [in Algeria] is unhealthy"34. And then, on .l 
November 1954, the war of independence- broke out -- in he 
Aures, Kabylia, Algiers, Blida, and Oran. No more than 500 men 
t0ok. pa~t. the 300 men in the Aures be1ng armed with only 
about 50 shotg 1ns35. 
Characterised by lack. of di~cipline, most of the pla:.ned 
attacks aborted. However, telephone poles were fellea, 
communicatio~s cut, property of land barons set alight, the 
Algiers gasworks attacked, and firearms sei=ed i n atticks on 
military barracks36. 
The FLN anncunced in a radio message (broadcasted by Cairo 
Radio) that "a true revolutionary struggle at the side of the 
Moroccan and Tunis~an brothers" had started, having as its 
goal "national independence ... by every means until the 
reali3acion of our goal"37 • The first ~inter of the war of 
independence was difficult for the FLN: in Kabylia thP El.N 
fighters were held up in the icy mounr.ains and the local 
population -- with little food for itself -- was not too 
willing to aid the fighters38. In the Aures , which Ben Bella 
envisaged as Alger ia's "principal revolutionary stronghold"39, 
the situation WdS even worse, with seve~al ~f the leaders 
killed or imprisoned. In Algiers, the movement was broken up 
·,rithin ten days after the attack~ on 1 November, and the 
3ders were imprisoned40. 
"At that time [1954] the idea that the petty brigand at t.:acks 
in the Aures meant the beginning of a national movement which 
would lead France to the brink of c1v1l war and force it to 
decide to abandon its substantial European colonial population 
in Algeria, would have seemed extravagantly far-fetched" 41 . 
The armed struggle in Mozambj 11•e started on 25 September 1964 
with even fewer fighters than in Algeria. Three groups of 
insurgents -- 24 in total -- attacked administrative posts and 
small military targets in Cabo Delgado with little success42. 
One of the groups was led by Joaquim Chipanda , a form~r 
schoolteacher who was to become minister of defense in the 
independent Mo7ambique43. 
The start of the war of independence 1n Angola is more 
difficult to determine. What is known is that in 1961 two 
violent confrontations between members of the local population 
and the regime took place. On 4 February 1961 the Luanda 
prison was attacked by a group of MPLA supporcers to free 
politic~l prisoners; the attack failed, and more than 3 000 
Africans were killed in reprisa144. 
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Between 14 and 16 March another uprisinq took place in 
northern Angola, when about 60 000 Bakongo rebels took part in 
the brutal murd~r of more than a hundred Portuguese and ~bout 
6 000 Ovimbundu coffee workers45. "It was the [single) bi,1gest 
slaughter of Europeans which ha~ taken place in Africa th .. s 
century" 4 6. Portuguese repression was brutal: more than 6t 000 
Africans died, and 100 000 fled to the Congo47. Chilcote48 
claims 20 000 Angolan deaths. 
"The initial outbreak at Primavera. appears to have been 
spontaneous", but Roberto's UPA (fore-runner of the FNLA) 
claimed responsibility for the uprising49. 
In December of 1961, these uprisings turned into wars of 
independence, with UPA fighters being trained in Algeria, and 
the MPLA declaring that it, too, was ready for an offensive50 _ 
The small scale of tne clashes between the guerrillas and the 
government troops should come as no surprise. Particularly in 
the early stages of the conflict, "guerrilla warfare is above 
all an endurance test of f orced marches in difficult terrain 
rather than a series of military engagements, which in fact 
should be avoided rather than sought"Sl. 
9.3.2. Effectiveness of the revolutionary movement 
9.3.2.1. Strategies 
Mao argues that revolutionary success is practically ensured 
if a two-pronged strategy is employed. Firstly, violence is 
need~d to wear the enemy down52. Secondly, violence should not 
be used against the members of the population who support the 
cause of the revolutionary movement. Rather, the peasants in 
the rural areas must be educated and aided by the example set 
by the cadres53. For Mao, guerrilla warfare combines carefully 
planned military operations with efforts to gain the support 
of the population. 
All the revolutjonary movements in Africa tried to employ the 
Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare, as opposed to the 
approach favour~d by Guevara and Debray. 
As called for in Mao'~ doctrine, the guerrilla fighters did 
not achieve big military victories -- but the government 
troops could not destroy the guerrillas. Crane Brinton54 
states that in tne first phase of revolution the government 
meets the illegal acts of the revolutionaries with military or 
political force, "but in eac'", C-'lse with a striking lack of 
success". The rulers were unable to make "adequate use of 
force 0 55. This was true in some of the African revolutions as 
well, particularly in Algeria and Guinea-Bissau. 
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Throughout 1955 the Algerian insurrection spread, with Lhe 
fighters better organised and equipped, and the country 
divided into six wilayas, whereby the FLN took on the colonial 
structure as a whole56. On 1 Ap1·il 1955 governor-general 
so~stelle declared a state of emergency. 
The scene was now set for a long period of repression, but 
the French encountered serious initial problems. Firstly, 
apar~ from the police force, the French had only 3 500 
fighting troops, the rest of the 57 000 troops being either 
garrison troops, or units in transit57. The fighting units 
were not trained in counter-insurgency warfare, and were 
inadequately equipped. They resorted to the clumsy rattisage, 
literally "raking over"sa, in which large areas of the 
countryside would be F rolled in the hope of finding 
guerrilla fighters, wh~ e villages were occasionally 
bombarded, and Algerians :i.ndiscriminately arrested, leading to 
an increase in the number of people who joined the FLN59. 
The Algerian war of independence was primarily characterised 
by its brutality. The FLN employed revolutionary terror 
against both the colons and the Muslims and the French ar~y 
aoplied the principle of collective responsibility (punishing 
t:1e group for the crimes of individuals) ruthlessly, and used 
torture extensively60. This had only one effect, as 
Soustelle's advisor, Germaine Tillion btated: "the cycle of 
repression getting even tougher, and the rebellion ever 
3trunger" 61 . 
Two years after the outbreak of the insurrection, the French 
had more than 200 000 troops combatting the 8 500 FLN 
fiq·hters, plus 21 000 auxiliaries62. During 1956 and 1957 the 
war further increased in intensity and brutality, with the FLN 
reaching its military high point in early 195763. From 
September 1957, with the completion of the Morice Line , the 
nationalist rural guerrilla war started to wane. The Morice 
Line, a 200 mile long system uf el~ctric fences and minefields 
along the Tunisian border guarded by 80 000 troops, proved 
very difficult for FLN fighters (from base camps in Tunisa) to 
br~~ach. Amirouche, a senior FLN leader, trJ.ed to lead 1 200 
men across the line in 1958 -- only ten got through64. 
The FLN was to end the war with the vast majority of its 
.:iqhters holed up j n Tunisian camps and a small number of 
::i~rhters being p1..• ... ·sued relentlessly by the about 450 000 
French troops ir Algeria65. 
Ir Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC's armed struJgle was perhaps the 
most successfuJ of all the revolutionary movements. The war of 
independence increased in intensity throughout 1962, and on 18 
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July 1963 the Portuguese de1e11se minister, general Manuel 
Gomes de Araujo , admitted t~ ... c: "well-armed groups ... have 
infiltrated our Guine territory over about fifteen per cent of 
its surface 11 66. 
New York Times correspondent Lloyd Garrison67 describes how 
the PAIGC had pinned the Portuguese forces down in their 
fortified towns. Catie, which he visited in August 1963 "was a 
prison in which the Portuguese had sought shelter ... No one 
moves outside the town during the day without a weapon. After 
dark the barbed wire gates are closed and floodlights 
illuminate the hostile jungle ... soldiers based in Catie live 
in continual tension. " 
As the revolutionary movements succeeded in keeping the 
regime under pressure with their armed struggle, they began to 
gain more support from the local population. 
In revolutions, the war of independence is "a war in which 
the civil population is both the prize that is at stake and 
the plaything of the opposing forces, a war without a front 
line or without frontiers, a war in which the enemy is 
everywhere and nowhere, in which neutrality, or the adoption 
of a wait-and-see policy or a policy of in~ifference, ar~ 
practically impossible, in which the army charge d with 
repressing the revolt finds itself besieged ar.d surrounded and 
inevitably distressed by the collective conspiracy with which 
it is confrontect 11 68. 
A revolutionary movement is usually very successful in 
mobilising support, because it is" ... an armed and discipiined 
organisation to recruit revolutiona-ies, keep alive their 
fervour and commitment. , engage in military operat.ior,s whose 
eventual aim is the seizure and consolidation of poli~ical 
power" 69. 
The capture of locaJ support gives c:he revolutionary movemer.t 
two distinct ddva~tages: firstly, the "ki.1ship network thaL is 
conzequently made available to the j vement: eacn peasant 
guerrilla ope=ating in his own village or province can take 
advantage of acquaintances as well as relatives for the 
purposes of refuge, recruitment, and information117 0. 
Debrav7 : stressed the " importance of raising the politicdl 
consciousness of peasants by ensuring their daily contact with 
the guerrillas, who must share the peasants' living 
conditi0ns, work by their side, and help th~m wilh the 
concrete tasks that improve the material circumstance~ of 
peas21t life". 
Debray and Guevara7 2 argued that the a c tions of the 
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guerrillas will create an " insurrectional focus (foco)" in 
which the inspired population will 1 ·~e up against the 
government. howe;1er, armed struggle: al<,:1e cannot inspire 
people to rise against a re~ime, and in October 1967 in 
Bolivia Guevara -- who believed "that all that is needed for a 
peasant-based revolution is the presence of armed men 
preaching liberation from oppression" -- was killed because 
the oppressed did not take to his message73. In the African 
revolutions all the movements tended to follow Mao's strategy 
instead of Guevara's -- the painst~king building of popular 
support for the movement was a central element of their 
st:-ategy. 
It is important to remember that a large number of the loca l 
population did not join the revolutionary movement and that 
some fought for the rulers. Dunn74 states that more Algerians 
were voluntarily fighting for the French than for the FLN. 
Aoout 142 000 members of the Portuguese armed forces of 179 
000 were deployed in the Lusophone territo~ies: "but the 
interesting point is that by 1971 well ove~ 40 per cent of the 
force was black ... this 1s increasingly a war of African 
against African"75. 
9.3.2.1. Lib~rated areas 
The clearest indication of success in a g~errilla war is the 
establishme nt of a liberated area, which 1s a "geographic base 
neeessary for extending ... military and political operations " 
uy the revolutionary movement76. This base, or liberated zone, 
should be in rugged terrain that impedes the government 
troops; it shou:d be close to a friendly country for 
sanctuary; it should provide the guerrillas with economic 
self-sufficiency, and the opportunity to demonstrate their new 
sy~tem to the friendly locals, thus winning even more 
support 77. 
The PAIGC's control over the country increased duri~g 1963, 
and in January 1964 lt defeated the Portuguese i~ a struggle 
that closely resembled conventional warfare. More than 3 000 
Portuguese soldiers t~ied to take the strategic island Como, 
but had to withdraw after 75 days of fighting78. Accordjng to 
Cabral, th~ , "was the worst defeat for the Portuguese in their 
record of colunialism. We calculated ~he enemy's losses at 
~tout 650 men"79. 
In February 1964, the PAIGC held a congress in Gl1inea-Bissau, 
at Cassaca. Thereafter, tPe intensity of the war of 
independence increased further, so that by July 1965 the 
movement claimed co~trol over about 40 percent of the 
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The PAIGC's war effort was acknowledged by the official 
Lisbon newspaper, DiAr~o de Noticias in earl~ 1966: "The enemy 
whom the Portugu~se must destroy is a wortny adversary. Its 
commanders are well-trained in guerrilla warfare ... and well-
armed ... They have shown clear signs of intelligence and a 
sense of initiative; unless our troops compel them, they never 
attack forces larger than their own, and thPy 11-;e to the best 
advantage a difficult t~rrain which they Kn ow like the back of 
their hands 11 8l_ 
In Mozambique, reporter Lord Kilbraek.en82 found that close to 
lake Nyasa and up to forty miles from the borders of Tanzdnia 
and Malawi, "in three thousand terrorised square miles the 
Portuguese, both civil and military, are confined to five 
small garrisons ... Not one white settler dares stay in the 
area ... The Frelimo are a thoug~ and elusive enemy .. at home in 
the jungle and bush, where they live off the country, striking 
silently by nigit, withdrawing swiftly into the dense cover if 
the Portuguese r epl y in strength." 
9.4. A terror campaign 
Terror was first used in the ser~ice of a secular ideolcgy in 
the French Revolution; since then, it has 1emained a very 
potent -- and gruesome -- weapon ln the ha1ds of 
revolutionaries. 
9.4.1. A rationale for the use of terror 
Hutchinson83 identifies four essential components of terror 
that can be used in defining the phenomenon: terror is the 
systematic and purposeful application of "extraordinary and 
intolerable violence", which :s characterised by the symbolic 
selection of targets, having a profound psychologir.al effect 
on the population. 
This is echoed by Thornton84, who identifies four of the five 
objectives of terror as being psychological in nature. Apart 
from the elimination of oppo~ition forces -- its physical 
nature -- terror is intended o strengthen the revolutionary 
m~vement's morale; to advert se the revolutionary m~vement; to 
destroy the authority figures and thus d~stabilise 
communities; and to psychologically isolate people who fear 
the actions of both inc umbent and challenger85_ 
However, terror does not only have psychological effects. It 
can change the political order of a country in the short term. 
Brazilian revolutioniry Carlos Marighela86 describes this 
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phenomenon when he highlights the paradoxica technique of 
terrorising the population, in order to evoke indiscriminate 
repression by the regime. Th-s repression then induces the 
population -- the target of ~error atLack~ -- to join the very 
movement that perpetrated these acts. 
"It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed contlict 
by performing violent action~ that will force tho~e in powP.r 
to transform tte political situation of the country into a 
military situation [ ... ) thus making the life of its citizens 
harder than ever; hemes will be broken into, police searches 
organised, innocent people arrested and communications broken; 
police terror will become the order of the day, and there will 
be more and more political murders -- in short a ~assive 
political persecution. The population will refuse to 
collaborate with the authoritie~, so that the latt~r will find 
the only solution to their problems lies in having recourse ~ 
the actual physical liquidation of their opponents. The 
political situation of the country wil~ become a rn~litary 
situation [ ... ) That will alier~te the masses, who, from then 
on , will revolt against the army and the police and blame them 
for this state of thing~n87. 
9.4.2. Terror again~t the ruling group 
In the African revolutions, the use of terror aga1ns the 
ruling group varied. It was an important strategy for the FLN 
in Algeria, whilst Amilcar Cabra188 of the PAlGC w s as a 
point of principle against the use of terror, and stated 1n 
1969: "[W)e want to have a P"litical resistance that will 
serve our people. We do not want a bloodthirsty people, 
shedding blo0d for the sake of it. " The ~sect terror i n 
Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe varied between these 
extremes. 
Frelimo restrained its actions agai~st Portuguese civili,ns, 
and about 150 were killed from the start of the war in 1964 
untjl the coup of 1974 -- an average of fift~~n civilians per 
year89_ This low casualty figure can be ascribPd o the 
following: Frelim0 ~J s wary of charges of "b~ack racism" and 
fighting a racial war; most whites stayed in towns, wl1ere 
little activity occurred; white farmers left their homes au 
when they felt it became unsafe, and migrated to U1e to~rns; 
and, if they stayed, reached some sort of compromise wi h th~ 
; 'surgents90 . Only after the fall of Caetano did viol ce 
a~ainst sett!ers increase. and this led to the wh' e ,o 
which by May 1975 had reached 1 000 per week91. 
In the Zimbabwean re ,lution, the two revolutionary mo·; m n s 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
- - -------------------- ---....-----~ 
made extensive use of terror against the ruling grr up, and far 
more whites were attacked than in MozambiquP. 92 . This can be 
ascribed to the fact that the whites in Rhodesia lived 
throJghout the country, and wer~ not concentrated in the 
towns93. Furthermore, Zaru and Zapu fought against a regime 
Lhat did not represent a colonial power thousand~ of 
kilometers away -- the "guerrillas' main enemy dwelled right 
at their doorstep"94 . 
However, from the start of the war in 1966 until December 
1972 only two deadly assaults on white families occurred95. In 
December 1972 Rex Nhongo, who was later co become head of 
Zapu's military wing, Zanla, ordered an attack on the Altena 
farm in the Centenary district. Thereafter, terror attacks on 
white farms became frequent. Moorcraft96 estimates that 294 
white civilians died in terror attacks during the war of 
independence. 
Missionaries -- who were soft targets -- were often singled 
out for accack, as was the case with the killing of sev~~ 
missionaries at Msumai97. Th~ revolutionary movements also 
tried their hand at urban terror, killing eleven people when a 
bomb exploded in a department store in the capita198 and 
blowing up an oil dump in Salisbury on 11 December 197999. 
The best example of terror against the ruling group was the 
shooting down of two Viscount passenger airplanes. On 3 
September 1978 guerrillas from Zapu's military wing shot down 
a Viscount with a Sam-7 missile . Eighteen of the 53 pas, engers 
survived the crash, but were then attacked by the guerrillas, 
who killed tenl00. Less than six months later, the guerrillas 
shot down another Viscount in the same area and all 59 people 
on board were killed101. The psychological ef.ect on the 
ruling group was evident: "A feeling of sullEn, resigned anger 
pervaded the white community"102. 
Despite this spectacular Zimb?bwean example of terror against 
the ruling group, "Algeria was a class~c case of revolutionary 
nationalist terrorism against a colonial power"103. 
The use of terror was advocated by the FLN in no uncertain 
terms, with ideologue Frantz Fanon claiming that the violence 
against the oppressor that goes with terror will have a 
therapeutic effect on the population. 
"Violence alone, violence committed by the people , 
violence educated and organised by its l~aders makes it 
possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives 
the key to them . . . at the level of individuals violence is a 
cleansing force ... [it) frees the native from his inferiority 
complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him 
fearless and restores his self respect"104. 
One of the best exa,oples of terror against the French 
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occurred on 20 AugusL 1955 when an FLN olanned attack on 
Philippeville left 123 people dead, 71 of them European 
civilians , including babies who were cluobed to deathl05. 
The French reprisal out-matched the brutality of the FLN 
attacks, ~ith casualty figures ranging betw~en 1 273 (French 
figure) tc l .' 000 (FLN figure)l06. The French applied their 
policy of collective responsibility. If one inhabitant of a 
village was found to be involved with the FLN, all the members 
of the village were punjshed and sent to a protected campl07. 
In other cases, Arabs were indiscriminately mowed down with 
machine guns, or taken prisoner and then shot in a manner 
reminiscent of Nazi atrocities. "At six o'clock next morning, 
all the l.m.g.s. [light machine-guns] and machine-guns were 
lined up in front of the crowd of prisoners, who immediately 
began to yell. But we opened fire; ten minutes later, it was 
practically over. There were so many of them that they had to 
be buried with bulldozers," was how a soldier recounted the 
repressionl08. 
This led to a large number of people joining the FLN, and 
recruitment picked up sharply -- by October 1955 Wilaya II had 
1 400 regular fighting men, the highest of any wilayal09 . 
Algeria was now iu a position of no return, for between the 
French and the Muslims "there ha1 been well and truly dug an 
abyss through which flowed a river of blood"ll0. 
The FLN further decided to take terror to the big cities, 
particularly Algiers. The espousal of terrorism at the Soummam 
conference, attended by the majority of :. ~1e revolutionary 
leaders, paved the way for an urban b ombing campaignlll. 
The campaign started on 30 September 1956, when two bombs 
(planted by beautiful young Muslim girls) e3ploded in populaL 
cafes, killing three and injuring fifty, mostly teenagersll2. 
This was followed by the assassination of a pied noir mayor, 
and on 7 January 1957 the authorit~es handed over control of 
the ci~y to general Massu. The military had to restore order, 
and Massu's parachute division set about this task 
fer0ciously: a general strike that was planned LO last for 
eight days ( ~oinciding with the UN debate on Algeria on 28 
January 19~7) was broken within 48 hours by heavy handed 
methods that included the firing of a tank shell into a closed 
shopll3. The bombing campaign continued: two days before the 
strike, three cafes were bombed, killing five and wounding 
sixty, and fifteen days later ten people died when two sport 
stadiums were bombed, the devices again placed by young 
girlsll 4 . 
On 25 February Massu's paras captured Ben M'Hidi, political 
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leader of the FLN in Algiers. With their organisation in 
tatters , the remaining FLN members planted a number of bombs 
i ·1 June, killing nine in one explosion115. On 24 September 
1957, almost a year after the first explosion had started the 
Bat tle of Algiers, Saadi Yacef, leader of the bombers, was 
caught in the Algiers Casbahll6. The battle was over, and 
(militarily, at least) a victory for the French. 
The Battle of Algiers was a lesson for the FLN to restrict 
its armed activiti1!s to the country-side, or accept that its 
fighters in the city are "terrorists" rather than 
11guerrillas 11 117. 
Greenrl18 gives the following reasons for this analysis: the 
mobility vf the revolutionaries being extremely limited, it i~ 
impossible for them to concentrate and I;\OVe in groups 01 armed 
men; furthermore, they ~ave no opportunity to establish a 
fixed base and liberated zone for revolutionary operations and 
government -- at the most they can strike terror into the 
hearts of the population. The Battle of Algiers "demonst •~ted 
how completely a well-trained and ruthless militAry force 
could contain urban violence in a way which was impossible in 
the countrysiderll9. 
The French repressiLn of the insurrertion ~L Algeria's cities 
- - especially during the Buttle of Algiers -- induc~d some 4 
000 FLN militants to head for the country-side, whi le the 
leadership went abroad, notably to Tunis120. 
9.4.3. The use of terror against th~ .u.•cal population 
h~, ~~h Arendtl21 argues that "only the two-edged compulsio~ o F 
id J ~uy and terror , one compelling men from within and the 
other ~o~~elling them from without, can fully explain the 
me~kne~s with whi~h revolutionists in all countries ... have 
gone to tr ~ir doom" rhe importance of ideology was ~i5cu~sed 
ii. Part Three . The ui:.c of terror against tt-e local poJ:, .. le ions 
was to assur~, _conically, their support for the movemen hat 
acted against th~·r. This Nas done by killing local leaders , a-
wsll as by indiscriminate terror against the populatjon. 
In Algeria, amid the wild killings at Philippeville, one 
murder was carefully planned and executed. The nephew of the 
liberal leader Ferhat Abbas, who had criticised the FLN, was 
murdered, sending a ~lear signal to all moderate politicians 
to either join the movement, or diel22. This was to become a 
strategy of the FLN, as embodied in a directive sent by Ben 
Bella in 1955, after Philippeville: "Liquidate all 
personalities who want to play the role of int3rlocuteur 




joined the FLN and was elected as member of the movement ' s 
governing body in August 1956124. Thus , in the words of Ben 
Bella : "The 'moderate nationalists' so dear to Soustelle 
thereupon [after the terror at Philippeville] reached the 
desired conclusions"125. 
FLN terror was not only directed at the leaders , but also at 
any Algerian who collaborated with the French. Thus, a further 
order uf the revolutionary movement read: "Kill the caids 
[local officials] ... Take their children and kill them. Kill 
all those who pay taxes"126 . 
The extent of these terror killings was such that during the 
first two and a half years of the Algerian war, 6 352 Muslims 
were killed in attacks on civilians, as opposed to the 1 035 
Europeans127. The casualty figures from terror attacks 
remained extremely high throughout the war. After suffering 
heav~ losses against the forces of general Ch~lle in 1958, th~ 
FLN launched a new wave of terror attacks in 1959, with 184 
civilians killed in incidents in January of that year, and 143 
i.1 Der omber128. 
The Kabyle smile, as the French soldiers referred to the 
terror victims with their throats slit, became commonplace in 
one of the most cruel wars ever fought12~. 
The terror had the effect of psychologically isolating 
members of the population. This is illustrated by a quote from 
the diary of Mouloud Ferraoun, a Kabyle schoolteacher who was 
to become a victim of (pied noir) terrorism in 1962: "Nobody 
is sure of ;:1: yth; r,;, it is truly terr~-r. Terror of the 
soldiers, terror of the outlaw. Terror which rules mysterious 
and inexplicable"l30, 
Governor-general Soustellel31 realised this as well: "Terror 
had taken hold. No one spoke. The population~~ a whole, 
without throwing in its lot with the rebels ... remained 
frightened and non-committal." 
In Mozambique, terror was alno employed by Frelimo, although 
not of the same intensity as the FLN ' s terror campaign in 
Algeria. "Frelimo selectively assassinated and abducted to 
complement its mobilisation " l32. From the start of the war in 
1964 until mirl-1973, nine hundred traditional leaders were 
murdered133. 
9owever , Frelimo did not only operate against colonial 
leadership figures , but against the local population as well. 
Portuguese spokesmen claimed t hat for every soldier killed by 
the guerrillas , one hundred civilians died at Frelimo ' s hands, 
which led to the psychological isolation of large numbers of 
illagers134. These actions against the civilian population 
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were not always aimed at gaining support for Frelimo, b~t 
sometimes at cutting ot! support for the colonial 
authority135. For example, by shelling aldeamentos (protected 
villages), Frelimo hoped to prove to the villagers that the 
Portuguese could not guarantee their safety, and therefore did 
not deserve the support of the civilian population. In 
Mozambic1ue, "[t J he aldeamentos provided health, so,:ial and 
educational facilities which had been lacking before"136. 
Henriksen137, quoting official Portuguese figures, states 
that from 1964 to 1973 the guerrillas killed 689 civilians, 
wounded 1 625, and abducted 6 500. An example was the attack 
on Nhacambo village, in which seventeen civilians djed. 
Portugal accused Frelimo of trQ attack , but the revolutionary 
movement denied the charges. 
The use of terror in Mozambique increased with Frelimo's 
campaign to "Bust Cabera Bassa", because the movement did not 
enjoy solid support in the surrounding part of Mozambique138. 
By provoking Portuguese retaliation with acts of terror, the 
civilian population became the object of collective Portuguese 
repression, and eventually the local population supported 
Frelimo139. 
9.5. Conclusion 
Turee central elements can be identified in the 3rmed struggle 
between African revolutionary movements and the ancien 
regimes: the length of the phase characterised by rural 
guerrilla warfare, the strategy which the movements used, and 
the role of terror in the armed struggle. 
It was seen in this chapter that the conflict between the 
revolutionary movement and the old regime took the form of 
lengthy wars of independence. B1inging the old regime to a 
fall took 8 years in Algeria; 13 years in Mozambique; 18 year.s 
in Guinea-Bissau; 13 years in Angola; and 13 years in 
Rhodesia140. On a global scale , only the revolutions in China 
(22 years), South Vietnam (21 years), and Malaya (12 years) 
can compare with the African revolutions studied tere as far 
as duration is concerned141. 
The initial low level of violence at the start of guerrilla 
wars led to a fatal under-estimation by the governments of the 
revolutionaries' power. They did not feel compelled to 
negotiate with the revolutionaries. French Interior Minister 
Francois Mitterrand (who was responsible for Algeria) said at 
the outbreak of the war of independence: "The only possible 
negotiation is war " l42. 




strategy followed by the revolutionary movements. They applied 
Mao's rules of guerrilla warfare, and took on the opposition 
only if they had a good chance of a victory . The guerrillas 
cultivated support amongst the peasants, and were eventually 
able to establish "liberated areas" in outlying areas of 
Mozambique. Large areas of Guinea-Bissau were ~nder guerrilla 
control . In these areas, the guerrillas acted as the de facto 
government , and concentrated on politicising the inhabitants 
of these areas. 
Any armed struggle frightens the civilians population . 
However, in the African revolutions terror was used as a 
calculated tactic to force the local population to support the 
revolutionary movement. In Algeria , this tactic led to extreme 
brutality, not only from the guerrillas, but also from 
government troops in their attempts to preven terror attacks. 
The government violence not only drew peoplP t o the 
revolutionary movement, but also played an important role in 
internationalising the African revolutions -- an aspect which 
is examined in the f o llowing chapter. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Notes to Chapter Ni ne 
1. Greene , T.H. 1984. Comparative revolutionary movements --
search for theory and justice. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall , Inc. First published in 1974. p129. 
2 . Ibid. 
3. Dunn , J. 1972. Modern revolutions: an introduction to the 
analysis of a political phenomenon. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press , p12. 
4. Huntinton, S.P. 1968. Political Order in Changing 
Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press . p264. 
5. Calvert, P. 1967. Revolution , the politics of violence, 
Political Studies 15, p2 . 
6. Cohan , A.S. 1975 . Theories of revoluti .~ : an introduction. 
London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. p26 
7. Cohan , Theories of revolution , p2g. 
8 . Dunn, Modern revolutions , pl5. 
9. Horne, A. 1987. A savage war of peac, -- Algeria 1954-1962. 
London: Papermac. First published in 1977. pl41. 
10. Horne, A savage war, p73. 
11. Merle , R. 1967. Ben Bella. London: Michael Joseph. 
Translated by Camilla Sykes. p77. 
12. Horne, A savage war, p75. 
13. Horne, A savage war, p76. 
14. Horne, A savage war, p78. 
15. Mondlane, E. 1983. The struggle for Mozambique. London: 
Zed Press. pl25. 
16 . Munslow, B. 1983. Mozambique: the revolution and its 
origins. London: Longman , p83 . 
17. Isaacman , A. & Isaacman , B. 1983. Mozdmbique -- from 
colonialism to revolution , 1900--1982. Boulder: Westview 
Press , p80. 
18. Munslow, Mozambique, p83. 
19. Munslow , Mozambique , p84 . 
20. Ne witt , M. 1981. Portugal in Africa -- the lase hundred 
ye?rs . London : C . Hurst & Co . p225 . 
21. Chab al , P . 1983. Amilcar Cabral. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p29. 
22 . Henriksen, T . H. 1983. Revolution and counterrevolution 
Mozambique's war of independence , 1964--1974. Westport: 
G~eenwood Press , p~ 0 . 
_3, Henriksen , Revolution, pp24-25. 
24. Pandya , P . 1988. Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga . 
Braamfontein: Skotaville , p41. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
- ----...--- ----------~ 
14 . 
25 Moorcraft, P.L. & McLaughlin , P. 1982. Chimurenga -- the 
war in Rhodesia 1965--1980. Marshalltown: Sygma/Collins, pl7. 
26. ~unt1ngton, Political order , pp271-272. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid . 
29. Greene, Revolutionary movements, pl33. 
30. Itid. 
31. Cohen, Theories of revolution, p73. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Pandya, Ma~, 06. 
34. Horne, A sa,:.§.!Lf war, p86 . 
35. Greene, Revc., uti...9nz.ry movements , p91. 
36. Horne, !1__,§avage_•. r~, p94. 
37. Horne, A s~vage w~£, p95. 
38. Horne , A s~vage wer, pl04. 
39. Horne, A sa.~ge war, p89. 
40. H1r~e , A savdqe war, ~1C4. 
41. Dunn, Modern r~volutions , pl48. 
42. Henriksen, Revolution, p25. 
43. Ibid . 
44. Pinheiro, P.M. 1~62. "Poll,ics 01. a revolt," in Angola: a 
symposium, views of a r ~volt. 1~62. Issu~d under the auspices 
of the Institute for Race P.elat1...,ns. Lo.1don: Oxtord University 
Press, plll. 
45. Fi ,ueiredo, A de. 19i:L "The case against Portugal," i1: 
Angola: a svmoosium, views of a r ~volt. Issued under ·he 
au~pices of the Institute f or Race Relations. London: Oxfo=d 
University Press. p53. 
46. Waring, R. 1962. "The case for Portugal , " in Angola: a 
S'lmposium, views of a revolt. Issued under the auspices of the 
Institute for Race Relations. London: Oxford ~niversity Press. 
p31. 
47. Figueire1o, "The case against Portugal ," p54. 
48. Chilcote, R. 1967. Portuquese Africa. Englewood ~liffs : 
Prentice-Hall, p76. 
49. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa , p76 . 
50. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, p77. 
51. Debray , R. 1970. "Castroism,: the Long Marer jn Latin 
America," in G.A. kelly & r:.w . Brown , jr (eds.) ~;truqqles in 
the state: sources and patterns of world revolution. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. First published in 1965. p457. 
52. Pandya, Mao, p22. 
53. Ibid . 
54. Brinton, C. 1952. The anatomy of revolution. New York: 
Prentice-Hall , Inc. First publi f hed in 1938. p94 . 
55. Horne, A savage w~, pl02 . 
56 . Wheatcroft, A. E:;1. "he world atlas of revolution . 
London: Hamish Har.ultc,1. plJl. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
l4J . 
57. Horne, A savage war, p96. 
58. Horne, A savage war, p26. 
59. Horne, A savage war, pl02. 
60. Wheatcroft, World atlas, pl30. 
61. Horne, A savage war, p115. 
62. Gre~ne, Revolutionary movements, p91. 
63. Chaliand, Gerard. 1977 . Revolution in the Third World: 
myths and prospects. Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press . 
p72. 
64. Gordon, D.C. 1966. The passing of French Algeria. London: 
Oxford University Press. p60. 
65. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p91. 
66. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, p102. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Bourdieu, P 1962 . The Algerians. Translate~ by A.C.h. 
Ross. Boston: Beacun Press. p.4 . 
69. Ellis, J., "Arm9d co~ponents of re~olution," in M. ~lliot-
Bateman, J. Ellis & •• Bowden, R~uolt to Revolution 1J"4. 
Manchester: Manchester Universit / P~P~~ ~114. 
70. Greene, Revolutiona~y movements, p135. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Cohan, A.S. 197 : . Theories of revolution: an introduction. 
London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. p112. 
73. Greene, Revolution,◄ ry movements, p134. 
74. Dunn, Modern r~volutions , p163. 
75. B1uce, N. 1973. "Portugal 's African w~r ," Conflict 
Studies, 34, 
76 . Greene, ?• -~ut-ionary movements, ~135 . 
7""1 • Ibid. 
78 Chilcot _, !__ uguese Afr ic, , p1 03. 
7 9. Davidson, 1969 . The liberation of Guin~ -- ~ e cts of 
an Afri~J. revolution . Harmondsworth: Penguin. ppl00-101 . 
80. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa , pl03. 
81. Chilco~e, ~ )rtuguese Africa, p104. 
82. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, p122. 
83. Hutchinson, M.C. 1978 . Revolutionary terrorism -- the FLN 
in Algeria, 1954-1962. Stanford: Hoover Institutio- Press. 
p21. 
84. Thornton, T.P. 1964. " Terror as a weapon of political 
agitation, " in H. Eckstein (ed.), Internal war: problems and 
approaches. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. pp71-91. 
~5. Ibid. 
36. HorPe, A savage war, p ~l8 . 
7. Ibid. 
~ Chabal , Ami:car Cabral , p77. 
~ 1 Henriksen, Revolution, pl25. 
9 Henriksen, Revolution, ppl23-128. 
91 :~anlon, J. 1984. Mozambique: the revolution under fire. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
14.a . 
London: Zed Press. p45. 
92. Gann, L.H. & T.H. Henriksen. 1981. The struggle for 




96. Gann & Henriksen, The struggle, p91. 
97. Gann & Henriksen, The struggle, p70. 
98. Gann & Henriksen, The struggle, p94. 
99. Moorcraft & McLaughlin, Chimurenga, p205. 
100. Moorcraft & McLaughlin, Chimurenga, p200. 
101. Gann & Henriksen, The struggle, p80. 
102. Moorcraft & McLaughlin, Chimurenga, p207. 
103. Hutchinson, Revolutionary terrorism, pxiv. 
104. Fanon, F. 1967. The wretched of the earth. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. p74. 
105. Horne, A savage war, p122. 
106. Ibid. 
107. Horne, A savage~ , p119. 
108. Horne, A savage war, p121. 




113. ~ - rne, A savage war, ppl91-192. 
114. hu.·ne, A savage war, pl92. 
115. Horne, A savage war, p210. 
116. Horne, A savage war, p217. 
117. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p140. 
118. Ibid. 
119. Wheatcroft, World atlas, p131. 
120. Chaliand, Revolution, p72. 
121. Arendt, H. 1986. On revolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books. First published in 1964. p57. 
122. Horne, A savage war, p123. 
123. Horne, A savage war, pl41. 
124. Horne, A savage war, p135. 
125. Merle, Ben Bella, p95. 
126. Horne, A savage war, p135. 
127. Ibid. 
128. Horne, A savage war, p352. 
129. Wheatcroft, World atlas, p130. 
130. Hutchinson, Revolutionary terrorism, p26. 
131. Horne, A savage war, p107. 
132. Henriksen , Re~olution, p119. 
133. Ibid. 




136. Bruce, "Portugal's African war," p9. 
137. Henriksen, Revolution, pl22. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid. 
140. Pandya, .Ms,Q, p6. 
141. Pandya, Mao, p6. 
142. Brinton, The anatomy, p94. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter Ten 
The role of international support in a revolution 
10.1. Introduction 
When a revolution occurs, it is not only the local populat:i.on 
that tends to side with either the incumbents or the 
revolutionaries. In an era of instant communications, 
revolutions in distant continents become eve~r.s played out in 
the living rooms of people all over the world. Not only do 
people take an interest in the revolutionary process, but 
organisations, governments, and international bodies pursue 
definite policies with regard to s~pport of the 
revolutionaries. Governments often see a potential ally in a 
movement, or an actual ally in the regime, and deci~e to come 
to assistance. This may lead to an increase in violence, and 
if both parties are supported by foreign governments, they may 
be less inclined to reacu a compromisel. 
Thus, decisions ffiade in New York, Washington, or Moscow can 
affect the revolutior.ary process more profoundly than several 
battles in the bush. 
Furthermo~e, the 9roundwork for external support is already 
laid with the existence of forums such as the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, and -- more importantly -- the 
(nowadays blurred) division of the world into ideologicol 
camps. In fact, "the external environment i!'lfluences by simply 
existing"2 . 
Mao Zedong stated in 1935 that "[i]nt~rnational support is 
necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country 
or nation"3. Mao's statement is echoed by Greene4 , as well as 
Leiden & SchrnittS, when they identify external support as a 
determining factor in the revolutionary process . 
External support as a determining factor becomes more 
important when ~he struggle is drawn out in time, highly 
ideologised and has mobilised large numbers of people 6 . As was 
shown earlier, African revolutions were Jong, ideologised 
affairs, and it is therefore not surprising that e:--:ternal 
support played an important role. 
External support can take many forms. Some countries may aid 
the revolutionaries, others the regime, while event3 in other 
countries may have inspired the revolutionary movement in the 
first place. Varying degrees of support are found: non-le hal 
moral support and humanitarian aid on the one end, and direct 
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military assistance on the other7 . 
In this chapter, external support will be divided into two 
sections: non-military support, and support for a military 
struggle. These categories are not mutually exclusive -- for 
example, a country that supported a movement on the diplomatic 
scene may also have provided military support, but the 
categories will al least provide some distinction between 
differ ~nt types of external support. Although the focus will 
be on external support for the revolutionary movements, 
international support for the ancien regimes will be looked at 
as well. 
Note mu~t be taken of the fact that the support analysed here 
was g;_ven during the war of independence. Military and non-
military aid after independen~e has as its aim the 
transformation of society, and will therefore be discussed in 
Crapters Twelve and Thirteen. 
10.2. Non-~ilitary support 
Non-military support for the revolutionary movement serves 
several purposes, one of the most important being the lowering 
of the legitimacy of t he ancien regime and promoting that of 
the revolutionary movement. It will be examined on two levels: 
state level, with special attention being given to the role of 
the United Nations and member c ountries of this global f o rum; 
and, secondly, non-state level, which includes the act i ons of 
non-gove rnmental bodies , suc h as c hurches, institutions, and 
various groups. 
1 0 . 2 .1. Non-militi!£.Y_ support on state level 
Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, the former Syracuse university lecturer 
and leader of Frelimo, soon realised that the "international 
campaign for recognition and aid was an extension of the 
internal c 0nflict"8. Thus, Frelimo went to great lengths to 
publicise itself: tracts and bulletins were d _ributed, 
journalists were taken into "lioerated areas", prisoners 
exchanged through the International Red Cross, foreign states 
were visited and their leaders lobbied, and appeals were made 
t:hrough the United Na'· ions for the end of Portuguese 
colonialism9. 
The UN, particularly its General Assembly dominated by the 
Non-Aligned countries, served as an internationc>l forum from 
which the colonial regimes were criticised. The UN (where 
Mondlane had worked as a researcher) acknowledged Frelimo as 
the sole representative of the Mozambican people, granted the 
revolutionary movement observer status, supported the justness 
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of its armed struggle, and condemned Portuguese colonialisml0. 
Recognition by the world community is of extreme importance 
to the revolutionary movement, not only during the conflic~ 
with the ancien regime, but also after it seizes power. 
According to "the requirements of international ].aw ... every 
unusual change in governmental arrangements, be it caused by a 
coup, revolt, or revolution, must be recognized by other 
members of the international community" 11 . This is of such 
importance that "the lack of recognition spelled the 
extinction of Moise Tshombe's independent Katanga in 1963"12. 
Recognition of a movement and the justness of its actions, 
furthermore strengthen the moral and legal standing of the 
movement and serve as a basis for increased materiaL support. 
For example, Henriksenl3 argues that the depiction of Portugal 
a~ a colonial country, ruled by fascists, policed by a 
Gestapo-like secret police (PIOE) and a SS-like para-military 
organisation (Legiao Port',!(Juesa) was instrumental in lessening 
governments' support for Portugal, partjcularly in 
Scandinavia. For e1:ample, in 1972 Sweden allocated $150 000 to 
the Mozambique Institute (an educational centre), and in the 
following two years gave $3 million to Frelimo, the MPLA and 
PAIGC for "civilian activiti~s 0 14. In 1973 Norway and Denmark 
allocated $2 million and $1,3 million respectively for 
"victims of aparth~id and colonialism" 15. 
Frelimo did not only receive support in the UN, but also from 
the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation for African 
Unjty. For example, the African Liberation Committee (a 
subcommittee of the OAU founded in 1963) has as its aim the 
destruction of the colonial regimes, as well as white rule in 
South Africal6. This group not only supports the movements by 
non-military means, buc provides the movements with sanctuary 
and hardware as well. 
The rise of the Non-Aligned Movement played a ~-,rther role in 
the shaping of international opinion. The FLN in Algeria can 
be said to have grown with the NAM, and "with the rise in the 
diplomatic scatus and organisational effectiveness of the non-
dligned powers, it was to improve stiJ.l further 1117 . 
For a long time, the official French view was that the FLN is 
the product of outside forces, particularly Egypt. Jacques 
Soustelle, French go.vernor-general in Algeria during the most 
violent years of the war of independence, believed this until 
his death in 1990. "Don't forget that the FLN ... was 
practically created by Nasser 11 l8. 
In September 1957, the FLN scored a major breakthrough in 
the battle for international recognition when senator John F. 
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Kennedy came out strongly in favour of Algerian independence. 
The American policy of aiding France in its war against the 
Muslims, said the man who was to lead the US into the Vietnam 
quagmire, was "a retreat from ~he principles of independence 
and a~ticolonia .sm11 1 9. Following this speech, America was to 
change its stance in the Security Council, abstaining instead 
of supporting her Nato ally. 
Occurrences like this were, according to governor-general 
Soustelle, "worth more than a convoy of arms" to the FLN20. 
This support by ~overnments and international organisations 
led to a diminishing of support, both military and non-
military, for t h e ancien regime~, and left them with little 
moral standing in the international community. France, and 
particularly Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa found 
themselves very alone in the world. 
10.2.2. Non-military support on non-stat~l~vel 
The revolutionary movements did not only receive support from 
governments and the United Nations and the Organisation of 
African Unity, but also from smaller organisations and 
churches. 
Frelimo, for example, was aided by a large number of 
organisations. These ranged from the American Ford foundation, 
which until 1965 supplied Frellmo with $100 000 for 
educational projects, to Finnish students who supplied a 
printing press21. 
Apart from the UN, various churches served as sources of non-
military external support. Contrary to the actions of 
Zimbabwean guerrillas, who conducted attacks on missionaries, 
Frelimo cultivated the support of the chu .ches22. This paid 
off in a number of ways: the missionaries aided wounded 
guerrillas; they exposed malpractic, s of the Portuguese armed 
forces, such as the Wiriyamu massacre; and they introduced the 
revolutionary leaders to their church groups in Europe or 
America. The most spectacular pay-off came in June 1970, when 
Pope Paul VI accorded an audience to Ma~celino dos Santos of 
Frelimo, as well as the leaders of the MPLA and PAIGc23. In 
reaction, Portugal recalled its envoy from the Vatican. 
10.3. Military support during the revolution 
All the revolutionary movements in Africa started their armed 
struggle with very few weapons . and virtually no external 
military support . However, as the movements started to prove 




support increased, sometimes rapidly. In this section, 
military support will be examined by looking at two aspects: 
r:,ilitary training and arms supplies; and the use of 
sanctuaries by the revolutionary movement. (The Cuban support 
of the MPLA -- which characterised Angola after independence 
-- will be analysed in Chapter Twelve, because this external 
support was more instrumental in aiding the MPLA in the civil 
war, and aiding the movement in its attempt to transform ~he 
political and socio-economic orders.) 
10. · . J . The supply of arms and training to the movements 
After tne outbreak of violence in Algeria, the international 
community was slow to supply the FLN with arms and training. 
~enior .tLN leador Rabah Bitat claims that the movement did not 
receivP such support until 1956 -- nearly two years after the 
first suots wer13 firect24. 
Mozambiq11e received a limited supply or weapons from Arab 
countries such as Egypt, and parti~ularly Algeria. Algeria 
"assumed the irternational status of a revolutionary mecca" 
under 8'3n BellH, and trained about- 250 Frelimo members --
including Samo -a Machel -- at Tlemcen in 196325. It is 
interesting to note that Nelson Mandela confirmed during his 
~isit to Algeria in May 1990 that he too received guerrilla 
training from the FLN -- and that the experience in 1961 had 
made him a mau26. 
Soviet support for Frelimo in Mo7ambique apparently preceded 
Chinese suppcrt: in 1977 (at the signing of a twenty year 
Cooperation ,md Friendship Treaty' president Machel stated 
that the USSR had supported "FreliLo from the very beginning 
of its exist~nce1127 . The same is true for the MPLA in Angola, 
which had received Soviet support from its formation in 
195628. 
St'lndard wHapons used in African guerrilla wars were Soviet 
or Chinese-•nade AI<47 or AI<S0 assault rifles; the Soviet RPO 
light machine gun; heavier anti-aircraft machine guns; 82mm 
mortars; Scviet and Ch inese 122mm rockets (used after 1972 in 
Mozambique); the RPG2 and RPG7 rockets; and some SAM7 anti-
aircraft mLssiles29 . 
The training of PAIGC guerrillas took place in tht:. USSR, 
Ch ina, Cuba, AlgP-ria; Senegal, Ghana under Nkrumah, and 
particularly Guinea, where the Kindia training camp was first 
staffed by Soviets, who were replaced in 1965 by Algerians30. 
The training of Frelimo guerrillas was to a J a:-ge e;ctent 
carried out by the Soviets and Chinese. There were about one 
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hundred Chinese instructors in the sanctuary camps in southern 
Tanzania, who gave basic instructions in the handling of small 
arms and explosives, while advanced training was offered at 
the Nanking Military College, at Harbin, and other centres in 
north-east China31. 
This aid had an important influence on the movements, 
particularly in regard to the crystalli~ation of its political 
program, and as a result the movement~ moved steadily to the 
left of the political spectrum. "[T)he most compelling 
exposure to Marxist programs arose in the course of the 
desperate midnight of war when Soviet and ChinPse advice and 
literature offered a direction and solution to waging rural-
based revolution in an uneven transitional society. The 
culmination of this evolutionary path crystallised after 
decolonisat~on at the Third Congress in February 1977 when 
Frelimo redefined itself as a 'Marxist-Leninist vangua=d 
party' 11 32 . This does not imply that, had Frelimo received 
extensive Western support, the movement w?uld not have changed 
its political program. In communist doctrines the movement 
found a blueprint for gaining power and the fundamental 
alteration of society, while the West could offer no drastic 
remedy for the problems of colonialism and underdevelopment33. 
Mozambique, unlike Angola, recaived very little external 
support from Cuba. This can be ascribed to the clash between 
Frelimo officials and Che Guevara during the latter's visit in 
1965 to Frelimo headquarters. Guevara favoured the Latin-
American foco model, in which armed guerrilla bands are 
considered to be the most important tool in the revolution. 
Frelimo, on the other hand, favoured an approach based on mass 
mobilisation of the population34. 
Mozambique was the only country of the three Lusophone states 
that received constant support f~om both the communist 
superpowers over a long period of time. Fralimo did not side 
openly with either the Soviet Union or Red China during the 
war of independence, and accepted aid from both. China 
provided not only instructors, but a revolutionary doctrine 
and strategy based on the power of a peasant-based protracted 
guerrilla war as well. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
allowed Frelimo to use its African embassies as communication 
channels, and most importantly, supplied most of Frelimo's 
arms35. "Although there can be no firm estimate of the amount 
of communist patronage, this ~uch is certain: the assistance 
was crucia1 11 36 . 




control over revolutionary organisations. However, as Marshall 
Philippe Leclerc -- the French commander in Indo-China --
stated, "(a]nti-communism will remain a useless tool in the 
hands of the West until the problem of nationalism is 
resolved11 37 . Furthermore, although the revolutionary movements 
subscribed to a left-leaning ideology and non-alignment, ?nee 
independent they did not become communist colonies, as will be 
pointed out in Part Five. 
10.3.2. The importance of sanctuaries 
Apart from weapons and training, the availability of 
sanctuaries is the greatest external factor in a guerrilla 
war. Amilcar Cabral realised this. When Guinea-Bissau's 
neighbour, the Republic of Guinee, became independent (and 
could, therefore, provide sar1ctuary to the PAIGC), Amilcar 
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The fact that the FLN enjoyed the support of states 
contiguous to Algeria was one of its trump cards. Tunisia and 
Morocco became sanctuaries for thousands of fighters39. France 
did not attempt regular cross-botder raids. When it did 
attack, for example when the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi 
Youssef was bombed, it was internationally condemned for the 
killing of civilians40. 
The sanctuaries were of extreme i;.1portance to the FLN. "(B) ut 
for the aid and protection afforded it by Tunisia and Morocco, 
the rebellion would have been circumscribed and perhaps 
crushed before the end of 1957 .... it is singularly difficult 
to destroy an enemy enjoying t11e sanctuary of an inviolable 
frontier 1141 . 
The same can be said of all the other African wars of 
independence. 
At the investiture of the transition government in Mozambique 
on 20 September 1974, Samora Machel thanked Tanzania and 
Zambia for their " role of strategic rear ... (which) therefore 
made our victory pos~ible 1142. Guerrillas were trained at the 
camp at Nachigwea in Tanzania, while Dar es Salaam was the 
political and diplomatic center of the movement, and the site 
of the Mozambique Institute, while Mtwara was the port through 
which aid for Frelimo entered the country43. 
Botn Tanzania and Zambia allowed Frelimo the use of radio 
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stations to broadcast their appeals to Mozambique44 . The PAIGC 
had a radio station, Radio Libertacao, in Conakry45. 
In the case of the Zimbabwean war of independence, Zanu and 
Zapu received sanctuary in Tanzania, Zambia, and particularly 
Mozambique46. Zimbabwean guerrillas started to operate out of 
Tete province from as early d 3 1972, when the country was 
still under Portuguese rule4 7 . The fact that the Shona people 
of southern Mozambique shared a language and culture with the 
Shonas of Zimbabwe made Mozambjque th~ ideal sanctuary48. This 
was the case in Angola (where the Bakongo straddled the border 
with Zaire); Algeria (Arabs live in Morocco and Tunisia); 
Mozambique (the Makonde also live in southern Tanzania) and in 
the Namibian war of independence, where the Ovambo are to be 
found in southern Angola as well. 
Unlike the cross-border raids, or even sometimes the 
occupation of areas of the host countries by the South 
Africans and Rhodesians, the Portuguese and the French 
refrained from large-scale attacks in the sanctuary-granting 
states. 
Portugal's view that cross-border raids would whip up the 
international opinion against the country was the reason for 
its more cautious attitude in dealing with sanctuary-granting 
states. "Being insecure in itg international po~ition, Lisbon 
hesitated and lost the military gains of preempt:ive raids"49. 
10.4. Support for the anci~n rJgime 
It is not only the revolutionary movement which receives 
external support. The present gov~rnment may also receive 
military and non-military support, which brings another 
dimension to this characteristic of (Afrjcan) revolutions. 
Greene50 states that "where the existing government has been 
unable to marshal external support in the fac ~ of a strong 
revolutionary movement, the government's defeat is usually a 
question only of time". This is, to a large extent, true of 
all the African re~olutions, but particularly of the 
Zimbabwean revolution. When the country's only ally, South 
Afri~d, forced the Smith regime to negotiate with the 
revolutionary movements, it had no choice but to comply. 
Foreign support for the revolutionaries will most likely lead 
to support for the regime, particularly if it is a guerrilla 
war characterised by high ideological intensity5l. Africa 
proved to be no exception. The reason for this was that the 
fundamental transformaticn of society, as advocated by a 
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revo:utionary movement, led -- in a world that was 
particularly sharply divided by ideology in the 1960's, 1970's 
and 1980 's -- to international concern by the ideological 
groups which felt their views opposed by the revolutionary 
movement. 
In Algeria, France was supported to varying degrees by 
European countries and America, her allies in Nato. This aid 
included diplomat ic aid, as well as military support. 
This fact was exploited by the FLN and countries which 
supported its cause. ~he following report sent from Algeria by 
Yugoslav resistance hero Zdarko Petchar in March 1959 serves 
as an example: "The bombing had continued for an hour when the 
first napalm bombs fell . There was a high burst of fierce 
flame and the fire spread with terrifying rapidity through the 
wooded hills ... From all sides angry c ries rang out 'America! 
America!'"52. 
Between 1950 and 1960 France received 4,3 billion dollars ~n 
military aid from the United States, which is twice as much as 
any other country, yet most of France's defence spending went 
to th~ funding of the Algerian war53. 
Portu~al received support from a number of Western countries, 
as well as Rhodesia and South Africa. These Western countries 
supported Portugal for three reasons: its colonies had rich 
resources which offered good investment possibilities; Angola 
and Moza,nbique were strategically located along the Cape oil 
sea route; and they feared that should Portuguese rule 
collapse , the scope for greater c1mmunist penetration would be 
extensive54_ 
Furthermore, Portugal possessed tht Azore and Cape Verde 
Isl~nds, on which important Nata ba~ s were located. This 
explains why, from 1949 to 1968, 1\mer. :;, provided $202 million 
worth of economic aid -- $120 mill '~r. in the last six years of 
that period55. In renegotiating the .re base agreement, the 
Nixon Administration agreed to suppl.! " - tugal with $30 
million, as well as the option of borrcwing up to $400 
million56. 
West Germany supplied a large quantity of rms , while France, 
after it had left Nato, became the biggest e,porter of arms to 
Portugal in the 1970's57 . The French also provided Portugal 
with techniques on counter-revolutionary warfar r, learned in 
! ndo-China and Algeria, and the Portuguese adopted a number of 
. . 
- --- ~ --- - - - -- --- - -- -- -
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these st1ategies, such as the use of helicopter units, elite 
units and pscyho-social groups. 
However, Western countries, in general, were sensitive to 
African aspirations and ideals, and Portuguese colonialism was 
not considered very favourably. Given the unpopularity of 
Portuguese rule, military support by these countries was 
limited58. 
The governments of South Africa and Rhodesia thought 
otherwise on the issue of rendering military support to the 
Portuguese. 
They had one thing in common: a wish to retain a political 
system that repulsed the international community and repressed 
a large portion of its populations. If the Portuguese fell, so 
the argument ran, it would lead to a domino effect, as one 
revo lutionary movement after another would triumph over white 
minority regimes. 
South Africa kept its military aid at a low profile. Military 
equipment like Jeeps, radio transmitters, horses, and food 
were flown into Mozambique59. In 1968 the country sent two to 
three hundred paramilitary policemen to the southern bank of 
the Zambezi river, near the site where the Cabera Bassa dam 
was being constructed60. 
Already the target of a UN boycott, Rhodesia had little to 
loose in its desperate fight to prevent a black government 
from coming to power. 
Because the Zanu g~errillas used Mozambique as a sanctuary, 
Rhodesia had an agreement with Portuguese commander general 
Arr i aga to cross the border at will in order to pursue these 
guerrillas61. The Rhodesian actions did not stop at operations 
aga~nst Zanu. They conducted counter-insurgency operations --
against Zanu and Frelimo targets -- in the Vila Pery (Chimoio) 
area, and turned "western Tete ... into a Rhodesian 
battleground"62. 
10.5. Conclusion 
The contemporary revolutions in Africa were characterised by 
large-scale international interest. The levels of support 
varied from non-military support given by non-state 
organisations, such as churches and committees, to the supply 
of armaments and sanctuary, and even fighting or behalf of one 
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of the parties in the war of independence. 
Regimes that were sensitive to international opinion were 
more easily influenced than countries which were isolated, 
either ~orally or th~ough economic sanctions. This is not to 
say that a country which does not heed international opinion 
will be more effective in its counter-insurgency. The example 
of Rhodesia illustrates this point. It was a rebel state, cut 
off by sanctions, and when its principal backers -- the South 
Africans -- withdrew tt~ir support, the Smith government was 
put under pressure to negotiate with Zanu and Zapu63. Thus, it 
can be proposed that the Smith government decided to negotiate 
because -- in the idiom of Skocpol64 -- of a crisis in the old 
state which was to a certain extent brought on by external 
support for the revolutionary movemen~. 
Despite the efforts of the ancien regime state to influence 
international opinion and cut off support for the 
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Chapter Eleven 
~T .... h~•-----r--'•~v_o~l .... u~t~ i ~o_n~a __ ui_o~v ___ em_ e_n~t ........ b_e~come • the new ruler 
11.1 . Introduction 
The most dramatic aspect of any revolution is when tPe old 
rulers are replaced by the revolutionary movement. This 
ustally marks the ~nd of one phase of revolution (fighting 
ag1in3t the ancien regime ), and the beginning of another phase 
(the transformation of society). 
In the African revolutions , the actual transfer of power from 
the old regime to the revol•1tionary movement was ofcen brief, 
but the manner in which it occurred had an effect for years . 
This is one of the central themes of this chapter. 
The transfer of power is analysed on three levels: how did 
the ancjen regime lose the battle against the revolutionary 
movements stud;ed here; how power was transferred from the 
government to the revolutionary movement; and the 
characteristics of the state after the transfer of power. 
It is shown in this chapter that the struggle between the 
ancien regime and the r~volutionary movements studied here was 
characterised by ineffective and costly counter-insurgency 
warf~re by the rulers and lack of support for the old regime 
- - internally and in the international community . In short, it 
touche= upon most of the characteristics of revolution 
discussed in Chapters Three to Ten . 
Tne actual transfer of power to the revolutionary movements 
showed interesting chacacteristics as well . In some of the 
revolutions , the transfer was virtually dictated by t he 
revvlutionary movement , b~cause the old regime had become --
for various reasons -- too weak to enter into real give-and-
take negotiations with the mcvement. In others , the movements 
had to make concessions in o~der to become the new rulers. 
lhis question is central to the manner in which the transfer 
takes place , and is investigated in the second part of this 
chapter. 
In the final part of this chapter, the ouLcome of this 
transfer of power will be investigated. How did members of the 
ruling group react to the fact that they faced an uncert~in 
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future under a government made up of former "terrorists " ? The 
whites' reaction varied from mass exodus and violent 
resistance to accommodation, and the manner of the transfer 
played a large role in determining this reaction. 
In some of the countries serious splits developed within the 
revolutionary movement after it b~came the new ruler. This 
characterist ic is analysed in section 11.4.2. 
11.2. Characteristic• o~ the •truqqle between the 
revolutionary movements and tba ancien re ime states 
It was argued in Chapter Nine that the conflicL between the 
incumbent and the revolutionary challenger is not restricted 
to the military sphere. Indeed, events in the diplomatic and 
political sphere can often eclipse victories in the bush. 
11.2.1. Ineffective and costly counter-insurgency warfare 
The French found it difficult to pin down the Algerian 
guerrillas. Duri11g the first two years of ~lie Algerian war of 
independence, the guerrillas, known as the Army of National 
Liberation (ALN), fought from the desert and mountain5, where 
it was difficult for the French to engage in combatl. 
In 1956, the French expanded thejr army and changed their 
tactics. It seen proved to be successful , with mobile soldiers 
from ~lite units combing the vast bled, or outback. By 1958-
'59, with the Challe Plan, the battle was won by the French 
troops2. The ALN's fighters withdrew to the sanctuaries of 
Morocco and Tunisia. The Morice Line, a 200 mile long system 
of electric fences and minefields along the Tunisian border 
guarded by 80 000 troops, proved very difficult for FLN 
fighters (from base camps in Tunisa) to breach. 
When the Evian peac.:e a•.;c,:,,rd was signed in 1962, only a few 
thousand men were still holding out, barely managing to 
survive3. However, b y t~is time other aspects -- tiUCh as the 
political situation in Er~ncP. -- had become so orominent that 
they determined the cvurse of the war. 
The Portuguese hac mixed fortunes. They lost the war in 
Guinea-Bissau, but the guerrilla wars in Angola and Mozambique 
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ended in a stalemate with _he Portuguese neither victori~us nor 
d~feated. 
I~ (Jinea-E 'ssa~, the PAIGC's control over the country 
increa8~d g rad u~ll y. In January 1964 it dafeated the Portuguese 
in a confl ict which ~an be described as conventional warfare4 . 
More than 3 ~re .~. 1 ug~ese soldiers tried to take the strategic 
island Como, bu t }1aJ • 0 withdraw aft~r 75 days of fightings. 
According to Cabral , tt1is " was the woes ~ defeat ftr the 
Portuguese in their record of colon1&l1sm. We calcu lated the 
enemy's losses at about 650 men 11 6. In 1971 the PAIGC claimed to 
have cont~ol over 80 percent of the country, the capital Bissau 
being the major exception7 . 
Towards the end of Portuguese rul ~ i~ Muzambique, the control 
of the government forces had dimint sllad to such an extent that 
Zanu guerrillas were actually using bases in Tete province8. 
This angered the Rhodesians , and in Octcber 1972 Smith held 
talks with Caetano abont the apparent lack of success by he 
Portuguese in their counter-i~surgency efforts. Caetano 
dismissed ru1odesian criticism: ~some of our neighbours with 
less experience do not conceal theJ = fears and, in chis way, 
play the enemy's game. They have oeen told more thin once that 
there is no reason for their great fright " 9 
Al J. Venter found the Portuguese " troops reluctant to attack, 
inept in the handling of weapons under fire and ... often content 
to sit tight and stay out of trouble 11 10_ However, the 
Portuguese military headquarters in Nampula and the Cabora 
Bassa (now known as Cahora Bassa) dam were never u nuer s~rious 
attack from the gue~cillas. The failure of Portuguese counter-
insurgency warfare cannot be attributed o, .ly to the individual 
soldier. The military high command had no comprehensive 
strategy, rivalry existed between different groups in the 
military, as well as between career and conscripts officers, 
and the military had a defensive mindsetll. 
Counter-insurgency warfare is very expensive, because of the 
large number of troops required, as well as the fact that it 
encompasses projects aimed at uplifting the local population. 
By 1971 Portugal WJS spending about 40 percent of its national 
bc~get on its army, with 90 percent of its resources being used 
for counter-insurgency warfare12 . To give an idea of the size 
of the Portuguese forces in Africa -- and the effect on an 
already weak economy -- one publication states that ~hen 
compared to the size of their populations, the United States 
would have had a proportionally equal force in Vietnam to the 




At the height of the Algerian war, the French had 450 000 
troops in the country -- outnumbering the guerrilla forces by 
at least sixteen to one14. 
Rhodesia's operating budget for its counter-insurgency war 
for the year 1978-'79, amounted to USS 242 millionlS. Although 
supported by South Africa, this proved to be a very ueavy 
burden on the economy. 
Counter-insurgency warfare which failed to defeat the 
guerrilla fighters is one of the characteristics of the 
African revolutions studied here. The Portuguese armed forces 
were inefficient and revolutionary movements were therefore 
able to control large areas of the country. These "liberated 
areas " were used for extensive mobilisation of the local 
population, as well as for propaganda purposes. 
The French and the Rhodesiani:; were more efficient in 
combatting the revolutionary fighters. In these countries the 
high cost of the war did play a r ole in paving the way for a 
victory by the challengers. However, the lack of support for 
the old regime amongst it s former supporters, the local 
population, and the international community proved to be of 
greater consequence. 
11.2.2. Lack of support for the old regime 
Greenel6 states that counter-insurgency warfare is ''primarily 
a struggle by the government for the m1 nds and sympathies of 
the naLive population. It is true that massive repression can 
succeed, at least temporarily, in curtailing guerrilla 
activities . .. . But the lasti~g success of counterinsurgency 
warfare depends on inducement, not coercion. The minds and 
sympathies of the people ore won by convincing them that their 
life is likely to be better under the existing government " . In 
this respect the counter-insurgency efforts of all the ~ncien 
regimes failed, because they could not mobi~ise sufficient 
support among the local population. 
A major reason for lack of local support was the manner in 
which the counter-insurgency war was fought. All the old 
regimes based their strategy on the notion that the 
"revolutionary fish " should be deprived of the "friendly sea" 
in which it operated. To do this , the French, Portuguese and 
Rhodesians adopted different systems of protect~d villages , 
where the population would be protected from the guerrilla 




4 . . 
. . . . .... . - . . 
The success of the Portuguese aldeamentos -- like the 
Rhodesian protected villages or the French regroupement 
centres -- depended on two factors: that the local population 
should be willing to enter these places , and that the 
authorities should be in a position to providP adequate 
services to the inhabitants17. 
In practice, the peasants were often forcibly removed and 
taken to villages far removed from their ancestral lands. 
Because of the number of people concentrated in the villages, 
some peasants .1ad to walk long distances to reach their 
fields. The facilities in the villages were often horrific18. 
In one Algerian regroupment centre, food was so scarce that 
the inhabitants ate grass19 . The centres often accommodated 
more people than they were designed for. For example, in the 
Algerian Kabyle area 15 000 people were crammed into a village 
designed for 3 ooo~o. Malnutrition and disease were the order 
of the day. Finally, the villages were constructed in a 
military fashion to protect the people against guerrilla 
attacks. Huts were built in neat rows, and barbed wire and 
floodlights surrounded these living places designed to win the 
hearts ?.~d minds of the local population21. 
In Algeria n ore than one million Muslims (out of a population 
of nine million) were living in these centres22; in Rhodesia 
300 000 blacks (out of a population of four million) were 
living in the protected villages, or ?V's23, and 440 000 
people were living in the Mozambican aldeamentos24. Instead of 
winning these people over to the old regime, the squalid 
living conditions in these centres assured -- ironically --
solid support for the revolutionaries. 
11 . 3 . The nature of the transfer of power 
It was pointed out above that the manner in which political 
power was transferred from the ancien reoir .. ~ tc the 
revo l utionary move~~nt can have an effect f o r 1~-" ~ t c ~ome . 
In t~e African re ~ulutions, brc~d types of t.an~iJr are 
id~ntified: firstly , instances in which t ~e old regime 
collapsed and transferred power fairly r3pidly, such as in the 
Lusophone colonies ; secondly , a transition structurtd over an 
extensive period and characterised by extended give-and-take 
negotiations. Of the five revolutions studied here, only 
Zimbabwe saw a meaningful negotiated settlement . 
Algeria , on the other hand, occupies~ position between 
' . . . - . 
I 
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the Lusophone areas and Zimbabwe -- negotiations did take 
place, but the French had to bow to the demands of the 
Algerians. It is iDteresting to nnte that transfers w~ich 
characterised the decolonisation of most of Africa were often 
of the first type mentioned above -- for example, the sudden 
withdrawal of Belgium from the Congo, wh -h led to a violent 
power struggle. 
11. 3 .1. Rapid transfe£ of _2ower 
The fall of the Estado Novo regime in Portugal, which led to 
the transfer of power to the revolutionary movements in 
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, is the best African 
example of sudden transition. 
On 25 April 1974 senior military officers -- disillusioned by 
the Afr1can wars and the political situation inside Portugal 
-- cverthrew the Caetano regime and exiled its leaders to 
Brazi:.25. A few months later, on 7 September 1974, Portugal 
agreed to the independence of Mozambique26. In Angola, order 
broke down as the three liberation movements fought pitched 
battles to ensure that they would lead an independent Angola. 
This conflict led to the involvement of numerous external 
powers, a~ongst them South Africa, the USA and USSR27. 
In the case of France, it was not s0 much a matter of a 
weakened old regime which had to negotiate with the 
revolutionary movement. It is true that in May 1958 the pieds 
noirs, aided by some elements within the French Army, rose 
against the Fourth Republic and asked general Charles de 
Gaulle to assume power28. However, the end of the Fourth 
Republic did not mean that the French hold on Algeria grew 
feeble. The counter-insurgency war proved to be very 
successful, particularly through the Challe Plan of 1958-'59. 
De Gaulle, ever his own man and not the champion of algerie 
francaise as the French of Algeria had thought, started secret 
nt;otiation~ with the movement which he sought to destroy on 
the battlefield29. Why did de Gaulle negotiate, and why was 
the transfer so rapid? 
Former governor-gen~ra 1 ,, , ques Soustelle -- who clashed with 
de Gaulle over Alger a• - ·uependence -- said that with the 
Challe Plan, "the milit ,,ry problem was solved"30. He believed 
that de Gaulle negotiated 'because he was feeling he was 
becoming old. He wanted to be amongst the four or five of the 
more important leaders of nations of the world"3l, and France 
could not become a powerful nation if it still had to fight 
the drawn-out war in Algeria. De Gaulle admitted this much 




he discussed the attempted coup by members of the elite 
forces: "It is obvious that the unity, progress and prestige 
of the French people are at stake, and that the future of this 
people is blocked as long as the Algerian problem remains 
unsolved"32 . 
De Gaulle had come to realise that France could not hold onto 
Algeria in an era characterised by the winds of change. 
"Africa is done for, and Algeria with it"33. 
Gaulle then tried to resolv~ the situation as soon as 
possible, and the French ;onceded to all the demands of the 
FLN . Soustelle describes the peac~ negotiations at Evian in 
Switzerland as follows: "We found oil (in Algeria] ... and at 
the last moment c"~ Gaulle decided not to relinquish the Sahara 
at any price. He said 'to hell with Algeria, but we keep ~he 
Sahara'. Unfortunately the French negotiators let it appear 
that they had to get a solution without a delay so that the 
most astute of all the Arab negotiators, Krim Belkacem said: 
'What about the Sahara?' And of course the French negotiators 
said we do not relinquish the Sahara. 'Oh, then nothing 
doing.' And so Joxe, he was the father of the pres~nt day 
minister, called de Gaulle on the telephone and said: 'what 
about that?' and de Gaulle said: 'Oh, to hell with the Sahara 
also.,3 4 " 
On 25 June 1975 the transitional government handed the rule 
of Mozambique over to Frelimo, and Alberto Chipande, who had 
fired th~ first shot in the war of indeoendence, hoisted the 
Mozambican f~ag, while Samora Machel lo~ked on35. 
The murder of Cabral in 1973 had thrown the PAIGC into 
disarray, and when Guinea-Bissau's independence was 
acknowledged on 10 September 1974, the party was characterised 
by an autocratic leadership racked by internal conflict, and 
out of touch with its peasant followers3f. 
11.3.2. Protracted, negotiated transfer 
Unlike the Lusophone and Algerian revolutions, where the 
negotiations wich the ancien regime dealt only with how power 
was to be transferred to the revolutionary movement, the 
Zimbabwean revolutionary movements gained power after a series 
of negotiations which involved concessions on all sides. (The 
negotiations to end the war of independence in Namibia shared 
many characteristics ~ ith that of Zimbabwe -- internatJ.onal 
supervision and peace keeping forces.) 
In Zimbabwe, the first, and major concession, was made by Ian 
Smith. In 1976 South African prime minister John Vorster had 
been applying oressure on the Smith to accept majority rule --
even holding up landlocked Rhodesia's imports and exports37 . 
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On 19 September of the same year, Smith had a meeting with 
Vorster and American Secretary of State Henry Kissenger in 
Pretoria. 
Kissinger told Smith: "Your reputation as a devious and lying 
twister is even worse than mine. But let me warn you not to 
try any funny stuff with me because this time you ~ill have 
met your match"38. He Se'.d that the Rhodesians could only h old 
out for a couple of months, and offered a deal in ,,hich the 
Smith government agreed to majority rule within two years39_ 
"Smith looked around the room and said: 'You want me to sign 
my own suicide not~•. There was only silence. Kissenger later 
recalled that it was thr most painful moment in hia life. 
'Smith made it worse by acting like a gentleman• 11 40_ 
It was not Smith's suicide note, but definitely that of UDI 
Rhodesia. Further negotiations followed and culminated in the 
Lancaster House agreement between the Rhodesian government and 
the revolutionary movements. 
11 . 4. The outcome of the •~.:-ansfer of power 
The reasons for, and manner of, the transition fror, the old 
regime to the revolutionary government play an important role 
in the shaping of a new society. Three major facto~s were 
relevant in the African countries during the time ~f the 
transfer of power: the reaction of the whites; po~er struggles 
within the revolutionary alliance; and the socio-economic 
condition. 
11.4.1. Reaction of the whites 
The reaction of the whites -- who were in a privileged 
position -- was to a large extent determined by the manner of 
the transfer. In the countries where the transfer was quick, 
with no alternative government system agreed upon with the 
revolutionaries, panic and frustration were common . Some 
whi~es adopted violent methods. In the countries where a new 
constitution was guaranteed through negotiations, whites were 
still uneasy, but hopeful of continuing to live in the 
countries. 
11.4.1.1. Violent resistance 
Algeria had the largest white population of all the countries, 
both numerically and proportionally. When they realised that 
they had no power to stop the transfer of power to the FLN, 
the whit~- unleashed a bloody campaign of right-wing terror. 
The pied noir terror movement, the Organisation de l'Armee 
Secrete (OAS), indulged in an orgy of violence against 
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Muslims, thus scuttling any hope for them to stay on in an 
independent Algeria41. Hocine Djibran, a Kabyle, believed 
"tha+-. until May 1958 the pieds noir~ believed they could co-
exi~t with 1s and make integration work. When they starLed to 
kill A~abs indiscriminately, the e..etits blancs ware 
ir.toxicated ... they no longer thought straight" 42. 
After the coup of 25 April 1974 that toppled Caetano, Frelimo 
signed an agreement with the Armed Forces Movement and an 
interim government consisting of six Frelimo members and four 
Portuguese, and lEd by Joachim Cilissano, was appointed on 20 
September 197443. A Portuguese settl~r movement called Fi~o 
("I stay"), and elite commando soldiers, tried to stage a coup 
the following day, but it was crushed after three days by 
Frelimo and Portuguese soldiers44_ 
11.4.1.2. Mass exodus 
~fter the Evian agreement was signed, ni.nety percent of all 
pieds noirs left Algeria45. 
They had burned all bridges of conciliation with the local 
population, and "[o]ne of the biggest mass migrations in post-
World War II hi~tory ... [tookl ... place out of the Algerian 
ports" 46. On passenger liners, aircraft, cattle boats, 
tr&w ... ers an" tugs the pieds noirs crammed, taking what they 
could carry, dnd lef 1 ,r a country that many of them had 
never ~een. On some d ays up to 15 000 persons left, and six 
months aft er the Evia~ agreement more than 400 000 people had 
left4~. " Scme drove 01f stiff and proud, heads held high, 
convinced ~f c heir innate super iority ~o the Arabs, as had 
bean l~e i r ru ~estorr UEOn arriving in the harsh, broiling 
Algerian hint•riand; ot!ers left heartbroken, miserable and in 
a pan:c, tneir go,cts stored in their homes awaiting the 
inevitabl 0 loot- rs 48. 
Breytenbc1 ,-h49 cit <"'s fear of the following 33 reasons for the 
mass white exod~s seen in Algeria and the Lus~~none areas: 
drastic suffering, declining i~w and o~aer, 'oss of status, 
expendability (being replaced by Afr"-; ., ~ve. Je. 
Fui.thermore, the whites were "unwil .alinquish control 
and privilege" -- but above all, re io1, between white 
and black seemed impossible, partic, ,·er long and 
brutal wars of indepe~denceSO . 
The mass exodus of whites -- termed "Euroflight" by 
BreytenbachSl -- was of a scale seldom seen after WWII: 800 
000 French left for France, leaving only 30 000 colons behind, 
570 000 Portuguese fled Angola, 220 000 returned from 
Mozambique, and 190 000 whites left Zimbabwe52 . As is shown 
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below, the effect of this loss of skilled manpower was 
disasterous foe the newly independent countries. 
11.4.2. Rifts within the revolutionary alliance 
The revolutionary movemn~ts quickly found that ruling a 
count~y is a different ball game from challenging an unpopular 
government. The period after the fall of the old regime was 
often characterised by turbulence: splits within the 
revolutionary alliance, banditry, civil war, and the settling 
of scores with opponents of the revolutionary movement. 
In Angola, the sudden departure of the Portuguese left a 
power vacuum which not one, but three, movements tried to 
fill. The MPLA ar,d the FNLA under Holden Roberto had a history 
of earlier clashes, while there was hostility between 
Savimbi's Onita and the two other movements as we1153. As was 
pointed out earlier, none of the movements could claim that 
they operated throughout the country; in fact, their support 
tended to correlate with the distribution of their ethnic 
support base. The fact that different ethnic groups supported 
different revolutionary movements (thus reinforcing the 
cleavages of society), with a wide range of ideologies, and 
foreign aid and intervention playing a large role, widened the 
scope for an internal fight for political power. 
At first, the FNLA and Onita attempted to negotiate 
separately with the new military government in Portugal, but 
eventually on 15 January 1975 the three movements agreed to a 
transitional government in which all three movements would be 
represented until independence on 11 November 197554 . The 
transitional government broke down for all practical purpo~es 
when Roberto's FNLA -- with the aid of up to 1500 soldiers 
from Zaire -- tried to drive the MPLA from Luanda55. However, 
by early August the MrLA had managed to repulse the att3ck, 
and had driven the FNLA and Onita, as well as members of the 
Bakongo and Ovimbundu ethnic groups (traditional supporters of 
the two movements) from Luanda56. By now the situation had 
become thoroughly internationalised, with Cuban military aid 
starting to build up, and on 23 October 1975 the So~th 
Africans launched a raid that ended short of Luanda57 . The 
Cuban forces of bP.tween 15 000 and 20 000 were, by Neto's own 
admission, responsible for the stopping of the South African 
invasionSB, as well as the defeat of another FNLA drive toward 
Luanda prior to independence in November59_ On 11 November 
1975 Angola became independent.:, and the MPLA, in control of 
the capital but still enmeshed in fighting th~ FNLA and Onita, 
took control of the country. 
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In Algeria, the FLN had managed to unite Algerians around the 
ideal of independence. Once this was attained, this unity came 
under severe pressure. One writer attributes the power 
struggle which broke out to the fact t~at the Algerians were 
not a nation prior to the French occupation60. 
Other reasons for the figrting amongst the FLN after 
independence include the fact that communication was difficult 
between external and internal groups, as well as personal 
ambition 61 . 
Furthermore, Ben Khedda, in an interview with le Monde62, 
stated that the wilaya system (which allowed for decentralised 
decisjon making during war time) was another reason, because 
it led to provi~=ialism during peace time. The separation 
between the external and internal wings led to different 
approaches -- the external group did not realise the extent of 
popular ~upport for the revolution, and t~nted to impose 
military rule of the South American type. Finally, because 
they had lost touch with the local situ~tion, p~rsonalities 
had become more important than principles. 
The French writer Jean Daniel argues that the FLN was from 
its start a broad front, with different factions and leaders, 
th~t was held together by~ negative qoal -- the toppling of 
the French rule. When that goal fell away, fighting broke out 
in the ranks of the FJ..NG3. "It may be said that by 1 July 
1962 the FLN was already dead. The real power now lay with the 
former army of the exterior, because it was well-oryanised and 
professional; the bureaucracy which gradually strengthened its 
position; and the workers unions, which were quickly brougnt 
under government control"64. 
The FLN split into various factions at the time of 
independence, with Ben Bella (released after being imprisone~ 
since 1957) opposing the group under Ben Khedda, and the 
internal gudrrilla leaders ~o~.ning yet another faction. The 
country was close to civil war (and it has to be kept in mind 
that most males were still bearing arms as members of the 
FLN's external or internal army), but d~monslrations by the 
masses prevented its outbreak. Still, about 15 000 Algerians 
died in the fighting65. 
In Algeria the intensity of retribution against members of 
the local population, who had supported the anci~egime, was 
severe. In pur1es, AYger~ ,s loyal to France -- particularly 
the harkis who fought under the French flag against the FLN --
were killed in large numbers, with estimates ranging between 
30 000 and 150 00066. Jacques Soustelle claims that "there 
were 200 000 Muslims who fought for France". The fact that 
France had deserted them by not allowing them to move to 
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France was for Soustelle "most shameful"67. 
Algeria is an exception with regard to the intensity of 
retribution against members of the local population who had 
supported the ancien regime. A number of ethnic groups in 
Mozambique refused to join Frelimo, or even actively supported 
the Portuguese , but they were not wiped out on the same scale 
as in Algeria. 
Mozambique did not exper~ .ce power struggles at first. This 
was to change, however, when the Rhodesian, and later South 
African, sponsored movement Rename started to operate in the 
country. Zimbabwe was, with the excepLion of attacks on whites 
in the south-western areas, free of pow~r struggles or 
retribution. 
11.4.3. Socio-economic situation 
The end of the old regime found the revolutionary movements in 
different stages of readiness to govern a country. The 
Algerian revolutionaries, as well as the MPLA, wert the least 
prepared to take control of the countries. This is one of the 
reasons for the armed conflicts that appeared at the end of 
the old regime. In the other two Lusophone colonies, the 
movements were better prepared, but independence came with the 
movements not quite ready for it68, The Zimbabwean 
revolutionary movements, as well dS Swapo in Namibia, were 
much better prepared for their future roles. 
Angolan food production declined sharply because the 
Portuguese abandoned 6 250 farms, which produced r.ot only cash 
crops, but food as we1169. Angola had to import only 10 
percent of its fon~ before independence; after independence 
this figure shot up to 50 percent of all staples7 0. 
Only oil revenues prevented the GNP of ueclining more than 
the 20 percent which it did after independence ($1,8 billion 
in 1976) 71. Industrial production dropped with 75 percent 
between 1975 and 1976; coffee production from 200 000 tons 
before independen~e to 72 000 tons in 1976; the mining of iron 
ore ground to a halt; diamond production was down by 66 
percent; the livestock industry nearly destroyed; and the 
fishing industry severely disrupted72 . 
Guinea-Bissau , which had a small white population, and 
Zimbabwe -- where a negotiated settlement made m~re whites 
stay on -- did not experience this level of disruption. 
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11. S . Con~iusion 
All the revolutionary movements studied here emerged 
victorious despite the fact that they could not match the 
firepower of the governments. Their victories were 
cl.aracterised by a guerrilla strategy which made it difficult: 
for government troops to pin their opponents down. Thousands 
of soldiers were tied down in the st:ruggle, which further 
increased the cost of this (ineffective) counter-insurgency 
warfare. A secord characteristic of the victory of the 
revolutionary movements studied here is thL little support for 
the ancien regime amongst the local population. In the 
international arena as well, the revolutionary movement was 
seen as the underdog fighting a powerful and morally corrupt 
ruler, and former allies deserted the authorities. 
I 
The most im~ortant element of the transfer of power to the 
revolutionaries is the manner in which it was dc ne. In the 
case of the Portuguese territories, the transfer was swift 
because the old regi me had collapsed. Algeria showed 
simi l arities. This collapse of t :1e regimP led t o the exodus of 
the white groups, whi ch plunged the economi~s of the c ountries 
into chaos . A negr tiated settlement -- 2ike the one i n 
Zimbabwe and Namibia -- on the other hand assured a more 
stable socio-economic and political order after the transfer 
of power. 
It was stated in Chapter Eight that different groups within 
the : evolutionary movement were frequently involved in power 
st~uggles. After tne toppling of the old regime , ant3gonisms, 
whjch had been papered over by the goal of defeating the 
government troops, brolc into the open. Puwer struggles 
between the political ,t, l military wings characterised the 
Algerian revolution throughout the war of independence -- and 
Dearly resulted in a ci,il war after the end of French rule . 
The fall of the old r13ime meant that the revolutionary 
movements had succeeded -- against large odds -- in their 
struggles against political and so~io- ~conomic orders which 
they felt were unjust. In the following, and final, sect.on of 
this study the attempts of the movements t0 constr~c . a "new 
society " are examined. 
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PART FIVE : TRANSFORMING SOCIETY 
Chapte r Twe lve 
The fundamental alteration of the political order 
12.1. rntroduction 
After t he fall of the oln regime. ··olutionary movement 
fi nds itsel f in a position to tr society. This dttempt 
take.3 p laces on t wo levels · tl1e p , ~al and the economic. 
In t h is chapter , the t anr~ imation o f t he political order in 
con temporary African _r~.,,• c.,lu· .ionn is exami ned . To simplify 
comparisons between the i •l• l i t ical order u nder the old and new 
regimes , a similar approach to the one adopted in Chapter Three 
is used. Thus , the p~evalent myth , political institutjons and 
the political elite form the ~hree broad areas of investigation. 
The new myth and values reflect the ideology of the 
revolutionary movement: aspects such as national unity and 
egalitarianism feature strongly. 
It will be shown in section 12 . 3. that the establishmer.t of new 
political institutions is charac teristic of the revolutionary 
regimP.s. These institutions revo lve around the popular front 
which was created t o t opple the old regime , and wh iGh was 
eventually transformed into a vanguard party, usua lly within a 
one-party state . 
The former leaders of the guerrilla and diplomatic struggle 
against the old regime find Lhemselves as dominant figures 
within the new state. Is the new elite more representative of 
the population , and is it more responsive to the needs of 
citizens? These aspects are examined in section 12 . 4 . 
On the o ther hand -- d oes the population support the new 
rulers? The e xtent of SU} port for the revolutionary regime 
varies . The movement may l.!ither have the support o f a large 
major i ty of t he people , or a civil war may break out , in which 
certain groups oppose the new regime. 
Ev~n if a ~evolutionary government is initially suppo rled by a 
large number of the population , this support usually dw i ndles 
after a couple of years. This c i1ange marks a lowed ng o f 
rev olutionary fervor and energy - - a process kno wn as Thermido r, 
named after the similar occurrenc e in the F~enc h Revo lut ion . 
Contemporary African re~olutions experienced a similar 
phenomenon -- in the case of some r evolutions, a Therm i aor i n 




- - - .. . . . . ' . . . . . . . 
12.2. Introducing a new myth and values 
It is very difficult to immediately transform a society during 
a revolution. A revolutionary movement cannot, however, leave 
the impression that traces of the old order still exist, 
because there can be no new beginning if elements of the hated 
past are still apparent. 
One of its first acts, after the fall of the old regime, is 
to introduce a new constitution, or basic law, which embodies 
the revolutionary ideals. It was pointed out in Chapter Three 
that a constitution reflects the prevalent myth and values in 
a society . Such a new constitution can then be seen as the 
cornerstone of the transformation of society, because it 
supplies a new myth and set of values for the new political 
orderl. The myth of the new African revolutionary regimes, as 
reflected in their constitutions, stressed the importance of 
national independe~ce and unity, as well as the ideal of an 
ega]itarian and classless society. 
12.2.1. An aLtempt to create political unity 
After the coup of 25 April 1974 which toppled Caetano, Frelimo 
-- whose strategy called for the expansion of liberated areas 
-- found itself with no such areas south of the Zambezi, and 
with little political mobilisation done in these areas which 
were previously controlled by the Portuguese2. 
Thus, Frelimo decided that national unity was a prerequisite 
for tackling Mozambique's vast economic problems. In his 
Independence Day address, Samora Machel said: "In establishing 
our development strategy, we must attach special value to what 
is our chjef strength, the mobilisation and organisation of 
the people"3. The Frelimo leadership believed that every 
member of the popul~tion sh~ 1 d be educated politically, and 
organised in such a way that the population is united behind 
the ideals of the Mozambican revolution. Political unity will 
serve, amongst others, as a safeguard for the revolution: 
"(T]he main defence must be to popularise the revolutionary 
aims", Marcelino dos Santos told Joe Slovo in an interview4 . 
The task of crealing political un3ty was entrusted to the 
grupos dinamizadores [dinamising groups], which operated 
throughout the countryS. 
The attempt to create political unity was furthermore aimed 
against the influence of tribalism and the traditional rulers, 
who [as was pointed out in Part Three] ' nitially played a part 
in the organisation of the revolutionary movement. 
"We do not recognise tribes, regions, race or religious 
beliefs. We only recognise Mozambicans who ?re equally 
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exploited and equally desirous of freedom and revolution", was 
how Machel summed up Frelimo's feelings toward national 
unity6. 
The media stressed the importance of unity, with the slogan 
"from the Rovuma to Maputo we are all ~ozambicans" being 
repeated often in newspapers and on the radio 7 . 
12.2.2. Egalitarianism and a classless society 
Samora Machel's statement on the equality of Mozambicans is 
incorporated in Article 18 of the Mozambican Constitution: "In 
the People's Republic of Mozambique, women and men have equal 
rights and duties, this equality extending to the political, 
economic, social and cultural spheres"8. 
Similarly, the Angolan constitution allows every member of 
the population -- with the exception of people unfit to do so 
-- to participate in the political process -- although there 
is only one political party. According to Article 3 of the 
Angolan constitution, "the masses shall be guaranteed broad, 
effective participation in the exercise of political power"9. 
At independence, Neto indicated how the MPLA sought to solve 
the problem of inequalit;i. "The People's Republic of Angola 
will, under the guidance of the MPLA, gradually advance 
~awards a people's democracy state, with an alliance between 
workers and peasants as its nucleus"l0. This was further 
highlighted at the first plenary me8ting of the MPLA's central 
committee in October 1976, where people's democracy wa~ 
described as a phase in the struggle of the MPLA, with 
"socialism as the highest aim of our revolution. We must arm 
all militants with the doctrine of scientific socialism --
Marxism-Leninism"ll. 
12.3. Est ablishing new political institutions 
Another element of the new political order is the 
establishment of political institutions that are meant to 
replace those of the ancien regim~. While the revolutionary 
movement could be characterised as a broad, popular front 
during the war of independence, this often changed after the 
toppling of the old regime. The popular fronts were, in 
several cases in Africa, replaced by elitist vanguard parties 
in the Marxist-Leninist mould. 
12.3.1. Frorn_p_Qpular front to_a single, van_g}lard part_y: 
After the end of Portuguese rule in Angola, Mozambiq..:e and 
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installed governments -- tried to for~e n~tional un~ty in 
countries which were torn apart by yPars of wnrfar~. They 
opted for the strategy which they knew well: ~he mobilisation 
and organisation of the population within the tried and tested 
framework of a popular front, as used in the wars of 
independence12. 
After independence, the Frelimo government in Mozambique 
introduced the grue_os dinamizadores, consisting of youthful 
party members, whose task it was to mobilise the population 
and forge unity between different groups -- ethnic, 
rural/urban, young/old, and worker/peasant13. 
This phase lasted from independence on 25 June 1975 until 
Frelirno's Third Party Congress in February 1977, when it was 
decided to transform the populist anti-colonial front into a 
party with a "stru 1~e and ideology of the classic Marxist-
Leninist type"l4. 
Although moet movements claimed that they were fighting for 
d"'mocracy, they were quite candid about their vi,?ws on multi-
party systems after independence. "I must admit that we never 
even considered thP possibility of allowing a crop of 
political parties to mature in Algeria, once we were in pcwer. 
In actual fact, after the Declaration of Independence, we 
purposely excluded this possibility in the Tripoli programme, 
as to us it se med like a 'luxury' which an underdeveloped 
country could not permit itself", Ben Bella saict15. 
The leaders of the FLN, Frelimo, MPLA and PAIGC did not only 
outlaw any other political movement, but also chan9ed the 
nature of the revolutionary movements. The broad fronts from 
the days of the independence wars were discarded in favour of 
smaller, ~lite organisations -- thP vanguard parties. Less 
than a year after Algerian independence, BP.n Bella de~lared: 
"I do not believe in the idea of a mass party that accepts the 
participation f the most conscious Algerjans and those who 
are less conscious. I believe in the idea of a vanguard 
party"l6. According to him, such a party should only include 
those ''who are the most dynam c and who should be examples to 
follow ... In Algeri, we need bet~een 100 000 and 150 000 
(m mbers of a vanguard party] 11 17_ 
In Mozambique, the introduction of the concept of a vanguard 
party occurred at the Third Party Congress of rrelimo, which 
was held in February 197718. In D"'cember that year the MPLA's 
transformation was initiated at its First Ordinary Congress, 
where Agostinho Neto sa.1.d: "The MPLA, after heroically leaaing 
two national liberation wars and having st~rted the process of 
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laying the material foundations for building socialism, has 
now fulfilled its historic mission as a national liberation 
movement. The laying down of People's Democracy and Socialism 
as goals to be attained implies qualitative leaps in the 
politico-1deolog1cal and organisational sphere, so that the 
vanguard organisation may play its full role in the leadership 
of society ... That instrument, organised and structured in 
accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles, which will lead 
the revolutionary classes, w: 11 be the Vanguard Party of the 
Working Class"19_ 
Thus, a broad anti-government front was changed into an 
organisation dedicated to transform society. In 1972, ~eto had 
denied iu ;in interview that the MPLA was communist, because 
"for a part7 it is possible (to identify its ideology) but 
when a movement consists of people who are different 
politically and ideologically, i t is not possible to say that 
this is, for example, a communist movement" 2 0. 
After independence, however, the MPLA changed from a movement 
to a party, and it was able to clearly state its goals and tha 
manner in which the movement sought to achieve these. In the 
case of the MPLA, the influence of its Marxist-orientated 
ideology can be clearly seen. 
One informed obser ver states that the impor t nee which the 
MPLA attached to a vanguard party w~s modelled on Lenin's 
Pre1iminar Draft Resolution of the Tenth Con re~s, which he 
wrote for the Communist Party Congress of 192121 ~- Lenin wrote 
that "only the political party of the working class ... is 
capable of uni ting, training and organisin9 a vanguard of the 
proletariat and of the whole mass of t:'le working people that 
alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petit-
bourgeoi~ vascillations of this mdss"22_ 
For example, the .1!'LA Central Coro:nittee stated that the 
alliance betweet, worker and peasant would, through the 
vanguard party, "exercise a Revolu+:icnary Democratic 
Dictatorship over i.1te.cr,al and exten1al react ior., creating the 
conditions for the establishment of the Dictatorship of the 
l'roletariat i1, the stage of bui laing sociali~, .. 23. This 
statement reflects the same idiom as Lenin's Two tactics of 
~_ocial d':!mocracy i.n the democratic revolution, in which he 
refers t o the "revolution3ry deroocratic di~tatorship of the 
proletari:1t ano the pea!?antry"2-1_ 
The change t.:i a vanguard p3r.ty rr.eant that only the most 
p,>litically consr.ious citi~ens should be members of tr~ party. 
In the transition from a mass-based fror.t to a .. elit:.ist 
•.ra.1guard party, membership of the rdvo1 utionary movements 
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accordingly declined drastically. 
Following the MPLA's decision to establish a vanguard party, 
ther~ followed a series of purgPt a ·1d "r~ctification 
campaigns". At the time of the ~ir;L Congress there were 110 
000 members of the MPLA.25. Thus, it was decided to weed the 
party out, with the central committee stating that: "a vast 
rectification movement will be launched at all levels in order 
to correct errors, improve methods of work, cleanse the 
organisations of harmful elements and unite all militants 
behind the party's goal. The rectification movemFnt wil :. be 
the guarantee of unity within the party and of the ideological 
firmness of its militants"26. 
By the time Eduardo dos Santos took over the leadership of 
the MPLA after the death of Neto in 1979, the rectification 
campaign was over, and the membership of the MPLA reduced to 
only 16 58327. By 1982, the membership had grown to 30 00028. 
It was shown in this section that a one-party s t ate i s 
usually the result of extensive mobilisation of the population 
by the revolutionary movement before the fall of the anc ien 
regime29. A one-party state ruled by a respected leader 
associated with the struggle f o r independence is usually 
c haracterised by the stabilising, and centralising, r ole o f 
the party30_ Generally, the l oyalty o f the c itizens is 
directed at this leader instead of t he [single] party, and if 
he is replaced, the loyalty may decline31. 
12.4. New political &lites 
Moskos32 states "that an initial radical revolutionary elite 
is characterized by a membership which is intellectual, 
Western exp~sed and marginal in its ethnicity, and that the 
second generation of the radical revolutio,ary elite wit~esses 
a rise in heartland born, less educated and non-Western 
exposed indiv~duals" 
This 3lso appeared to be t he case in the African revolutions, 
where second-generation leaders like Boumedienne had a 
different outlook on life than the intellectuals like Ferhat 
Abbas. 
On the other hand, unlike the argument of the mass society 
theorists that marginal men become leaders because they are 
socially "uprooted and unattached"33, it may simply be the 
r~sult ~ f "the general trend in which power passes from high-
statu9 agi.+:ators to lower-status ..idministrators"34 . Whatever 
the reasotis, definite shifts in the leadership of the 
movements occurred in all th~ revolutions. 
What is clear, is that the leadership of all the movements 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
was more representative of the population than the leadtrs of 
the old regime. The new elite was drawn from different groups 
or classes35. In all the revolutions, the "second class 
citizens" became the new rulers. 
Davies36 incorporates this aspect when he defines revolutions 
as "violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of 
one ruling group by ar.other that has a broader popular basis 
for support''. For Lasswe1137 a revoluti Jn is characterised by 
"a shift in the class composition 0f elites". 7his was indeed 
the case in all the African revolu ~ions. 
Dunn38 maKes the state~ent that a revolution entails much 
more than the alteration of the eli~e: ttE new elite should be 
able to solve the problems of a society wLth more ease than 
the previous regime, and it should not "tJrn out that the ~1y 
problem which they were capable of handling mor~ deftly than 
those they replace is the single problem o f social control". 
12.5. Varied support for the new rulers and their policies 
Social control proved to be iffiportant -- ond often took up 
most of the time of the leaders. This is especially so in the 
case of Angela and Mozambique, where the governments dre still 
-- despite attempts at peace -- locked in battle with opposing 
groups. 
In the case of Angola, the ~•P,....A regime does no t have the 
support of large numbers of• ie population, p a rticularly the 
large Ovimbundu ethnic grou~ Unita, organiJed around this 
group, has now opposed the Luanda government for sixteen 
years, and there is still no end in sight ot the civil war 
which has all but destroyed the agriculture of this country. 
In fact, despite peace talks between the Angolan government 
and Unita, the rebel movement has since the departure of Cuban 
troops "thrown a noose" around Luanda39_ Jonas Savimbi's 
movement could thus negotiate from a position o f strength at 
the first official talks between the protagonists on 24 and 25 
Ap-il 1990 in Evora, Portuga1 40. The role which the 
i1 endence of Namibia played in the worsening of the MPLA's 
for nes is important. Not only did tens of thousands of Cuban 
troops leave the country, but Nujoma refused the Angolans 
permission to use Nanibia as a springboard for Jperations 
against Unita in southern Angola. "The Luanda government 
considers this refusal an act of monstrous ingratitude. Of all 
the former Front Line States, Angola made the heav~est 
s2~rifices for Na.nibia's independence. Experts estimate at $1C 
000 million the cost of war damage suffered by Angola. 11 41 
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Like the MPLA, Frelimo is currently nego iatin with h 
Renamo movemenL in order to agree to a cease-fire which will 
end the hostilit~es of tif► een years Rename, o~ the 
Mozambique. National Resistance Movement, was Otlginally 
supported by South Africa and Rhodesia, but South Africa 
officially discontinued its aid when it signed h Nkoma i 
Accord with Mozambique in 198442. Nine coun• ries, including 
the Unit~d States and the Soviet Union, are invnlved in the 
effort to end the war which has left more than 600 000 p opl 
dead43. Nearly 1,5 million people have fled he country, wo 
million have been displaced fr0m their homes, .... rid 4,3 m1lllon 
are affected by hunger as a result of the wac44. 
In Algeria, the government of Chadli Benjedid is under 
pressure from Muslim fun~amentalists, as well as the movemen 
of former president Ben Bella, who returned to the r.ountry 
last year after 7.5 years of imprisonment and exile. H 
denounced the government as a "system of band1ts anM thieves". 
"I don't believe that men who distinguished themselves by mor 
than two decades of authoritarianism can sundenly transform 
themselves into great democrats", Ben Bella (73) said of th 
FLN's move toward political reform and democrat1sation45. 
12.6. Tharm.idor -- toward a post-revolutionary aociaty 
Brinton4 6 calls the "slow and uneven return to 1 .iter, less 
heroic times" Thermidor, because it was in this month (July) 
of the revolutionary French calender that Robespierre's fall 
led to a decline in revolutionary fervou-. 
The countries which experienced revolutions are all to 
varying degrees encountering their own "Thermidor" and are 
moving coward a society which is no longer characterised by 
revolutionary ferv r. 
The former LusopLJne areas -- whose governments had embraced 
Marxism -- are moving toward democracy. "We are writing new 
and important chapters in our common history", was how Gu~nea-
Bissau president Joao Bernardo Vieira described the 
democratisation movcs47. In Mozambique, a new constitJt1on was 
introduced in December last year to allow for a multi-~arty 
democracy, while the MPLA ha~ pledged that it too would allow 
other political parties in t1e first quarte- of 199148. 
12.7 . Conclusion 
It was show~ in this chapter that the revoluciona1. movements 
introduced a new myth, which revolved a ound egalit~rianism. 
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Another characteristic of the African revolutions was tbe 
manner in which the former anti-colonial front changed after 
independence. It was replar ed by a vanguard party made up of 
ideologicJlly literate people. This group became the new 
elite, taking leadership positions. However, tensions which 
existed during the war of independence continued, and often 
led to power struggles wlthin the new governments. 
The new regimes were not popular with all of the people. In 
Angola a civil war is still raging between sapporters of Unita 
and the government, while the bandit movement Renamo is 
fighting Frelimo in t-, ... zarnbique. Peace talks are currently 
under way -- these talks signify the waning of the 
revo l utionary energy in these countries, and are an attempt of 
an idealistic movement to become more pragmatic in the face 0f 
a hostile world. This is borne out by their attempts to reform 
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Transformin the socio-economic order 
13.1. Introduction 
It was argued in Part One that a process cannot be described 
as a revolution if ~here is, apart from other criteria posted, 
no transformation of the socio-economic order. 
I n this ch,pter the alterations in the socio-economic orders 
of the African co~ntries which experie.1ced revolutions will be 
eAamined . The extent of the transformation varied from country 
to country, but it can safely be said that the socio-economic 
order under the new regime differed vastly from that under t he 
old regime. 
The approach will be the same as in the examination of the 
old order in Chapter Four, save that aspects of the demography 
of the new states and their economies directly after the fall 
of the o ld r~Jime were already discussed in Chapter Eleven. 
However, other central elements of the socio-economic order 
of the countries form the basis for the analysis of the 
transformation which occurred in these contemporary African 
countri"!s. 
13.2. Type of ownernhip 
It was shown in Chapter Six that the revolutionary movements 
had a c l ear idea e~vJt how the socio-economi~ order was to be 
transformed. 
For example, Frelimo decided at its Seconc. Congress in July 
1968 that an independent Mozambique should be aligned on the 
side of the world class struggle, and that the movement should 
aim -- primarily through collectivised agriculture -- to 
construct "a new society free from exploitation of man by 
man" 1 . Likewise, in Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and 
Zimbabwe the ideological map for the socio-economic 
transformation was drawn long before the fall of the old 
regime. 
One of the central elements of these maps was the ideal that 
control over the economy should not be in the hands of a small 
nwnber of people. For.most of the revolutionary movements, the 
way to ensure a more equal distribution of wealth was state 
ownership of, and thus control over, the means of production. 
Shortly after the fall of the old regime, the majority of the 
r~volutionary movement3 set out on this path. 




The African countries which experienced the mass exodus of the 
previ ous ruling groups -- Algeria, Angola, Mozambique and 
Guinea-Bissau -- \,•0 rn "bound to fall into some form of 
socialism very quickly", because numerous enterprises were 
abandoned, and the state had to intervene to start production 
again2. 
In Angola, the guidelines regarding nationalisation were 
issued in March 1976: the properties of "saboteurs", 
"traitors", members of the FNLA and Unita, as wel~ as those 
absent from the country for longer than 45 days "without 
justification" were nationalised, ~ the owners received no 
compensation3. 
Furthermore, the MPLA set itself a goal of nationalising 80 
percent of the 500 "heavy" industries before 19804 . When the 
First Congress was held in December 1977, the state already 
had total control over textile, suga~, metal, and plywood 
production enterprises, as well as 50 percent contrcl over 
diamond, dockyard, footware, matches, and margarine production 
enterprisesS . The nationalisation of hundreds of abandoned 
Por tuguese properties in 1979 meant that the MPLA was close to 
i t s goal of owning 80 percent of the major industries6. 
In Alger i a, the peasants occupied the deserted colon farms at 
independence, while workers did likewise at former Qied_!loir 
industries. Ben Bella's government had -- short of removing 
the peasants and workers -- little choice but to nationalise 
these enterprises by promulgating the Marc h Decrees, and at 
the end of 1963 more than five million acres, as well as 450 
industrial firms, were under state control7 . The March Decrees 
meant, according to Ben Bella, that "(t)he land had come back 
to the people who cultivated it and Algeria had taken a 
decisive step on the road to socialism"8. 
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau experienced large-scale 
nationalisation as well, but Zimbabwe did not nationalise on a 
vast scale. In Namibia no nationalisation was effected. 
13.2.2. The nature of state-owned enterprises 
The means of production that were nationalised were run by the 
new government. How successful were the revoluLionary 
movements? 
At first, the FLN under Ben Bella followed a path which 
allowed workers a large amount of control. Nationali~ed farms 
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were under the management of the workers themselves (a system 
called autogestion), and Ben Bella referred to this system as 
the "most precious achievement of the Revolution"9. However, 
after the coup d'etat in which Boumedienne toppled Ben Bella, 
the nature of Algeria's transformation to socialism changed. 
While Ben Bella had tried to transform the FLN into a quasi-
Marxist vanguard party, Boumedienne advocated the opposite 
approach to establishing socialism. He depended mainly on the 
~tate to carry out the transformation of society, and 
relegated the part y to play a minor rolelO. One of his first 
intentions after the coup was to establish a "state which will 
be able to outlive men and events" 11 . In fact, "(n)owhere in 
Africa has there been such a glorification of the state as in 
Algeria under Boumedienne"l2. 
The Algerian regime did not place as much importance on 
ideology as did some other revolutionary regimes. It was no 
wonder, then, that the ideological document on socialist 
development, the Charte Nationale, which appeared cnly in 1976 
but reflected earlier strategies as well, rejected "all rigid 
dogmas" and thus, by implication, Marxism13. However, the 
Algerians followed the Soviet model of economic transformation 
much closer than several other revolutionary regimes, and 
their policies differed markedly from the strategies of the 
"African socialist " countrie~. Economic transfornation should 
be the result of "overall and harmonious development on the 
basis of planning which is s cientific in its origin, 
democratic in its form~lation, and im~erative in its 
application 111 4 . 
The central theme of the Charte Nationale was that Algeria 
would only be truly independent if it had cc~trol over its 
resources, and had a developed industrial LY~~ that could 
sustain economic growth, i.e. if the country was able to 
exploit its resources and operate its industries without being 
dependent on foreign assistancelS. 
At Boumedienne's death in 1978, his statist brand of 
socialism "seemed to have been permanently etched across the 
face of rhP country 11 l6. The economic order of the Algerian 
state had been transformed from a colonial economic order to a 
socialist order, in which revenues from hydrocarbons were used 
to finance investments in public projects and "industrialising 
industries", aimed at generating further de·relopment l 7 . The 
importance placed on,the secondary (manufacturing) sector 
stands in stark contrast to the economic orders of the 
majority of the other countries. The Algerian economic order 
was, however, plagued by the lack of attention given to the 
troubled agricultural sectorl8_ 
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In Angola, the question of whether the state enterprises 
should be run collectively, with the workers playing a 
managerial role, or by state-appointed managers, caused 
controversy. In the March Decree of 1976, which authorised the 
nationalisation of properties, provision was made for the 
participation of workers in the management of these 
enterprises1 9. However, in October 1976, this decision wa!i 
reversed by the Central Committee which declared that it was 
necessary to replace "the present form of collective 
leadership with personal leadership", a principle which was 
confirmed at the First Congress20. Thus, in a manner 
reminiscent of the different approaches of Ben Bella and 
Boumedienne, the MPLA curtailed workers participation; in 
fact, ic "effectively killed the self-management movement"21_ 
13.3. Primary sector dvminant, but in decline 
In all the countries agriculture remained one of the most 
important elements within che primary sector; · .1 Guinea-
Bissau, for example, it virtually dominated p-,, ~ -:anomic 
order. In other countries such as Alguria and ·ngola, the 
exploitation of minerals proved to be very im~r r , ant. 
13.3.1. Poor~ricultural reduction 
In Angola at independence, about 1,2 million peasant families 
had less than two hectares of land, on which they produced for 
their own consumption; a further 150 000 African farmPrs were 
producing cash crops (accounting for 14 percent of these 
exports) and 140 000 Ovimbundu were working as migrant 
labourers in the coffee p lantations22. 
The MPLA moved very cautiously in transforming the 
agricultural sector. The MPLA did not nationalise peasant 
land, as was done in Mozambi que, but only abandoned Portuguese 
farms. Neto realised that the transformation of the economic 
order "is long, complex and difficult", and that the 
nationalisation of peasant land would alienate the 
population23. "If now in the name of socialism we were to 
begin to expropriate the peasants, our people would at once 
feel they were being sacrificed to our socialist option"2 4 . 
The 6 250 abundoned Portuguese farms were nationalised and 
consolidated into state farms, which were very large: 450 
farms were regrouped into 58 state farms which employed 175 
000 workers, while four "agri-businesses" employed a further 
150 000 workers25. The co-operative movement, started in 1976, 
proved to be a failure, with only 300 formed. Because little 
collective far ming took place, it was decided to launch an 
education campaign prior to another co-operative movement. 
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Dinamisadores_ ( "dinamising agent s") were sent to the 
countryside to educate the population, and t o convince them of 
the advanr ages of collective farming26. 
Thus, the MPL.:\ chose a pragmatic rather than a strictly 
:dPoloqical strategy for the transformation of the economy, 
concentrating mor? on production than doctrinal prescriptions . 
For example, aft~r a failed Cuban-assisted attempt to run the 
abandoned Portuguese coffee plantations in northern Angola as 
state farms, former Ovimbundu workers were resettled, but this 
time as small owners -- and despite creating a kulak class 
prohibited by the MP:..•· C'"'"'munist idev ~.ogy -- and their 
productivity was ~igher than that of the failed state 
enterprise27. 
However, the agricu::. :ural S•·ctor remained very weak: coffee 
production was 26 000 tons in 1.978 as opposed to the 210 000 
in 1973; pineapple prv~Jc tion ~~s 4 400 as opposed to 55 000 
tons; cotton 1 000 and 79 000; s ; sal 15 000 and 60 000 tons; 
sugar 39 000 in 1978 and 82 000 i~ 197328. Furthermore, Angola 
still had to import more Ch3n half of staple f oods sold on tre 
market, and there were fr~m..ient f oo~ cihortaoes in the urban 
areas 29. · -
On ?.l May 1977 (six days befo ~P a cou p attempt ) , Neto said in 
Lui\nda: "the proble m of food supplies i s serio·1s. There is no 
cassava, no potatoes, no gro und.r1·Jc-, no p alm 0.11. ',here is 
nothing on the market .. this si J~t i on pl~ases no one 11 3°. 
The Econ~reic and Social Directive · adopted at Frelimo's Third 
Congress in February 1977 set out the first coherent economic 
policy for Mozambique, and laid down a st~ategy for economic 
develc:pm :1t31. Acco rding to this strategy, Mozambique was in 3 
phase of building a popular democracy during which t~me the 
foundations for a Socialist Revolution were to be laid with 
"agriculture as the basis and industry as the dynamic and 
decisive factor"32. 
Two principles were laid down for the development of 
agricult~re: firstly, the concentration of t he populati~n in 
villages where social services would be available; and, 
secondly, the modernisation of the rural areas by mean~ of 
state farms and co-operatives33. The principles were 
interrelated in the sense that the villages should provJde the 
labour for the state fa . . ns34. 
The agricultural sector i n Mo•~mbique employs 80 percent <J 0 
the active population of the country, and between 1980-198G 
contributed between 40 and 45 percent ~f the gross value of 
total production in the country35 . 
o N • • ~ , I.,• • 
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Agricultural output declined during the course of the 1980's; 
the market production had remained at the same level since 
1983, with the production of 1986 being less than half of that 
of 198136. Furthermore, the marketing of cash crops planted by 
peasants (such as cashew nuts) was in 1986 ouly 40 percent of 
the 1981 leve137 . While the production of vegetables for urban 
consumption haci increased fivefold from 1981 to 1986, the 
agricultural production on the state farms and co-operatives 
was only 45 percent of the 1981 level s38. 
This situation was clearly disastrous for Moza.-nbique, not 
only in its attempt to transform the economic order, but also 
in the daily human suffering that t hese figures implied. 
Several reasons are given, of whic h the severe drought and the 
Rena~o banditry are the most important39 . These factors, 
amongst others, fo~ced more than two mi l lio n Mozarnbi~ans off 
their land, and affected a further two millio n whu decided to 
stay on their farms40. 
It is ironic that the PAIGC -- which unde~ Cab:al had been 
perhaps thP. closP.st t c:i the peasant .::i of a l l the .revo.iui...1.onary 
movements -- kept some exploita~ive Estado Novo agricultural 
policies intact, and refusec to s pend money on the development 
of these rural me mb~~s o f the population . 
The agricultural marke~ in G,1inea-Bissau f ormed a monopoly 
under the Salazar Legime and t his did not change muc~ under 
Lhe Pl\IGC. Ab :)Ut 2 3 C state o ut lets (the nationalic;ed Sociedade 
Comer ci al Ultr.amarina) - ol l ected produce from the peasants, 
but because of the · 0 ~es paid, most peasants chose to 
, n e ighbour~n g slatP3 1 >here it ~culd s nLUggle their produ<..t 
be wold f or muc~ h ~gi i-:es 41. T~u~ , whj le an estimat ed 80 
000 tons O J. rice we r ... ~ uced in 1981, onl.)' 1 547 t ons were 
sold to the stat,.. and of the estirnated 30 000 tons of 
grouPdnuts produced in the same year, only 6 475 tons were 
sold to state officials42. 
This , for a country that was primarily dependent upon ~ts 
agric,,il ture, was disastrous. The import of rice (the staple) 
increased from 14 000 tons in 1975 to 43 000 tons in 198243. 
This led to a sharp increase in loans and requests for 
economic 3id. 
The ~e1sants were critised for this state of affairs , not 
only ~y tho government but also by the World Bank and donor 
organ ~ations. They were dismissed as being the 85 percent of 
the p tr -~ation who o n ly consumed and contributed little to the 
GDP4 4 . i ·-.:..,ever, no mention was made of the fact that the 
disadva: •-,led peasantry, struggling under monopolistic laws, 
chos e no , ·:o support an overblown bureaucracy, and resorted 
instead t., -:ross-border traffic45. 
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Algeria, in its quest for industrial development neglected 
its state-controlled agricultural sector. The Three-year 
Development Plan (1967-1969) made provision for only 16,9 
percent of investments to go to agriculture, with the two 
following Four-year Plans (1970-1973 and 1974-1977) also 
characterised by a low level of investment in agriculture4 6 
This nPglect of agriculture is surprising, especial. y if 
Algeria's climate and lack of tertile land (as well as the 
rdpid increase in population) is taken into account . Prio~ to 
the war of independence, Germain Tillion estimated that the 
c ountry could only feed three million people, and the 
population at that stage ~-3s already nine million47 . The 
official response by the regime (which had pledged large-scale 
agrarian reform during the war) was that agricultural 
production can only be expanded through the use of fertilizer 
and mechanisation, both of which c ould only be produced after 
industrial development48. This neglect was to cost Algeria 
dearly. 
Between 1973 and 1977 more t...dn a million tons of wheat were 
imported annually at a cost of about $700 million per year49_ 
In 1971, an attempt was made to improve agriculture with the 
promulgation of the Charter of the Agrarian Revolution, which 
entailed land refo rm and collec tive farming. State a nd 
nationalised land were distributed amongst need/ peasants; at 
the end of 1 ' ~a, more than 100 000 peasants had each received 
a portion of land after the distribution of 3,1 million 
acresS0. 
Furthermore, more than 6 500 farming co-operatives were 
established, but only about 200 "socialist villages" were 
formed, and the concep~ proved to be largely unsuccessful51 . 
Finally, agriculture under the new Algerian economic order 
was regulated by "an army of rural bureaucrats", who were in 
charge of the distribution of land and the running of the co-
operatives and villages52. Thus, the statist nature of 
Algerian socialism manifested itself in agriculture. 
13.3.2. Minerals 
The sudden increase in the price of oil in 1974 changed the 
nature of Algerian socialism as suddenly not millions, but 
billions of dollars were available for investment in economic 
projects53 . 
In 1978, Algeria had.a GDP of $24,6 billion and a per capita 
income of $1 37454. rhus, the exploitation of its hydrocarbon 
resources was the mainqtdy of Algerian economic development, 
as reflected in the slogan "to plant oil so as to reap 
industry 11SS. A large share of revenue from hydrocarbons was 
invested in Algerian industries. 
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During the First and Second Four-year Plans, 37 percent of 
all the investments in industry went to the extra~tion of oil 
an~1 gas, with a further 40 percent being invested in 
petrochemical and steel industries56. The extent of these 
investments becomes evident if it is taken into account that 
total investments during the Second Four-year Plan {1974-1977) 
amounted to $27 billion~?. Nearly 80 percent of all 
investments, or about $22 billion, went to the oil, gas, 
petrochemical, and steel industries. 
Thus, Algeria had pinned its hope for economic development on 
one of its few natural resources, with the aim of investing 
the revenues to build up an industrial base. 
Oil was discovered in the mid-1960's in Angola · $ Cabinda 
province and was responsible for a GNP of $474 million, the 
second highest in Africa south of the Sahara58. Angola copied 
the Algerian approach to the exploitation of its mineral 
resources, set up its own state oil company, Sonangol, and 
entered into a number of agreements with multi-nationals59. 
The negotiations were carried out by the same American 
consultant, Arthur D. Little, who acted for the Algeri~ns60. 
The first of these agreements was signed in December 1978 with 
Gulf Oil, and resulted in the transfer of 51 percent of 
shares, management, and production to Sonango161 . In September 
1979, an agr ~ment was signed with Texaco, wh~reby Sonangol 
obtained complete ownership of the company's concessions, but 
Texaco was to operate the oil field off Cab,nda in return for 
60 percent of the expected 50 000 barrela per day62. By 1980, 
th. Gulf-Sonangol agreement provided the regime with annual 
revenues of about $1 billion, which formed between 60 and 80 
percent of its total revenues. It was estimated that with the 
addition of the Texaco field the revenues could double by 
19a363. 
The same approach was employed in the diamond mining sector, 
where production had fallen to 15 percent of pre-independence 
levels64. In August 1977, the regime took control of 61 
percent of the assets of Diamang, while the consortium would 
continue to be responsible for the marketing of the gems65. 
13.3.3. Weak or non-existent industrial sector 
It was pointed out earlier that of all the revolutionary 
regimes, it was only Algeria whose strateg7 for the 
transformation of the economic order depended on large-scale 
industrialisation. This industrial development will now be 




Boumedienne's statist socialist development program relied 
extensively on hydrocarbons; no~ only fur their revenue, but 
for the creation of secondary industries in this field, which 
in turn would lead to the establishment of other industries. 
Over 360 para-statal industries, primarily in the oil, gas, 
petrochemical and steel fields were created to serve as the 
engine for economic transformation66. 
The Three-year Development Plan (1967-~969) led to the 
spending of 48,7 percent of all investments in these sectors, 
with similar spending in the First and Second Four-year Plans 
(1970-1973 and 1974-1977)67. 
This high level of investment, fuelled by high =evenues as a 
result of a rising oil price, paid handsomely for Algeria 
during the 1970's. Real economic growth was estimated to be 
10,4 percenc in 1976, and 7,8 and 9 percent in the following 
two years68. 
However, the new industrial plants were producing far below 
their capacity. The following reasons are cited by Ottaway69: 
technical and managerial inadequacies; a low demand for the 
produce inside Algeria; and little surcess in selling these 
produce on the European market. Thus, these industries were in 
effect subsidised by the oil revenues. The Algerian regime 
appeared willing to continue this practice, because the 
industries were established to make the country independent 
from the industrialised Western countries70. Furthermore, 
without this industrial base Algeria would never really 
advance technologically, as Boumedienne himse:..f realised: "The 
essential goals of a policy of industrialisation are not 
manifested only thr0ugh the creation of more jobs. They go 
beyond that. They include the need to foster, through the 
development of our natural forces of pro~uction, a process of 
internal accumulati~n of our material and human resources, 
essential for us to emerge into the technological era1171 . 
At independence, the secondary sector of Angola's economy was 
responsible for 1e to 20 percent of the GDP, and the colony 
had 500 industries classified as heavy72. Between 5 000 and 10 
000 workers were in the fishing industry, 20 000 to 40 000 in 
the construction industry; 55 000 in transportation; and 70 
COO in the service sector73. 
13.4. Trade balance 
13.4.1. Dominance of former colonial power and industrialised 
countries 
Whereas most of Angola's trade was with Portugal prior to 
independence (see Part Two), the country now has ties with the 
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Soviet Union and Eastern European countries (former socialist 
bloc members), the Nordic states, Brazil, the United States 
and the European Community74 . The trade links are, however, 
still the strongest with the Western countries, primarily 
because of the colonial legacy. After ten years of 
independence and moving toward socialism, more than 70 percent 
of Angola's t~ade is still with western capitalist 
countries 75. 
While exports to the industrialised countries, Asia and 
Africa rose from $889,3 million in 1978 to $2 257,7 million in 
1984, imports rose from $665,7 million to $1 003,1 million in 
the same period76 . The United States, despite the fact that it 
dij not recognise the MPLA 9overrunent, dominated this 
import/export trade, with $957,7 million (nearly 50 percent of 
all exports) going to the US in 1984; while Angola imported 
$113,4 million worth of goods from the United States in the 
same year77. 
Prior to independence, 92 percent of Guinea-Bissau's exports 
went to Portugal, but by 1981 this figure ·~as down to 20 
percent 78. 
13.4.2. Foreign aid 
It is difficult to establish exactly how much aid ~..ngola 
receives, because few official figures on aid are released, 
and there is a lack of statistical services79. 
However, the country has received substantial aid from the 
Soviet Union, which pledged $2 billion for the period 1984 to 
199080. The Soviets supplied $17 million during the 
reconstruction period of 1976 to 197881 , and between 1975 and 
1982 the Soviet Union supplie d aid worth $40 million to 
Angola82 . The Soviets also undertook to participate in a 
hydro-electric scaeme and in a joint fishing scheme83. 
With regard to Western aid, Angola received in 1983 the sum 
of $30,5 million from France, West Germany, Belgium, Derunark, 
Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy84. 
Furthermore, as a member of the Lome Convention, Angola will 
be able to boost its trade w·.th the European Community85. 
The economic airl that Guinea-Bissau received i3 to a large 
extent similar to that of Angola. Immediately before and after 
independence, the PAIGC was almost exclusively supported by 
the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. For the 
period 1976 to 1978, they supplied 26 percent of Guinea-
Biss~u's foreign aid, but in the following year this was down 
to only 9 percent86. 
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13.4.3. The debt crisis 
With its overblown bureaucracy and diminishing agricultural 
base, Guinea-Bissau was forced to apply for foreign loans 
between 1977 and 1981 the credit supplied to the state 
increased annually by 43 percent87 . 
These loans were used for the foli ; wing: consumer goods (38 
percent); capital goods (28 percent); technical assistance (13 
percent); training (2,4 percent); and 5,7 percent for other 
expenses. The government never spent more than 10 percent of 
its budget on rural development; in 1983 the Ministry of Rural 
Development received 3 percent of the budget -- and this in a 
country with 85 9ercent of its population being rural 
peasants88. 
On the other hand, 56 percent of the budget was used for 
government salaries: the government employed 15 000 workers 
(61 percent of all salaried persons), and 83 percent of these 
government workers lived in the capital, Bissau89. This was 
surE>.iy an untenable situatiou, and Guinea-Bissau paid a heavy 
price for this policy. 
13.5. Education and health 
13. 5 .1. Chang_in__g__!:,_he education system 
The Frelimo government inherited one of the worst colonial 
education systems: it was highly centralised, Portuguese-
orientated, and designed to give Africans a rudimentary 
education in order to i.1tegrate them into the colonial 
economy90. Furthermore, the proportion of children actually 
attending school was smaller than elsewhere in Africa91 . 
The alteration of the educational system was high on 
Frelimo's list of priorities, as a means not only to ensure 
that production would be enhanced (Lhrough an educated work 
force), but also under the new regime to mobilise the (young) 
m~3ses92. Thus, education under the new regime had to 
"intensify revolutionary political and ideological training of 
teachers and pupils, in order to ensure that teachers are 
active agents in the revolutionary process"93. 
Fralimo gained control over education by nationalising all 
private educational ~acilities, and integrated these with 
state schools94 . Imme~iately afcer independence, the 
government had to replace large numbers of secondary school 
teachers (mainly Portuguese who had left the country) and 
introduce new, non-Portuguese orientated textbooks95. 
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The education program had ~ixed success, partly because of 
the activities of Rename . Primary school enrollment increased 
from 672 000 in 1975 to 1 311 000 in 1985; the number of 
secondary pupils increased from 26 000 to 135 000 over the 
same period96. The illiteracy rate o 93 percent at 
independence was r£duced to 72 percent in 1980; this was not 
sufficient, however, and "acute shortages of skilled manpower 
persisted in all sectors"97. 
The activities of Rename led to the closure of 2 629 primary 
and 22 secondary schools, leaving about 500 000 pupils without 
educational facilities98. 
The former University of Maputo, w1.ich had only 40 Mozambican 
~tudents and 2 500 Portuguese students at independence, was 
renamed the Eduardo Mondlane University and had 1800 studer.ts 
in 198199. Teacher-training centres were established and twn 
institutes for vocational teachers opened in Nampula and 
Umbeluzi respectivelylOO. 
Findlly, the Frelimo government undertook a literacy drive 
within its armed forces and under industrial and agricultural 
workers, in which an estimated one million people 
T')articipatedlOl. 
13.5.2. Fighting disease and ill health 
The population of Mozambique was not only neglected 
educationally, but physically as well. 
Life expectancy in Mozambique is forty years, the mortality 
rate is 19 percent, with 45 percer.t of all deaths being 
children, under five years of age, and women of reproductive 
age102. 
This state of affairs is largely the result of poor hygiene 
and nutritionl03. About 75 percent of all disease is caused by 
infections and parasites, with malaria being particularly 
rife: in Sofala province, 80 percent of children between 2 and 
9 years suffer from malarial04. 
The Frelimo government increased the budget for health from 
$15,1 million in 1974 to $54,6 million in 1Q80, and 
concentrated on preventive medical care with vaccination 
campaigns and family planning centres being prominent105 . 
The number of medical doctors dropped from 519 before 
independence to 06 in 1975, but increased ~o 317 doctors and 3 
800 health workers in 1995106. Health posts and centres -- a 
cornerstone of tne government's health 1 olicy -- increased 
from 426 to 1 178 for the same peri~dl07. However, this still 
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meant that there was one doctoc for 44 000 people, and one 
he~! th r~st for 12 000 108. Furthermore, the activities of 
Renan.0 l ~d to the closure or destruction of 30 percent of the 
health network, leaving about 2 million people without health 
carel09. Torp, quoting the Eiull0 states that $34 million is 
necessary to =ebuild the h~alth network, and a further $36 
~illion is required to keep health c are in the year 2000 at 
the level of that of 1986111 . 
The health ~y~ tem has 993 units (hospitals and health posts) 
with 12 836 bea s -- an average of one bed per 1 000 peoplell2 . 
Th i s average repre sen~s the situation in both urban and rural 
areas. In the towns and cities, the 17,5 percent of the 
populatio,1 li~ring there have access to 90 percent of all 
d o~tors and 66 p 3rcent of the total medical staffll3 . On the 
otl1er hand, the r ural 82,5 percent of the population have 
theoretically a s J ngle doctor for 3 21 200 peoplell : . 
Attempts are made to rectify this situation. A total of 110 
students had enrolled by 1979 f or the six-year medicine course 
at the Edua rdo M?ndlane University, and it was planned to 
admit fifty medic al st,,dents per year115. Furthermore, four 
health training centres were established in Maputo, Beira, 
Quel i mane and Nampula in o rder to train nu rses and midwives 
(45 percent o f a l l trainees), and t o provide training in 
nutrit i on and child c ar~ for gene ral medi c a l wo rkersll6. Thes e 
workers would, i n tur n, teach the Organisation o f Mozambican 
Wome n courses in he alth and nutrition, i ~ ~rder to reach as 
many of the population as possiblell7. 
All the countries are apart from ill health, under-
nourishment and disease -- faced with the Aids crisis. In 
Zimbabwe, about 25 percent of all Aids carriers are children 
under five years of agell8. Most of the 4 000 children 
contracted the deadly disease from their mothers. 
13.6. Position of women and child.ran 
In most of the African countries, women were often at the 
lowest rung of the social l~dder. Traditions and customs such 
as forced marriage, polygamy, the ease of male divorce, bride 
price, and fertility requirements characterised, and were 
partly responsible toF, the low status of women within the 
Afri c an societiesll9. 
~o also transform the social order on this level, the role of 
women in African society had to be altered by the movemer.t. 
Samora Machel recognised this: "The participation of 




the triumph of our Revolution. It is the essential condition 
for the advancement of the new society which we wish to 
create"120 . 
After independence, the Organisation of Mozambican Women 
(OMM), acting in concert with both rural and urban dinarnising 
groups, launched a campaign to alter the political 
consciousness of both women and men, and formed branches of 
the OMM all over the countryl2l. Men who objected and those 
who continued with practices such as bride price and polygamy, 
were disciplined and barred from holding political 
positions122. 
Despite the opposition to the change of women's roles, 
particularly in the rural areas, and the fact that the 
Portuguese system of family law -- which does not protect the 
rights of women -- is still in force, 28 percent of all 
deputies elected to local assemblies are women123. 
In Algeria, the largest women's rights organisation has 400 
members -- and this in a country with 26 million ~~ople1 24. 
Under the Islamic tradition few women are allowed to venture 
out of the home: of the country's work force of eight million, 
only 380 000 are femalel25. Men can divorce their wives by 
simply telling them that the marriage is over -- and they are 
allowed to cast their wives' votesl26. 
13.7. Toward reconstruction and a post-revolutionary society 
After independence, Frelimo ar.d the other revolutionary 
regimes were "faced with the prospect of attempting to do two 
potentially contradictory things at once: to sustain somethir.g 
of its inherited structure in order to avoid economic collapse 
while beginnin~ to search out openings toward an economy very 
differently structered"l27. The manner in which the economic 
order should be structured was pointed out at the Third 
Congress as being "the destruction of capitalism and the 
construction of socialism"128. 
However, the economir. realities, such as poor agricultural 
production, wide-spread hunger and escalating foreign debt, 
forced Frelimo to backtrack after only seven years. In October 
1990, thb government altered its constitution not only to 
allow other political parties, but also to introduce free 
market mechanisms in the economic sphere. Article 37, clause 
one emphasises the following aspects: "[A]ppreciation of 
labour, market forces, initiative cf ~-onomic agents, 
participation of all types of ownership, and action by the 
state as the regulator and promoter of economic and social 
growth and development 11 129. 
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In a similar fashion , Algeria , Angola and Guinea-Bissau are 
currently restructuring their economies on systems based less 
on dogma and more on pragmatism. 
13 . 8 . Conclusion 
This chapter Gescribed a prominent characteristic of the 
African revolutions studied here. To varying degrees, the 
revolutionary governments failed to transform the economies 
into he~1thy and expanding systems. 
After the fall of the old regime, a process of 
nationalisltion began in all the countries, except Zimbabwe 
(and ne\ly-independent Namibia). The state-owned enterprises 
were not effective, and continuing war and conflict meant that 
agricultural production could not be increased sufficiently to 
supply in the demands of a growing population. 
Angola and Algeria were fortunate in that they could depend 
on revenue created by their oil industries, but when the oil 
price slumped these economies suffered as well. 
Ali Ma~rui13O argued that African countries could be 
"moder~ising without westernizing" and had to s trive toward 
high levels of knowledge, innovation and social sympathy. The 
African revolutionaries tried to do s0, but -- with the 
possible exception of Algeria -- very l ittle modernisation 
took place. In fact, the rigid economic policies followed by 
the revolutionary governments led to little economic growth, 
no foreign investments, and therefore no "wealth" to 
redistribute. The co·mtries had to borrow on a vast scale --
particularly from western countries -- in order to feed their 
populations. However, the liberalisation processes taking 
place in most of ~he countries are having an effect in the 
economic sphere as well . It is possible that with the 
introduction of freer markets , as well as extensive foreign 
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Africa has seen numerous types of collective political 
violence . Various types of revolts existed through the 
centuries, and were recorded by historians from the time of 
ancient Egypt onward. 
Revolution is a relatively "nodern" concept its current 
meaning evolved at the end of the eighteenth century, during 
tre French Revolution. Whereas concepts such as revolt 
indicate the replacement of rulers, revolution goes further: 
it deals with the trans~ormation of the old order and the 
creation of a "new world". It is this aspect of the concept 
which formed one of the central elements of the analytical 
model used in this study to distinguish between revolution and 
other violent collective action in Africa. 
To identify contemporary African revolutions, another element 
was added to the analytical model. Popular participation in 
the process of transforming society is considered by the 
majority of experts on revolutions as indispensable. The 
analytical model was further refined by identifying different 
elements of the two central aspects of revolution. 
Thus, the transformation aspect deals with the political and 
socio-economic order, while the participation of the 
population is reflected in the leadership, ideology, followers 
and organisation of the revolutionary movement. 
A third element of revolution is evident from the fact that 
re•. ,lution is classified as belonging to the genus 
"rebellion". Rebellion means, explicitly or implicitly, the 
use of violence against authority. There can be no revolution 
without violence, and the African revolutions were 
characterised by extreme violence. 
Finally, revolution is not a sudden event , nor an overnight 
change as, for example, a coup d'etat. It is a drawn out 
process, often characterised by several phases. 
These four major aspects were included in the definition of 
revolution used in this study. The phenomenon was identified 
as the funda~ental transformation of the political and socio-
economic orders of a country by an elite-directed, mass-based, 
and ideologically-ins~ired organisation that employs violence 
during one or all of the phases in this process. 
Tne analytical tools constructed in Part One of this study 
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were then employed to firstly identify the African countries 
which had experienced revolutions. Five countries were 
identified -- Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and 
Zimbabwe. These countries experienced the transformation of 
society by a mass movement. Other African countries such as 
Ethiopia or Burkina Faso were extensively transformed, but the 
aspect of popular participation in any of the stages of the 
transformation was absent. On the other hand, in countries 
where the government was toppled by a mass movement (for 
example , Milton Obote in Uganda, and Namibia after its war of 
independence), the new rulers did not attempt to fundamentally 
transform socie1 y. 
What were the characteristics of the revolJtions in these 
five African countries? 
The revolutionary movements did not set out with a plan or 
strategy (usually supplied by external powers) to topple a 
regime that was inherently good and eificient, as governments 
often painted the picture. In fact, the very existence of the 
movements meant that the incumbents were out of touch with the 
population. 
In all of the African countries, the ancicn regime was 
established through violence. European powers colonised 
African land, fought off primary resistance, and imposed their 
rule on the local population. The rulers could therefore not 
count on support from the population, who viewed their rule as 
illegitimate. European superiority was the cornerstone of thi s 
rule. Politica . · ,stitutions were controlled by whites, who 
made up the p - · ~ical Alite as well. This made the old 
political order vulnerable, because the leaders of the local 
population could not be co-opted into the ~lite and government 
structures. Resentful of their inferior status, the local 
population tried various types of peaceful resistance, which 
was usually met with violent repression by the government 
forces. The death of thousands of people in this manner proved 
to be one of the major causes of revolution, because it l~d to 
the establishment of movements dedicated to gaining political 
power through any means . 
The selected African revolutions were characterised by the 
fact that the population had to endure repression and 
discrimination for a long time. Furthe~~ore , from the 
description of the socio-economic conditions prior to the 
revolution it is evident that the living conditions in the 
selected countries were poor. 
· The intricate relationship between socio-economic conditions 
and revolutionary potential was examined. All the countries 
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had a small, but very influ~ntial white community. The largest 
white group was established in Algeria, were the one million 
pieds nolcs comprised 10 percent of the population. The whites 
controlled the economies of the countries, while the local 
populations -- mostly rural peasaPts -- were engaged in 
subsistence farming, or small-scale cash crop agriculture. 
The whites were involved in agriculture as well, but in an 
organised and scientific manner. They pushed the local 
population off fertile lands, adding to their resentment. The 
fact that the whites controlled the means of production meant 
that they controlled labour as well. In the Portuguese areas, 
strict labour regulations were enforced. The local population 
had to work on state project s such as the building of roads 
a major grievance in t~ese areas. In Algeria, where large 
numbers of peasants had been pushed off the land, there 
developed a largP. lumpen-proletariat -- jobless, unskilled 
peasant r . This group was to support the FL~' in large numbers, 
primarily because they anticipatea a better future under a 
Muslim government. 
Another grievanc~ of the local population was the fact that 
the whites received much better medical care and education. In 
1960, for example, Guinea-Bissau had only four hospital : . The 
French provided far better medical services, but had to 
contend with a rap~1ly growing Muslim population. 
It can be speculate~ that the ancien regimes, by giving the 
local population no political voice and doing little to 
improve their living conditions, were in themselves a cause of 
the revolutions described in this study. The people had 
numerous grieva,1ces , and the "men of words" -- tne future 
leaders of the revolutionary movements advocated that the 
current order should be transfor~ed. 
The people who estatlished the revolutionary movements were 
characterised by the fact that they were intellectuals •ho had 
exposure to the west~rn world. Most were males in their 
twenties or thirties. They had special character traits, of 
which the most important wdS the firmness of their 
convictions. Against nearly insurmountable odds they proceeded 
to take on mighty governments. The men endured detention and 
many died for the cause they so fervently believed in. 
Another characteristic of contc~porary African revolutions is 
the fact that the leaders were inspired by an ideolugy which 
pr~ached the radical transformation of society. This aspect of 
the ideology (its social criticism) went hand in hand with 
another aspect, nationalism, which usually received more 
prominence prior to th~ fall of the old regime. With its 
emphasis on the independence of the territory, nationalism was 
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able to cut across class and ethnic ties, and proved to be 
instrumental in uniting the people of the country in a broad 
anti-government front. The ideology did not only unite people. 
It en~ Juraged political action , or praxis. People who believed 
fervently in the ideology of the revolutionary movement not 
only supported its cause, but also took up weapons against the 
enemy. 
The revolutionary followers were characterised by their 
youth. With little education and few prospects of a good life, 
they joined movements which they thcught would create a more 
equal and prosperous society. 
All the revolutionary movements placed great importance on 
organisation. Samora Machel traced Frelimo's victory to its 
ability to mobilise and organise the population. In fact, all 
the revolutionary movements were to a large extent able to 
determine what the future of their countries would louk like 
because they had the most competP.nt organisations. 
These organisations provided a chain of command, which eased 
communication within the movement, and inst~lled discip~ine as 
well. Two inherent problems of organisation -- friction 
between powerful groups in the chain of command, and a 
tendency toward authoritarianism -- were evident in the 
African revolutions. 
It is of little use if a movement succeeds in mobilising an 
unhappy population around ideals of a better future, but does 
not challenge the rulers. In Part Four, this conflict between 
the revolutionary challengers and the incumbents was analysed. 
All of the revolutionary movements were at fi~st committed to 
peaceful protest against the political and socio-economic 
conditions. However, whP.n it became clear that this approach 
was not successful, the movements decided on an armed struggle 
against the ancien regime. 
At first this struggle had a low intensity, but following 
Mao's strategy on guerrilla wa:fare, the movements gainP1 the 
support of the population and increased their military 
operations. In the P~rtuguese areas in particular, the 
t evolutionary movements were ~o successful in taking on the 
government troops that liberated areas were established. In 
these areas, which were controlled by the revolutionary 
movement, the guerrillas could rest, replenish their supplies, 
and poljticise the local population. 
The guerrilla forces did nut ~nly use Mao's guerrilla 
strategy of winning local support through persuasion and 
example. Particula ly in Algeria, terror became an instrumant 
of the revolutionary movement. The FLN emploted terror against 
. 
~ ~- --- --- - - ____ , __ ~-- . __ --~------ -------~ --~ ~-- - -
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
the local population -- forc ing peasants to co-operate -- and 
against the French as well. The terror campaign in the cities, 
primarilv Algiers, caJsed considerable loss of life and the 
destruct~o~ of property. In the final analysis, however, it 
was a majo~ ~cr b~ck &or the FLN, because the French destroyed 
its whole urbaP n~twc rk. 
The violent and pror,d~t~rl onflict between the challenger 
and incumbent in Africa dia no'" escape the nc,tice of a world 
in the grip of the Cold Wa.c. Countries toolt: ~ides : tl.e Soviet 
Union and the Ea~t Bloc supported the revolutionary moveruents 
in their struggle again~t colonialism and imperialism, while 
the West aided its Nato allies in their battlE against the 
insurgents. Support was not restricted to state level. Severa • 
groups -- for example churches and student movements --
supported the parties in the conflict. 
All the revolutionary movements studiect nere received 
external support . The guerrillas received modern weapons and 
training which they needed desperately t o continue their fight 
against the old ~egime. niplom~tir wupport, particula rly in 
the United Nations (which refl~cted the power of Th ; rd World 
countries) proved to be almost as important as victories in 
the bush. 
On the other hand, some of the allies of the invumbents 
decided to withdraw their support. The decision of the United 
States not to support France any longer in ~he UN' s Securjty 
Council was a major victory for the revolutionary movement. In 
Rhodesia, Ian Smith was practically forced to hand pcwer to 
the blacks after South ~Lrica threatened to cut off its 
support. 
The combination of military success and diplomatic pressure 
was employed by all the movements studied here. 
Despite their numerical superiority, the government troops 
were often ineffective in their counter-insurgency operations. 
Although the strategic thinkers knew that the battle was 
primarily for the hearts and minds of the population , the 
troops acted ~n such a way as to make popular support for the 
regime impossible. Peasants were herded into "protected 
villa~es" where the living conditions were poor -- instead ~f 
winning the people over, the government alienated them. 
Furthermore, the cost of military operations was high: before 
the fall of the Caetano regime Portugal was using 40 percent 
of its budget for its African wars . 
Two types of transfer of power characterised African 
revolution~. On the one hand there was the sudden transfer, 
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which was usually the result of the sudden fall of the old 
regime. The Portuguese colonies are a prime example, while 
Algeria shows several elements of this type of transfer as 
well. The outcome of such transfers was traumatic: the whites, 
feeling betrayed, resorted to large-scale violence. Right-wing 
terror groups sprang up in a brief reign of terror. When the 
whites saw that they could not prevent the transfer, there 
occurred what can only be described as a ~ass exodus. 
In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, real give-and-take 
negotiations took place. The position of the whites -- and 
some of their privileges as well -- were guaranteed at the 
Lancaster House conference. Despite their trepidation, 
accommodation was reached. A nurober of whites left the 
country, but the frenzied evacvation which crippled the 
economies of the other countries did not take place. 
In Part Five, the final aspect of African revolutions the 
transformation of society -- was analysed. 
Characteristic of all the revolutions was the attempt to 
create political unity in countries deeply divided by the wars 
of independence. This was attempted through the introduction 
of a new myth (usually embodied in the constitution) which 
stressed egalitarianism. 
New political institutions developed. With the exception of 
Zimbabwe all the countries became single-party states. In 
Angola and Mozambique, the ruling parties were changed from a 
broad front into vanguard parties. However, the revolutionary 
movements did not enjoy the support of the whole population. 
In Angola, a civil war rages fifteen years after independence, 
while in Mozambique Frelimo battles the bano i t movement 
Renamo. Peace negotiations between the two governments and 
their opponents are currently ► aking place. This marks a 
relaxation of revolutionary fervor -- Thermidor, as it is 
called after a similar occurrence in the French Revolution. 
All the revolutions showed, or are now showing, signs of 
Thermidor . The movements are less doctrinaire and more 
pragmatic, with the former vanguard parties agreeing -- in 
theory, at least -- to multi-party systems. 
A further characteristic of the revolutions studied here is 
the difficulties which the movements encountered in their 
attempt to transform the economic order . 
The exodus of whites led to the nationalisation of property 
(as called for in the ideologies of the movements) and the 
establishment of state-owned enterprises. Mozambique and 
Guinea-Bissau depended upon agriculture, while Angoln and 
Algeria derived most of their income from oil . When the price 
of oil fell, their economies -- and the population --
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suffered. Their attempts to redistribute wealth without 
economic growth proved disasterous in most cases, particularly 
in the former Lusophone colonies. 
Tod3y, nearly 37 years after the outbreak of hostilities in 
Algeria, the populations of the African countries which 
experienced revolutions are faced with bleak econ~mic 
prospects, civil war, rampant disease, and g::-ue:.nments which 
cling cynically to power. The "winds of change" are, however, 
blowing again through Africa: this time it is not political 
independence which is the rallying cry, but democratic reforms 
and a move toward free-market economies. Former "one-party 
states" such as Angola, Algeria and Mozambique are opening up 
not only their political orders, but are moving away from 
central planning and nationalisation in the economic sphere. 
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